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AN INTRODUCTION TO TAOIST YOGA

CHUNG-YUAN CHANG

I

IT IS A GENERAL IMPRESSION that Yoga as practiced in China is of Indian origin and was brought in with Buddhism, but when we examine the works of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, we find they contain both the basic philosophy of Yoga and adumbrations of its techniques. Yoga, as the Indian philosophers interpreted it, was a Way of abstract meditation and transcendental wisdom, "these two means being just like two bullocks tied to the yoke of a cart and leading to a destination."[1] Of course this partnership was a commonplace in Taoist thinking many centuries before the introduction of Buddhism from India. Particularly do we find the Yoga emphasis on breathing exercises well suggested in the writings of Taoist founders. An examination of the writings of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu in any detail gives ample credence to this contention. References to the three basic elements of Indian Yoga—abstract meditation, transcendental wisdom, and breathing techniques—are clearly and unmistakably set forth.

If we look, for example, at the thought in Chapter XVI of the *Tao Te Ching*[2] we can see how the theory of Yoga was well developed in China by the time of Lao Tzu.

> Devote yourself to the utmost Void;
> Contemplate earnestly in Quietness.
> All things are together in action,
> But I look into their non-action.
> For things are continuously moving, restless,
> Yet each is proceeding back to its origin.
> Proceeding back to the origin means quietness.
> To be in quietness is to see "Being-for-itself."
> "Being-for-itself" is the all-changing-changeless.

1. S. Radhakrishnan, ed., *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western* (London, 1952), p. 180.

2. The *Tao Te Ching* is most difficult to translate, and, to do it complete justice, the translator should have experienced spiritually the concepts of the author, as well as understanding them intellectually. The writer of this paper, in the preparation of this translation, has tried to convey the meaning through his own experience.

To understand the all-changing-changeless is to be enlightened.
Failure to understand leads to absurdity and disaster.
The all-changing-changeless is all-embracing.
To embrace all is to be selfless.
To be selfless is to be all-pervading.
To be all-pervading is to be transcendent.
To be transcendent is to attain *Tao*.
To have attained *Tao* is to be long-lasting.
When he loses himself among all these the Man of *Tao* does not cease to exist.

In this chapter Lao Tzu looks into the two aspects of things—subjectively into his own Self and objectively into all other things—and he awakens into a new consciousness. One's mind is always in action, but Lao Tzu keeps his mind in the extreme quietude of non-action. In non-action his mind sees its own nature and becomes being-for-itself. This being-for-itself, or Self Nature, is part of the universe. It interfuses with other things, with the nature of the "ten thousand things." Because this interfusion is all-pervading and all-embracing, the subject is included in the object and the object in the subject. Therefore Lao Tzu speaks of the selfless. When one is selfless, in the Taoist sense, he is in the realm of Non-Being or Void.

On the other hand, all objects, all things, are seen first as objects in action, growing and flourishing. But when one looks into their origins, their roots, one sees their non-action. The flow is from movement to quietude. Objects themselves fade into the Non-Being or Void. When subject and object have both entered the realm of Non-Being we have abstract meditation—one of the basic requisites of Yoga. When the individual achieves this point in the practice of Yoga and is conscious of the realm of Non-Being, he has entered the region of transcendental wisdom. "To be transcendent is to attain *Tao*."

We also find references to meditative breathing in the *Tao Te Ching*. In Chapter X we read:

Can you concentrate on your breathing to reach harmony
And become as an innocent babe?
Can you clean the Dark Mirror within yourself
And make it of perfect purity? . . .

Can you enter and leave the realm of Non-Being
And leave nothing to be retained there?

To achieve the Void, Lao Tzu himself recommends breathing exercises. To be sure, none of the details of such exercises are set forth, but that such techniques existed and were familiar to Lao Tzu we can hardly doubt. In the works of Chuang Tzu these ideas are developed in greater detail. Chuang Tzu, for example, describes the "fasting mind" in his Chapter IV. Here also he speaks of concentration, breathing, and the concept of enlightenment in some detail:

> Concentrate on your meditation. Do not listen with your ear but listen with your mind—not with your mind, but with your breath. Let hearing stop with the ear, the mind stop with its pictures. To concentrate on breathing is to prepare the emptiness for receiving things—the *Tao*. It is because *Tao* abides only in emptiness. This emptiness is the fasting mind. . . .
>
> Look at emptiness! In the chamber of emptiness there is produced light. The feeling of gaiety lives in repose. It not only permeates this repose but extends outward even while one is sitting still. Let the eye and the ear turn their communication within but eliminate all consciousness from without. The spirits and gods will dwell in this emptiness, as will the inner man (the Real Self). This is the way of transforming all things. . . .[3]

These notions of concentration and light are further explained in Chapter XXIII: "When one has reached extreme repose one gives forth a heavenly light. One who has developed this heavenly light sees his inner man (Real Self). Only through such cultivation can man reach eternity."

In these two quotations we can make out clearly the three important points of Yoga, i.e., breathing to enforce the process of abstract meditation toward the attainment of "extreme repose," or emptiness; from emptiness, or repose, one comes to enlightenment, sees the Real Self, and is associated and interfused with the universal forces of the gods and the spirits. This is the process of self-transformation leading to a highly integrated personality.

Although Chuang Tzu emphasized the method of breathing (the perfect man breathes "from the heels"), he was opposed to those who used breathing techniques to achieve longevity, without any under-

3. This and subsequent translations from Chuang Tzu are by the author of this paper.

standing of the philosophy underlying the techniques. In an interesting passage he criticizes these men:

> Men who blow and breathe noisily, and inhale and exhale silently, in order to release the old air and obtain new air, who hibernate like bears and stretch their necks like birds—these men are simply striving for longevity. Such scholars indulge in breathing exercises in order to develop their physiques, wishing to live as long as Peng Tzu. They are given over to such practices (Chapter XV).

But breathing exercises were more than this, more than mere hygienic aids. Ideally, they were an aid to attaining spiritual self-recognition, to becoming one with the universe and its natural forces. It was essential to understand the philosophy behind the technique. In the Confucian canon, too, as, for example, in the works of Hsun Tzu (*ca.* 298—*ca.* 238 B.C.), we frequently find a critical attitude toward those scholars who practice breathing exercises merely as an aid to longevity or physical well-being. Mencius (371?-289? B.C.) recognized a relationship between breathing and the personality, although he does not go into any detail, preferring to keep his discourse on a purely philosophical level.

We can look outside purely philosophical and speculative writing for confirmation of the early existence of some concepts of meditative breathing in China. We find, for example, a famous poem by Ch'ü Yuan (d. *ca.* 288 B.C.), entitled "Wandering in the Distance," which suggests a close connection between the concept of *Tao* and breathing exercises as an aid to its attainment. The poem, freely translated, reads:

> Eat six kinds of air and drink pure dew in order to preserve the purity of the soul. Breathe in the essence of the air and breathe the foul air out. The *Tao* can be received but it cannot be taught. The *Tao* is small and without content, and yet it is large without limit. Do not confuse your soul—it will be spontaneous. Concentrate on the breath and *Tao* will remain with you in the middle of the night.[4]

Moreover, when Buddhism was introduced into China, during the third and fourth centuries A.D., most Buddhist philosophers used Chuang Tzu to interpret Buddhism. We have, for example, the Buddhist monk Hui-yüan (334-416). When he attempted to explain the Buddhist theory of reality, he was obliged to resort to the teachings of Chuang Tzu to make his teachings intelligible. The practice of turning

4. From the *Ch'u Tz'u* ("Collection of the Poetry of Ch'u yuan, Sung Yu, and Others"). Author's translation.

to Lao Tzu or Chuang Tzu to interpret Buddha became so widespread that the term *ko yi,* or "method of analogy," became the accepted description of this species of inter-religious influence.

Tao-an (312-385), in his introduction to the *Sutra on Breathing,* used typical "method of analogy" techniques in explaining Indian meditative breathing to the Chinese. Note the great use of Taoist terminology in the following passage:

> The breathing technique known as Anāpāna refers to the inhaling and exhaling the breath. *Tao* and *Tê* rest in all places, there is no place that they are not to be found. Anāpāna is the use of breathing to achieve inward integration. There are four meditation techniques which make use of the functions of the body. Through breathing exercises we pass through the six stages toward integration. Bodily exercises lead through four stages toward concentration. These steps consist of taking away and taking away until we have reached the point of complete non-activity. The stages consist of forgetting and forgetting until we have done away with all desire. By non-activity we come into accord with things. By non-desire comes harmony in our affairs. By being in accord with things we can see into their nature. Through harmony in our affairs we can accomplish our missions. Accomplishing our mission, we make all *that is* consider itself as the *other.* Seeing into the nature of things, we cause the whole world to forget the self. Thus we eliminate the other and we eliminate the self. This is to achieve integration into the One.[5]

This quotation of Tao-an ostensibly describes Buddhist Yoga, but it describes very closely the Taoist concept of the achievement of non-being. It is not merely a matter of borrowed terminology. The goal of Oneness is a mutual goal of the Buddhist yogi and the Taoist meditative breathing practitioner. Methods of achieving the goal, as the Buddhist put it, by "taking away and taking away" and by "forgetting and forgetting" are the classic Taoist roads toward Enlightenment. They are the well-known methods of *wu wei* (non-activity) and *wu yü* (non-desire). It is not merely a coincidence or a matter of convenience that the Buddhists turned to the Taoist classics when they sought to interpret their teachings to the Chinese. These teachings, in no greatly different form, were already familiar to the Taoist.

II

From what we have said above it would seem that Buddhist Yoga and Taoist Yoga were very similar. Indeed, this is true, in the sense

5. *Tripitaka,* LV, 43. Author's translation.

that the goals of both are one and the same. But the similarity does not go all the way. The systems of the two Yogas are quite different in many respects. The Taoist system of meditative breathing was a product of its native ground. We have not merely the works of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, but many other roots. There is, for example, the well-known *I Ching* ("Book of Changes") and the widely prevalent theories of the Five Elements and the Yin-Yang Schools, as well as the works of the Chinese alchemists, numerologists, and diviners. Above all, there were the Chinese cosmological theories and the macrocosmic-microcosmic view of man as the universe contained in the individual.

The fundamental, or in any event the earliest, text of the Taoist Yoga, or meditative breathing school, is the third century *Chou Yi T'san-t'ung-ch'i* ("Synthesis and Agreement with the Chou Changes"), the work of Wei Pê-yang. It is a difficult and complicated work, dealing in the arcane and the alchemical, but it is worthy of study for those who wish to understand the foundations of Chinese Yoga. It deals with all of the theories mentioned above as contributing to the meditative breathing school—from abstruse cosmological speculation to alchemical practices and number-and-word-magic.

First, let us look at the macrocosmic-microcosmic theory which serves as the basis of Chinese Yoga. The classic work on this subject is known as the *Huai-nan-tzu*,[6] dating from the second century B.C. This work discusses the position of man in the universe. We read:

> What is spiritual is received from the Heaven while the body and its material form are derived from the earth. We say: "From the One came the Two. The Two evolved into the Three and the Three into all things. All things hold up *yin* and clasp *yang*." It is the harmony of the spirits of *yin* and *yang* on which all harmony depends. It is said: "At one month the embryo is formed; at two months it has skin; in the third and fourth month tissue and shape evolve; in the fifth muscle; in the sixth bone; in the seventh physical completion; in the eighth movement; in the ninth activity; and in the tenth birth." The body being completed, the internal organs have their form. . . . The senses are the outward, and the internal organs the inward regulators . . . each has its fixed rules. The roundness of the head is like the Heavens; the firmness of the foot is like the earth. . . .
>
> Heaven has four seasons, five elements, nine divisions, three hundred and sixty days. Similarly, man has four limbs, five internal organs, nine orifices, and

6. Ch. VII. Author's translation.

three hundred and sixty joints. Heaven has wind, rain, cold, heat; man, similarly, has joy, anger, taking, giving. . . . Man forms a trinity with Heaven and Earth, and his mind is the master. . . . In the sun there is a bird standing on three legs, and in the moon a toad with three legs. . . .

Thus, man is a microcosmic universe. This idea occurs frequently, indeed constantly, in Taoism, and the meditative breathing school proved no exception in using this concept for its own purposes. Through meditative breathing, man achieved the natural integration with the universe that was destined for him and foreshadowed in so many ways, according to early Taoist theory.

In early Chou times a system of eight trigrams (solid and broken lines) and sixty-four hexagrams, supposedly simulating the cracks in tortoise shell, were developed for use in prophetic rituals. Gradually these trigrams and hexagrams took on complicated symbolic meanings. The nature of these meanings is propounded in the famous *I Ching.* Arbitrary numerical categories were established and assigned fixed symbols. These symbols were picked up and used by the founders of Chinese Yoga. Let us look at a few examples of this categorizing impulse as it is displayed in the *I Ching* and note the parallels in typical Yoga theory.

The four primary trigrams, as set forth in the *I Ching,* are *chen, li, tui,* and *k'an.* These are correlated with the four seasons and the four directions, as well as with arbitrarily derived numbers. The yogi took these categories, for example, and assigned them to the internal organs, such as heart, kidney, liver, and lung. Thereon was built an elaborate relationship with the *I Ching* categories of south, north, east, and west, the four seasons, and other corresponding categories.

FOUR BASIC TRIGRAMS AND THEIR MEANING IN I-CHING.

Trigram	*Direction*	*Season*	*Number*
chen	east	spring	8
li	south	summer	7
tui	west	autumn	9
k'an	north	winter	6

APPLICATION TO THE SYSTEM OF YOGA

Five Elements	*Inner Organs*	*Animal*	*Five Greatnesses*	*Constant Virtue*
wood	liver	blue dragon	great beginning	love
fire	heart (mercury)	red bird	great change	propriety
metal	lung	white tiger	great simplicity	righteousness
water	kidney (lead)	black turtle	great origin	wisdom
earth	spleen		great ultimate	faith

In *Synthesis and Agreement* the four directions also are used to denote four of the elements and four appropriate animals. East is associated with wood; west with metal, north with water, and south with fire. East is the blue dragon or the liver; west, the white tiger or the lung; south, the red bird or the heart; and north is the black turtle or the kidney. From the *I Ching* we learn that the *chen* trigram suggests the idea of movement. From *chen* the circulation through other trigrams, *li, tui,* and *k'an* sets forth. Thus, in its Appendix V, we read:

> All things issue forth in *chen,* which is East. . . . *Li* suggests the brightness where all things come to see each other. This trigram represents the South. . . . *Tui* is the West and Autumn, the season in which all things are moving by their joy. We say, "*Tui* refers to the spirit of joy." . . . *K'an* refers to water. It is the trigram of the north, where all things return to rest and comfort. We say, "Rest and comfort indicate *k'an.*"[7]

Man's breath, according to the Taoist yogi, circulates among the inner organs, even as movement and quietude complete its circulation among the four trigrams, and as the ether of the world circulates among the four seasons and the four directions. The breath is the unifying principle which makes a Oneness of the microcosm of the body. Generally, however, the yogi prefers the category five to that of four. The fifth category represents a unifying principle in the center of the other four. The Taoists correlate the fifth category with the spleen, or earth. This is the storage place of all the energies and source of supply of vital force to all the other organs.

In an apocryphal addition to the *I Ching* known as the *Yi-wei Ch'ien-*

7. Author's translation.

tso-tu ("Apocryphal Treatise on the 'Change' ") commented on by Cheng Hsüan as early as the second century, we find a metaphysical category of four which was later picked up by the Taoist yogi. The relevant passage in the *Yi-wei Ch'ien-tso-tu*[8] reads as follows:

> In olden times the Sages worked upon the principles of *yin* and *yang* to determine the principles of growth and decline and began *ch'ien* and *k'un* to encompass the fundamentals of Heaven and Earth. But that which has form is produced of the formless. Whence came *ch'ien* and *k'un*? In answer we may say that first there was the Great Principle of Change, then the Great Beginning, then the Great Origin, and then the Great Simplicity.

The yogi has, typically, added a fifth (spleen-earth) category. This is the Great Ultimate, the unifying whole.

The Confucian element in Chinese Yoga appears in the adoption of the five constant virtues of love, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and good faith. East is love, west is righteousness, south is propriety, north is wisdom, and the central category is good faith.

The various threads of earlier Chinese theory (the Yin-Yang School, conventional Taoism, the Five Elements School, the *I Ching*, numerological theories, etc.) were first brought together as components of the new Chinese school of meditative breathing in the *Synthesis and Agreement*, the work which we have mentioned above as the basic classic of the school. As to the value of the word-magic involved, we will not attempt to make any comment here, but limit ourselves to descriptive commentary rather than symbolic interpretation. That the symbolism is a rich and complex one, will be obvious, I believe, even from the very simple suggestion of some of its aspects which I have outlined here.

Why, then, since we have spent some time indicating the four (or five) elements which go into the Taoist-Yogi concept of the microcosm of the inner man or Real Self—why, the initiate to Chinese Yoga may ask, do we commonly find merely two internal elements suggested as polar aspects of the internal unity? Symbolic word-play of this sort is, of course, subject to endless variation. This instance is a relatively logical one. The five internal elements combine, by the force of the central, unifying principal, into one. The four outer elements form two pairs which become the polar focuses. East and south combine, and

8. 1, 7-9. Author's translation.

west and north combine. The dragon, that is, goes toward the fire, and the tiger goes to the water. Here we have the two centers: fire, represented by the Trigram *li,* and water, represented by Trigram *k'an.* The former is the symbol of the heart, the latter of the kidney. According to the Taoist Yogi, the unification of *li* and *k'an* or the heart and the kidney is called the "small circulation" of breathing technique. Centered here is one of the important functions of Taoist Yoga. The theory of the "small circulation" breathing, arbitrarily correlated with the various categories of season, element, direction, ethical principles, animals, with their appropriate trigrams, patently displays the influences we have named above of indigenous Chinese speculation—Confucian ethics, Taoist cosmological views, and the lesser magical theories of the alchemical and divinatory practitioners.

For the Taoist yogi, in addition to the "small circulation," there is the idea of the "grand circulation." This grand circulation commences at the tip of the spine and moves upward along the spine to the head, forward and downward through the face and ventral surface back to the tip of the spine. One portion of this movement is, of course, rising, the other falling. The rising movement is known as the *yang* movement, the falling movement is known as the *yin* movement. *Yin* and *yang,* of course, are the basic polar dichotomies of Chinese thinking, representing the pairing of positive and negative, masculine and feminine, ascending and descending, etc. This rising and falling movement is symbolically paralleled with the waxing and waning of the seasons of the year. The influential Yin and Yang School of Chinese thinking and the *I Ching* combine to bring a characteristic contribution to Taoist Yoga.

In the *I Ching* we find an arrangement of twelve hexagrams to represent the circular movement of *yin* and *yang* and, at the same time, to indicate the movement of the seasons. *Yin* is represented in the diagram below by a broken line (– –) and *yang* (——) by a solid line.

Hexagram						
Name	fu	lin	t'ai	ta-chuang	kuai	ch'ien
Month	11th	12th	1st	2nd	3rd	4th

Hexagram						
Name	kou	tun	fou	kuan	po	k'un
Month	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th

In the upper row we see that the influence of *yang,* the unbroken line at the bottom of each hexagram, beginning at *fu,* steadily increases in succeeding symbols until, in the last hexagram *(ch'ien),* it is complete and all the lines are *yang.* At the same time there is a decrease in the influence of *yin,* represented by the broken line.

The second row illustrates exactly the reverse situation. Here we have a decreasing *yang* and an increasing *yin,* until, in the last hexagram, there is only *yin,* represented by the broken line. Scholars of the Yin-Yang School identified the twelve hexagrams with the twelve months of the year, beginning, as shown in the diagram, with *fu* as the eleventh month, when *yang* begins its influence, and ending with *k'un,* the tenth month, when *yin* reaches its point of complete dominance. Here we have a graphic representative of the fluctuating influence of *yin* and *yang* during the course of a year.

This whole symbolic *Gestalt* was taken over by the Taoist yogi, who adapted the increasing and decreasing influence of *yin* and *yang* to their concept of the circulation of the breath around the body. Since *yang* symbolizes a rising movement, the yogi takes the hexagram *fu* as the starting point of the grand circulation at the tip of the spine. The following hexagrams are assigned positions along the spine upward through the various stages to *ch'ien* at the top of the head. Thus does the *yang* influence rise to its peak at the apex of the grand circulation. When the breath descends through the face, chest, and ventral surface back to the tip of the spine the influence of *yin* waxes. Corresponding hexagrams are placed along the downward course, indicating that the *yin* element is increasing. At the last stage, *k'un,* the *yin* element reaches its utmost influence and the circulation returns to its starting point.

For the Chinese yogi this circulation of the "breath" throughout the body is divided into two "courses." The rising circulation, from the tip of the spine to the top of the head (or, more precisely, to the upper lip) is known as the *To Mu,* or Controlled Course. The descending

circulation, from the head (from the lower lip) to the tip of the spine, is known as the *Jen Mu,* or Involuntary Course. These concepts are purely imaginative, of course, but the yogi visualizes it as the supposed path of the circulation of breath. This circulation of the "breath" may be better described as a circulation of a heat current, which is felt by the practitioner. The upward movement is also known as the movement of *yang* and the downward movement as the movement of *yin.* When the practitioner is able to complete this circulation, it means that a complete cycle of *yin* and *yang* has been achieved. This completed cycle is considered the attainment of *Tao.*

We can see from this brief description of the "grand circulation" breathing exercises that they were deeply influenced by the Yin-Yang School and by the ideas in the *I Ching.* In short, we see that the theory of the small circulation and the grand circulation breathing (the basis of Taoist Yoga) can, in large measure, be traced back to the influence of the Taoist and Confucian classics and other native Chinese sources —the work of the numerologists, alchemists, and others.

III

The objective that the yogi holds before himself in his exercises is the complete elimination of thought. Rather, he tries to "get behind" his thoughts, i.e., transcend himself by looking into the storage house of the unconscious, where he sees his Real Self. If one understands the philosophy of Taoism and is "enlightened" to the Real Self there is no need of the system of Yoga. But most people cannot attain enlightenment through sudden revelation, and they need a technique to help them eliminate the floating thoughts which obscure their true vision. The one important technique is that of concentration. According to Taoist Yoga one picks a spot, such as the *Ming Tang,* or the Hall of Light, the spot between the eyes, and bends his concentration upon it to attain the vision of the heavenly light. Concentration upon a particular spot rules out other thoughts, and the mind is opened and the light shines within. However, the concentration-spot need not be the *Ming-Tang.* It may be various other parts of the body (the tip of the nose, the navel, the tip of the spine) or other outside objects. Usually the spot is that between the eyes or, more commonly, just below the navel. The spot below the navel is known as the *Ch'i Hai,* or Sea of





DIAGRAM I (LEFT): FRONT VIEW. The practitioner of Yoga sitting in a characteristic posi-ion. On the abdomen are indicated the positions of the Middle Red Field (new moon and three stars), the Yellow Court (square), and the Lower Red Field (cauldron). The Upper Red Field is located in the head. In the right hand is a Moon, symbolized, as is common in Chinese mythology, by a rabbit. In the left hand is the Sun, symbolized by the three-legged bird mentioned in the *Huai-nan-tzu*. The sun and moon are brought symbolically into a unity within the Yogin. The three rows of Chinese characters beneath the Middle Red Field, the Yellow Court, and the Lower Red Field are a variety of synonomous names for these centers. The Middle Red Field, for example, is also known as Spiritual Gate, Sea of Nature, Stream of the Heart, Heavenly Prince, Jade Mush-room, Red Mercury, etc., some twenty-four synonyms in all for the Middle Red Field alone. The Yellow Court is also known as the Old Grandmother, the Mysterious Gate, the Empty Middle, etc. The Lower Red Field, symbolized by a crucible, or cauldron, for melting and transmuting lead, is also known as the Sea of Breath, Earth Cauldron, Gate of Life, Flower Pool, Genuine Lead, etc. Around the figure are quotations from Taoist texts, recondite and mystical in character. Typically they read: "The House of the Spirit is the Door of Righteousness."

DIAGRAM II (RIGHT): REAR VIEW. This diagram illustrates the important "centers" of the ascending, or Controlled Course, of the grand circulation. These centers are located along the spine. The lowest, at the tip of the spine is *Wei Lu*, the "Gate of the Tail." Another important center, located half-way up the spine and in the region of the kidneys, is *Chia Chi* ("beside the spine"). It is the center for transmitting the upward and downward breath currents. A third center is located in the head, and is known as *Yuan Shen* ("Primordial Spirit"). It is the seat of Nirvana the Upper Red Field in the front view). Alternative names are: Heavenly Valley, The Jade Mountain, and many others. Also indicated on the diagram are the subsidiary centers in the genital region (between *Wei Lu* and *Chia Chi*, and known variously as The Dark First Prince, the Mysterious Prince, etc.) and in the neck (The Jade Pillow Gate, Heavenly Pillar, etc.). Details of these centers and their significance vary from authority to authority.

Breath. *Ch'i Hai* is the most important center and is known as the Regular Red Field. It is the lowest of the three Red Fields supposed to lie within the body. The other two, the Middle Red Field and the Higher Red Field, are in the region of the heart and the center of the brain. The Higher Red Field is located in the middle of the nine sections, or "courts" of the brain, and is known as the Mud Pill Court. Between the Middle Red Field and the Lower Red Field is the *Huang Ting,* or Yellow Court, in the region of the navel. This is the source of life (the umbilicus). "Mercury" from the heart above and "lead" from the *Ch'i Hai* below combine here to create the elixir of life. *Huang Ting* is the storage house of this elixir.

There are numerous dorsal centers in addition to the internal centers mentioned above. Three are the most important. They are *Wei-lu,* the tip of the spine, the beginning of the Controlled Course which sends the heat current upward and the end of the Involuntary Course by which the heat current descends to its beginning. The point behind the kidney on either side of the spine are the centers called the *Chia Chi* ("beside the spine"). In the neck is a third center known as the House of Wind *(Fêng fu).* This is the last gate through which the upward heat current passes moving to the Higher Red Field. The accompanying diagrams[9] indicate the centers, seen from the front and the back.

A brief comparison of Taoist Yoga "centers" with those characteristically used in Tantric Yoga may be of interest to those more familiar with the Indian system. Edward Conze[10] points out that there are four main internal centers in Indian Tantric Yoga practice: in the region of the navel, in the heart, in the neck, and in the head. The corresponding centers in Chinese Yoga are easily discernible in the accompanying diagrams. Sir John Woodroffe, in his *The Serpent Power,*[11] identifies six centers: "Inside the Meru, or spinal column, are the six main centres of Tattvik operations . . . Muladhara, Svadhishthana, Manipura, Anahata, Vishuddha, and Ajna." The first is the tip of the

9. The two pictorial diagrams reproduced here are from the *Hsing Ming Ch'ih Kuei* ("Meaning of Nature and Destiny") mentioned later in the text. These pictures from the original work were published in a later edition (1669), in the Princeton University Library.

10. *Buddhism: Its Essence and Development* (New York, 1951), p. 198.

11. Published under the pseudonym Arthur Avalon (London, 1919).

spine, the second is the genital region, the third the navel, the fourth the heart, the fifth in the throat, and the sixth between the eyes. All, indeed, have obvious Taoist Yoga counterparts easily definable in the accompanying diagrams. The question arises which influenced which? Conze points out that Tantric Yoga was not organized until the fifth or sixth century.[12] It is most interesting that the *Synthesis and Agreement,* published in the third century and the basis of Chinese Yoga, nowhere mentions Indian practices. Even the *Wu Chen P'ien* ("Enlightenment of Truth"), published about 1095, has references to what we know as Indian Yoga, but only in the slightest and most allusive fashion. Later works indicate a familiarity on the part of the authors with Indian practices. The excellent but little known *Hsing Ming Ch'ih Kuei* ("Meaning of Nature and Destiny"), by an unknown author,[13] published in the sixteenth century, shows a complete knowledge of Indian Yoga and has a picture of Lao Tzu, Confucius, and Buddha sitting together in meditation—with Buddha in the central position. Much evidence suggests that Chinese Yoga developed along a highly independent course in the early centuries of its existence, as well as having independent roots in Chinese culture. Possibly Tibetan texts unavailable to the author or further light from Indian sources can better clarify this point.

A rather more detailed word on breathing techniques is probably necessary for a rounded understanding of Chinese Yoga. Taoist meditative theory emphasizes light, rhythmic breathing—so light that "a feather will not stir before the breath." This is known as *t'ai hsi* breathing, or "breathing of the embryo." When one inhales, the air is sent to the bottom of the lungs, even lower, as if to breathe with the abdomen. The Lower Red Field beneath the navel, the "Sea of Breath," is supplied with this air. When one exhales, the diaphragm rises and the abdomen pulls in. This is the contrary of ordinary "chest" breathing. In practice, breaths are counted for training purposes, but as the technique is perfected this is dropped. One feels that one is not breathing at all.

12. Conze, *op. cit.,* p. 176.

13. The pictures reproduced by Richard Wilhelm, in *The Secret of the Golden Flower* (London, 1947), pp. 29, 41, 51, 63, were taken from this work. The "Inner Process" chart, published by Erwin Rousselle, "Seelische Führung im Lebenden Taoism," *Eranos Jahrbuch 1933* (Zürich, 1934), Tafel 1, p. 150, is taken from a Taoist temple picture, and deviates in a number of important points from the classical texts.

By this concept breath can circulate anywhere throughout the body —typically in the great circulation through the spine to the top of the head and down the front. Actually air, of course, cannot go through bone and flesh. It is, rather, a heat current, moving upward and downward. Even the idea of the "heat current" is not a very convincing one to the Western reader, but the writer was told on good scientific authority that concentration upon the blood vessels can make a measurable difference in the temperature of the spot. The Chinese yogin can send a heat current in a circular pattern around the navel which stimulates the practitioner in a short period into a trancelike state.

The writer has tried to present information on the Taoist system of Yoga. It is to be hoped that the phenomenon will be scientifically investigated some day on a truly objective basis which will enable the indifferent or the unsympathetic to form unbiased judgments of the theory and its practice.

IV

A concrete example of the practice of Chinese Yoga may serve as a fitting conclusion.

There is an interesting and authentic story[14] of a student who actually achieved Enlightenment through an interesting discipline under his master. In the Ming Dynasty (about the sixteenth century) there was a student who sought Enlightenment. One day he passed by a cave on a mountain top and saw a Taoist Master practicing meditation. He went up to him and made a bow, but the Master ignored his politeness. The student realized immediately that the Master must have achieved the highest stage. Immediately he sat down opposite him and practiced meditation. After a time the Master got up to make some tea. When the tea was ready the Master took a cup for himself and then put the cup back and resumed his meditation. The visitor came up, took a cup of tea and returned the cup the same as the Master had. Neither of them uttered a single word. In the evening the Master got up and prepared his dinner. When it was ready he took a bowl and ate. The visitor came forward and took a bowl and ate with him. After dinner they both sat back again. In the middle of the night the Master got up

14. Quoted from Cheng Chung-yin in his "Random Notes" section of the periodical, *Chio Hsün* ("Message of Enlightenment"), Shanghai, VIII (August, 1954), 10.

and took a stroll around the mountain pass. His guest did the same thing, both of them returning to their original places. The next day was very much the same. They meditated together, shared their simple meals in silence. After seven days the Master spoke, saying: "Sir, where do you come from?" The man replied, "The South." The next question was, "What makes you come here?" The man said, "To see you." "My face is just like this," the Master said. "There is nothing particular there." "I have already recognized that well," the man replied. The Master explained that during his stay of thirty years in his cave he had never met such a congenial companion. The man stayed with him and learned from him. One night as the disciple walked along the mountain path he felt a sudden lightning circulating within him. There was a roar of thunder in the top of his head. The mountain, the mountain stream, the world, and his very self all vanished. This experience lasted "for about the time it would take for five inches of incense to burn." After that he felt that he was an entirely different man and that he was purified by his own light. The student was told that even this light must be put aside. His Master, indeed, had experienced it frequently over the course of thirty years and had learned to pay no attention to it.

This story exemplifies the path through meditative breathing toward the final achievement, the Enlightenment. The quiescence of the student and the master symbolizes the need for meditation and clearing the mind of all thought. Those who look inward may suddenly even forget that they are looking. This is when the body and the heart are completely freed and all entanglements disappear. Greetings from guests are ignored, distinctions of name disappear, the face of the master disappears, even the purpose of meditation itself is forgotten. When one has advanced this far one's heart is empty, the essence of one's nature is manifest, and the light of consciousness transforms itself into the light of essence.

Taoist Yoga[15] is a product of Chinese culture. If we wish to evaluate

15. The word Yoga is not generally used by the modern Chinese, who refer, rather, to "quiet sitting" or meditative breathing. The term, however, was early introduced into Chinese, through Buddhist texts, such as Yogācāryabhūmi-śāstra, the work of Asaṅga (fourth century A.D.) in India and translated by Hsüan-tsang (596-664), in the transliterated form as *yü chia*. This expression is not now in wide use. In this paper the author has used the word Yoga as being most generally familiar to Western readers.

it in a socio-cultural context we must know something of its origins. Philosophically we must look back to Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu. But Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu were philosophers in a true sense and not magic theorists. They suggested the possibility of Yoga-like practices as an aid to attaining spiritual enlightenment, but they did not attempt to elaborate techniques or build up fanciful symbolisms. This work was chiefly the product of far lesser minds, who gave themselves over unthinkingly to the pursuit of vain and non-spiritual ends. That they accomplished something in the field of spiritual experience seems undeniable to the author, but it must be admitted that much of their work was the mere product of "medieval" alchemical hopes. It was an attempt at "scientific" explanation of phenomena without adequate scientific basis for judging, and it inevitably flew off into the excesses that are apt to be the chief pitfall of abstract speculation.

As to the value of Yoga practices, the author is personally convinced, not, however, in any proselytizing sense. The point of Yoga is the attainment of *Tao*. The value of Yoga is entirely as a means to an end; if *Tao* can be attained by other means, all well and good. Yoga can be put aside as an unnecessary aid. If it helps the individual in his effort to understand himself and see somewhat more clearly his relationship to the universe around him, then it serves the end of any spiritual exercise—self-realization.

FAITH AND REASON IN KIERKEGAARD AND MODERN EXISTENTIALISM*

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THE CENTENARY OF KIERKEGAARD'S DEATH affords an opportunity to reappraise the religious philosophizing of the nineteenth century Dane from Copenhagen. It cannot be denied that his influence within the complex development of western thought has steadily increased in the last thirty years. Quite apart from any desire on his part to gain disciples, he is now acclaimed the father or (at least) the uncle[1] of the popular and variegated philosophy known as existentialism.

But sons, even favorite sons, have a way of turning prodigal. The existential "sons" of this confirmed bachelor are no exception. And it would be intriguing, though beyond the scope of this paper, to trace the ways in which these intellectual offspring have departed from the fold and exhibit a multiplicity of western-"worldly" influences. Paul Tillich's excellent article, "Existential Philosophy,"[2] shows that this would take us back to Boehme and would include such contemporaries of Kierkegaard as Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Marx, and such successors as the "Life Philosophers": Nietzsche, Dilthey, and Bergson.

But the line of descent can be traced. In this matter that is before us of the relationship between faith and reason, the image of progenitor Kierkegaard is discernible. On this particular occasion it would seem not inappropriate to turn our gaze upon the founding father, though we shall cast a glance here and there at a favorite son. We think that they will be pleased that the intellectual portrait of their father is brought to the fore, so that he may throw light upon *their* problem of relating faith and reason, if not upon the solution of the problem itself.

* Paper read at the Conference on Existentialism held at Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois, October 28, 1955.

1. Walter Lowrie, *Kierkegaard* (New York, 1938), p. 7. Cf. his "Translators and Interpreters of SK," *Theology Today*, Oct. '55, XII, 3, pp. 312-27.

2. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, V (1944), 44-70. Cf. Werner Brock, *Contemporary German Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1935).

I

This question of properly relating reason with revelation and with belief and faith is, of course, by no means new to the history of Christian thought, nor is Kierkegaard's basic approach. Tertullian's trend toward irrationalism, of believing, for example, that the Son of God died just because it is absurd,[3] anticipates the attitude of Kierkegaard. But never before was this approach spelled out with such repeated emphasis as in the Dane's two important philosophical works, *Philosophical Fragments* (1844)[4] and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1846).[5]

One hesitates to pass these works under critical review, since the author warns that this turns them into abstract, doctrinizing treatises. But this difficulty can be overcome in part by letting him speak to us in his own words. The danger also can be prevented by keeping before our minds the problem which Kierkegaard set for himself, namely, How can *I* become a Christian? Actually, this simple query involved Kierkegaard in a complex of issues—in a discussion of subjectivity versus objectivity—to which we must shortly devote attention.

Another way in which we can do justice to Kierkegaard is by noting the foe which he faced: Hegelian rationalism. Swenson speaks of the *Fragments* as "an ironical parody of the Hegelian philosophy of religion."[6] It gives us Kierkegaard's view of how *not* to try to become a Christian. Hegel sought to reconcile reason and religion by giving to both philosophy and theology the same content: God as the absolute mind. His pantheistic God was constantly coming into existence in terms of the process of historical development. Kierkegaard was quite justified in being repelled by this *system* as he calls it, this rational world process which is so far from the biblical God. But, as we shall show, he reacted to the extreme position where he could see no interrelationship between faith and reason in the realm of Christian truth.

Kierkegaard rejected the "system," not only because of its misrepresentation of the Christian God, but also as not being true to life. "One thing always escaped Hegel—what it is to live," he said in *The Journals*.[7] The Dane agreed with Schelling, whose lectures he heard in

3. *On the Resurrection of the Flesh*, ch. 3.
4. D. F. Swenson, tr. (Princeton, 1936), hereafter referred to as F.
5. D. F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, trs. (Princeton, 1941), hereafter referred to as P.
6. *Something About Kierkegaard* (Minneapolis, 1945), p. 63.
7. A selection, ed. by Dru (Oxford, 1938), par. 610.

Berlin in 1841, that one could have a system of ideas but not of existence (P, 112). There might be a synthesis of thought, but life is always a dialectic of choices. He agrees with Feuerbach that passion is the mark of true existence. As all existentialists would insist, the dialectic for human existence demands decisions between qualitatively distinct courses of action, such as the aesthetic, the moral, and the religious, which Kierkegaard depicts in full contrast in his *Either-Or* (1843) and *Stages on Life's Way* (1845).

In static thought there can be *both-and,* in life only *either-or.*[8] Tillich sums it up when he says that all the philosophers of existence share a common foe, "the 'rational' system of thought and life developed by western industrial society and its philosophic representatives."[9] Our study will indicate the extreme to which Kierkegaard pushed this critique of logic.

A second foe which Kierkegaard came increasingly to oppose in his short forty-two years of life was the state Lutheran Church. He saw it as dead ritualism void of personal passion. He opposed the practice of infant baptism which automatically christianized the populace. And he rejected the leadership of the theologian, Grundtvig, because of his emphasis upon the Church as the objective source and norm of Christianity. This did not mean that Kierkegaard accepted the Bible as an objective norm, nor that he had a pietistic faith in an objectively conceived Redeemer.[10] Rather, for him "truth is spirit, it is an inward transformation, a realization of inwardness; it is not an immediate and extremely free-and-easy relationship between an immediate consciousness and a sum of propositions" (P, 37).

To quote Tillich again, "all the groups that appeared after 1830 had to face a common problem, the problem created by the breakdown of the religious tradition under the impact of enlightenment, social revolution, and bourgeois liberalism."[11] It was the formalism of the state churches and theological liberalism which left a void. Existential philosophy has stepped in to try to find meaning in the struggle and estrangement of life. I trust that it is plain that these are factors which we must note if we are to grasp the significance of the extremes of

8. *Ibid.,* p. 119.
9. *Op. cit.,* p. 66.
10. Cf. Lowrie, *op. cit.,* p. 109.
11. *Ibid.,* p. 66.

Kierkegaard's thought and its place in the development of the current existentialism.

II

We turn now to Kierkegaard's conception of paradox and truth within which he develops his idea of belief and faith. Here we are called upon to adopt the viewpoint of the "existential thinker," to use the phrase proposed in the *Postscript*. The existential thinker is one who thinks with interest and passion, one who takes the "subjective" approach to existence.

In the *Fragments* he writes, "The paradox is the source of the thinker's passion, and the thinker without a paradox is like a lover without feeling. . . . The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that thought cannot think" (F, 29). Above all else, Kierkegaard says, the mind collides with the Unknown, which is God. He out-Kants Kant by saying, "If God does not exist it would, of course, be impossible to prove it; and if he does exist it would be folly to attempt it" (F, 31). Indeed it would be foolish to try to prove that which the author says is by definition unknown. But the argument is applied to all reality. One cannot demonstrate that a stone exists, one must reason *from* existence and show that some existing thing (presumably experienced in "subjective inwardness" as existing) is indeed a stone. Or, to take another of his illustrations, we can say that the existence of Napoleon would explain Napoleon's deeds, but the deeds do not "prove" *his* existence, since someone else may have performed the same acts. Now there is a definite element of truth here. If Kierkegaard's use of the word "proof" is understood in the strict sense of deductive demonstration, then we know that this is not the way to proceed with questions concerning the existence of God, Napoleon, or a stone.

But is there no inductive approach to such questions? We shall indicate that Kierkegaard's account of what he calls an "approximation-process" of scientific inquiry (P, 25) is quite an unsatisfactory presentation of inductive confirmation theory. At this point it is sufficient to note that he errs in making the choice of belief in God's existence or Napoleon's existence appear irrational, as if there were no objective reasons why we make one choice rather than another. This is the central weakness in Kierkegaard's approach to the problem of faith and

reason. It is a weakness that an existentialist like Niebuhr, in contrast to Barth, would want to correct in terms of his "biblical realism," which appeals, when choices are to be made, to the data of science, history, and philosophy interpreted within the matrix of dialectical neo-orthodoxy.[12] Kierkegaard failed to see that one could have supporting or confirmatory evidences for choices without robbing choice of its volitional character and without ruling out the factor of personal decision. He leaves his readers on the end of a diving board out over the deep ocean. He says, "Leap! Leap, and do it with passionate faith."

To seek objective validity, he says, in the *Postscript,* is to make yourself as a thinker accidental and your existence and the truth impersonal (P, 173). But subjective reflection, he insists, is inwardness.

> Inwardness in an existing subject culminates in passion; corresponding to passion in the subject the truth becomes a paradox; and the fact that the truth becomes a paradox is rooted precisely in its having a relationship to an existing subject. . . . *When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not focused upon the relationship, however, but upon the question of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related. If only the object to which he is related is the truth, the subject is accounted to be in the truth. When the question of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individual's relationship; if only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be related to what is not true.* (P, 177-78).

What, then, is truth? *"An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth,* the highest truth attainable for an *existing* individual" (P, 182). And this is faith. Paul Tillich comments on this definition by declaring that "such a view seems to exclude any objective validity, and can hardly be considered the basis for an existential philosophy."[13] It means a leap into the dark if nothing objective is given. This is the logical, if not the actual outcome of Kierkegaard's position. Tillich feels that he falls down on the spot from which he attempts to leap, namely, on a type of pietistic-individualistic Lutheranism. So, too, we may say, Sartre and Heidegger, Jaspers and Marcel, Barth and Brunner, and Nie-

12. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (New York, 1953).

13. *Op. cit.,* p. 54.

buhr and Tillich, fall down after the leap of faith upon the quite different traditions in which they live.

Evidently the need to make responsible personal decisions does not imply that everyone will decide alike. Philosopher Dorothy Emmet puts this problem well. She agrees that faith and personal decisions are important in situations requiring moral choices which are new or difficult.

> But I think the existentialists tend to make the achievement of freedom through decision into an end in itself, so that it tends to become something rather abstract. Thus they sometimes use language which suggests that it does not much matter what you choose, so long as you have the courage to choose and not to rat on it. But a decision is only a responsible decision when it is the outcome of an honest struggle to perceive and know what things we ought to do.[14]

With this I agree. We must *know as well as appropriate for ourselves* moral principles and objective Christian truths if we are to grow morally and spiritually.

But by contrast, Kierkegaard's approach seems to make a virtue of "sticking one's neck out." In the *Postscript* he says:

> Without risk there is no faith, and the greater the risk the greater the faith; the more objective security the less inwardness (for inwardness is precisely subjectivity), and the less objective security the more profound the possible inwardness. When the paradox is paradoxical in itself, it repels the individual by virtue of its absurdity, and the corresponding passion of inwardness is faith (P, 188).

Note that Kierkegaard is not satisfied here to call belief in God an objective uncertainty, a matter of Socratic ignorance. It is an *absurdity* held fast in the passion of inwardness, i.e., by faith, a "grave strenuosity of faith."

In the earlier *Fragments* we read:

> When faith resolves to believe it runs the risk of committing itself to error, but it nevertheless believes. There is no other road to faith; if one wishes to escape risk, it is as if one wanted to know with certainty that he can swim before going into the water (F, 68 n.).

Belief, then, is not a rational conclusion but a resolution of the will which *excludes doubt* (F, 69). But surely if there is the risk of error and even of drowning, then there is still doubt, or at least room for

14. *Christian News-Letter* (London), Supplement for October 1, 1947.

doubt. It may well be the case that a given individual may will to run the risk, to push doubt aside. It seems to the writer that the only sense in which Kierkegaard can say that "belief *excludes* doubt" is in the sense of *refusing or resolving not to believe* that there is any doubt or possibility of error. It is not at all clear at the end of the long *Postscript* how the Dane can proceed to use the understanding both to exclude the possibility of believing nonsense and to insure that one "believes against the understanding" (P, 504).

III

We must briefly note, next, why it is that Kierkegaard came to look on Christian faith as an absurdity and a paradox, and what role, if any, reason plays in introducing others to this faith.

For Kierkegaard, "Christianity is the paradox."[15] D. C. Macintosh quotes Theodor Haecker as saying, in his work, *Sören Kierkegaard,* that Christian faith is "not only above reason, but contrary to reason, not only in certain cases but always *contrary to reason.*" Macintosh comments that "he came close to regarding this 'contrary to reason' as the only criterion of the truly Christian."[16]

Why does he present Christianity in this fashion? We have already spoken of the negative reason, namely, the reaction which he shares with all existentialists—and with evangelical Christians, for that matter—against philosophical rationalism and religious formalism. We have seen how he reacted against this to develop a dialectical psychology of immediate personal experience which Heidegger and Tillich have brought over into modern existentialism and conjoined with their new ontologies, non-religious, and religious respectively.

Part of the positive reason for Kierkegaard's view of faith as paradox is to be seen in his answer to the problem of the *Fragments:* How can an eternal happiness be based upon historical knowledge? This problem is put into the Christian context in the *Postscript to the Fragments,* where the author asks, How can God become historical in Christ? Kierkegaard sums up his attitude toward history when he says:

> In historical knowledge, the subject learns a great deal about the world, but nothing about himself. He moves constantly in a sphere of approximate-knowl-

15. *Journals, op. cit.,* 282. Cf. F, 49; P, 95, etc.
16. *The Problem of Religious Knowledge* (New York, 1940), p. 328.

edge, in his supposed positivity deluding himself with the semblance of certainty; but certainty can be had only in the infinite, where he cannot as an existing subject remain, but only repeatedly arrive. Nothing historical can become infinitely certain for me except the fact of my own existence . . . and this is not something historical (P, 75).

It turns out, then, that historical knowledge is one form of objectivity, and "the greatest attainable certainty with respect to anything historical is merely an *approximation* and an approximation, when viewed as a basis for an eternal happiness, is wholly inadequate" (P, 25). Yet Christianity, even in Kierkegaard's theology, must speak of God in relationship to time. So, he concludes, "the paradoxical character of Christianity consists in its constant use of time and the historical in relation to the eternal" (P, 88).

He repudiates the evidential value of any contemporaneous witness to the life, death, or resurrection (which he rarely mentions) of Christ. He is satisfied with the "leap" here, a leap which reason is indisposed to make and yet which we must make if we are to be true to our passionate existence (P, 92). It is the acceptance of the absurd which is, he says, "that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth, precisely like any other individual human being, quite indistinguishable from other individuals" (P, 188). "This is a breach with all thinking" (P, 513). This is a leap of faith and not of knowledge, for "no knowledge can have for its object the absurdity that the eternal is the historical" (F, 50).

We do not have space at this writing to examine all the issues raised by this existential view of history. We shall simply comment on the concept of faith that is evidenced here. In our concluding remarks we shall refer back to the problem of historical methodology.

For Kierkegaard the divinity of Jesus Christ (the eternal becoming historical) is a *paradox* to be accepted by inward faith. Presumably he wants also to say that he has faith in God. The latter he speaks of as a *risk* to be accepted by faith. Evidently to be a faithful Jew, one has only to take the risk. But to be a faithful Christian one both runs a risk (believing *God* becomes man) and accepts the paradox (believing God becomes *man*). Faith as a risk always involves epistemological uncertainty (P, 182). Faith as a paradox always entails subjective response (P, 192). Kierkegaard has not himself clarified the relationship be-

tween these two types of faith, the epistemological and the psychological. Two difficulties are apparent: (1) To the extent that Kierkegaard has pushed a risk which is based upon the uncertainty of Christian truth, he has tended in the direction of irrationalism; (2) To the extent that he has pushed a subjective and individualistic decision, he has tended both to shy from the quest for objective Christian truth and has given us an anti-social type of Christianity.

Tillich may be cited as an example of a modern existentialist who has tried to do something about the first difficulty. For him faith remains a risk because it always involves contingent elements. But above this he puts an ontology centering in God, "the Unconditioned," who has the certainty of "self-evidence" because he is known with "immediate awareness." According to Tillich, one can be "ultimately concerned" about the Unconditioned as it gets embodied concretely as myth and symbol, as ritual and sacrament, in mystic formulas and actions, in "prophetical-political demands for social justice," in devotion to scientific truth, and in a Stoical attitude toward existence. Tillich concludes that

> In all these cases the risk of faith is an existential risk, a risk in which the meaning and fulfillment of our lives is at stake, and not a theoretical judgment which may be refuted earlier or later. . . . The risk of faith is not arbitrariness; it is unity of fate and decision. And it is based on a foundation which is not risk: the awareness of the unconditional element in ourselves and our world. Only on this basis is faith justified and possible.[17]

The orthodox Christian can readily detect here what Tillich himself would call a critical reinterpretation for our time of an Augustinian ontology. He makes a valiant effort to overcome the arbitrary character of Kierkegaard's faith as risk while, at the same time, avoiding the traditional Protestant appeal to the Bible as objective authority from God.

For variety's sake we may mention Brunner as an example of a current existentialist who has sought to overcome the anti-social quality of Kierkegaard's concept of faith.[18] Paul Jewett has traced the person-

17. "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," *Union Quarterly Review,* 1 (1946), 13. For details of Tillich's view, see *Systematic Theology,* 1 (Chicago, 1951). For Niebuhr's opposition to truth as an absolute absurdity, see *Human Destiny,* p. 38 n.

18. I have already mentioned Niebuhr's "Christian Realism." Tillich has his "religious socialism" and his concept of a "theonomous culture."

alistic influence of Ebner and Buber on the more recent writings of this theologian.[19] Brunner's neo-personalism concerns the implications of the relationship between God and man for man's social relationships. With Kierkegaard, he would say that one must take the step of faith "all alone," but, adds Brunner, this is a step into a "fellowship-Christianity," "into the fellowship of the Church."[20] It seems to me that Brunner's emphasis on man as a social being should have brought him to a new and non-Kierkegaardian understanding of socially objective truth, including Christian truth, which could be experimentally confirmed or disconfirmed through individual and social experience. But instead, he has introduced a new paradox into faith by making it impossible for man to think of persons. He can only encounter persons.

Brunner has also continued Kierkegaard's contention that, since faith is subjective decision, it can only be communicated to others *indirectly*. As the Dane said, "Christianity is not a doctrine but an existence-communication" (P, 506). It is irreligious to suppose that one can communicate in this field directly (P, 69).[21] There can only be personal inward appropriation. The practical problem of how to write books under this severe limitation on social communication Kierkegaard sought to handle by "double reflection" (P, 223). That is, Kierkegaard tried to determine what his words meant to him inwardly and what they might come to mean to a reader. Hence the bulk of what he writes tells the reader what Kierkegaard does *not* believe or mean. Positive declarations are at a minimum. Thus we see that, according to the father of existentialism and most of his "sons," reason can play a role in introducing others to faith only when it is dilectically construed.

IV

At the beginning of our paper we stated our topic as the problem of faith and reason in the light of Kierkegaard and modern existentialism. What we have said so far should certainly indicate that *they* have a problem. We have indicated that recent existentialists are conscious

19. *Emil Brunner's Concept of Revelation* (London, 1954), pp. 67-70, 102, 161, 174.
20. *Op. cit.*, p. 70, n. 27.
21. Lowrie confesses, in his *A Short Life of Kierkegaard* (Princeton, 1942), p. 208, that the Kierkegaard he loves is the one who began to write directly after his Easter experience of 1848.

of the problem and that some of them have sought to throw some light upon the meanings of faith and reason and upon possible relationships between them. Since, individually and collectively, they have left us with much hazy darkness, it behooves us to conclude this study by making some positive suggestions. When we have concluded, it will be apparent that both for the existentialist and the non-existentialist there is much unfinished business here.

1. We may begin by asserting that existentialism is not existential enough. It fails at many points to do justice to the complex nature of man and his individual and social experience. Passion and volition are not presented in due proportion to and in interdependence with man's other potentialities or functions. With Kierkegaard and many of his successors, the rational side of man is minimized and even outlawed in the sphere of Christian truth. Reason is allowed a role in science but not in the realm of faith. Thus the Kantian dualism between facts and values, between science and ethics and religion, between a pure and a practical reason is perpetuated. On this theory the Christian is left with a kind of religious knowledge that bears no relation to objective facts or objective truth but is at the service of man's subjective religious needs.

This anti-intellectualism must be rejected, but its rejection entails neither rationalism nor positivism in a Christian, realistic, and functional view of human experience. Such a view of experience must also join the pragmatists in rejecting the spectator theory of knowledge. In many places in the *Fragments* and the *Postcript* Kierkegaard reveals a misunderstanding of the nature of scientific reasoning or critical thinking as involving a *spectator* type of detachment. He asserts that its truths are *abstracted* from reality, experience, and existence. This means, then, that a central part of Kierkegaard's problem is an epistemological one. It is apparent in his discussions of the *epistemological* breach between God and man, which he seeks to resolve in terms of truth conceived as inwardness alone (P, 178, 68 n.). And even "the observer of nature," he says, "does *not* have a result *immediately* set before him, but must by himself be at pains to find it, and thereby the direct relationship is broken" (P, 218). Here he completely misses the point that the observer-who-is-at-pains-to-find-it *may get results*, and that he may proceed to *appropriate* them in various ways. Accord-

ing to the historic Christian view, if these "results" are in the religious domain, they can be inwardly appropriated where there is an active personal concern and an inner working of God's Spirit, collectively known as the "grace of God."

Karl Heim is an example of a current existenialist who shows a genuine interest in science and yet whose philosophy is plagued with these same epistemological and psychological difficulties. According to Heim, "a proposition or a truth is said to be *existential* when I cannot apprehend it or assent to it from the standpoint of a mere spectator, but only on the ground of my total existence."[22] This definition may be interpreted in two ways. First, it may be an affirmation that *not all* truth is susceptible to the type of analysis and investigation employed ideally in the empirical sciences, where the technician is not unduly influenced by personal desires and commitments in arriving at decisions. There are truths—sociological, theological—in which one's own understanding of and involvement in existence may be not only unavoidable but desirable. Except for the Logical Positivists, I believe that, in one way or another, these two approaches to truth—"detached" and "existential"—are recognized. This aspect of existentialism is not peculiar to this philosophy. But, on a second interpretation of Heim's definition, one stresses the words "mere" and "only." By a rational and scientific approach to experience we become "mere" spectators, whereas the "only" way to get *real* or *ultimate* truth is through a non-rational (if not irrational) participation in existence. One cannot decide whether one likes this or not until he is told by the existentialist what it means to "participate in" or to be "grasped by" reality. This is not easy to determine, since by definition it is beyond rational expression.

Surely there is no logically necessary reason why the critical use of our rational powers need succumb to these perversions. Indeed, we may thank existentialism for giving us a warning not to let this be so. Those of us who wish to emphasize the controlling function of the rational in man's experiencing need not think that knowledge is only a matter of control, certainly not technological control. But the basic laws of logic must (or ought to) be in control, potentially, if not consciously, in all experience—emotional as well as the more directly cognitive. We may agree with Tillich, who is anxious as a philosopher

22. *God Transcendent* (New York, 1936), p. 75, note 1.

to overcome Kierkegaard's irrationalism, that "reason is the structure of the mind which enables the mind to grasp and to transform reality."[23] Knowledge by participation, emphasized by the existentialists, is one factor, and an indispensable one in the area of Christian faith, in the total picture of man's individual and social existence.

2. It follows that there is no logically necessary reason why Christianity must be construed as irrational.[24] We may agree with Augustine that an intelligent *and* empirical faith in God, Christ, and the Bible is possible. We may assert that Christian faith is a conviction concerning God, the world, ourselves, and our fellows which is based upon specific knowledge of one God and His Son Christ. As a conviction it potentially affects and guides every aspect of man's existence. As a conviction it may be grounded upon evidences possessing confirmatory value. Christian faith may demand rather than reject evidences which are actively sought after by the best empirical and intellectual methods available to man today. Such a faith is a gift of God, dependent upon the work of God's Spirit, and yet it is not a belief apart from evidence, certainly not contrary to evidence. It is, as B. B. Warfield once said, a "conviction passing into confidence."[25]

Roger Hazelton has summed up the complex interrelationship between faith and reason when he says, "Faith precedes understanding; faith needs understanding; faith pursues understanding; and faith achieves understanding."[26]

Surely this general point of view is to be preferred as a guide, though we shall always have to recognize that we are finite creatures and that there will be many areas of our experience where we must confess to the non-rational. But the non-rational does not imply the irrational—certainly not, if the God of the Bible is in control of His creation and hence is very much related to the "natural" world.

L. H. DeWolf has convincingly argued against *consistent* irrational-

23. *Systematic Theology, op. cit.,* p. 72. John Dillenberger, *God Hidden and Revealed* (Philadelphia, 1953), p. 181: reason deals with the "structure of the world and man as the arena in which revelation occurs." Barth, by contrast, defines reason as "faithless reason," *Church Dogmatics,* 1 (Edinburgh, 1936), pp. 30-33.

24. I have discussed this question and the role of the scientific method in "The Methodology of Christian Evidences," *Calvin Forum,* May, June-July, and August-Sept., 1954.

25. *Studies in Theology* (Oxford, 1932), p. 15.

26. *Renewing the Mind, An Essay in Christian Philosophy* (New York, 1949), p. 73.

ism as self-destructive in his critique of Kierkegaard, *The Religious Revolt Against Reason.*[27] He agrees with the point we have made that the use of the epistemological paradox threatens the very possibility of social communication. He shows that the religious existentialists must employ reason if they are to give concrete meaning to their conceptions of God, indeed, even to show that God is the Wholly Other. He is right, also, when he says reason is needed to distinguish between true and false revelations, to commend one's faith to others, to fight idolatry, to construct an adequate Christian social philosophy, and—we may add—a sound systematic theology. But DeWolf also warns the philosopher that "if he be a true lover of rational wisdom, he will be bound to observe the necessity of thorough-going personal commitment."[28]

3. I would like to conclude by emphasizing one area of unfinished business. If we are not to take an irrational view of Christian faith, and if we are to evaluate adequately the confirmatory or disconfirmatory evidences, then we must give renewed attention to the logical method of confirmation theory. This is a live problem in current philosophical analysis which we cannot afford to ignore, if we agree with the Apostle Peter that we should be prepared to give "a reason for the hope" that is within us. It would require another paper to present this subject with some adequacy and to indicate its appropriateness in such fields as history and theology.

We have seen that Kierkegaard offered us no positive historiography, or at least, a very confused one—involving, for example, his difficulty with the idea of a contemporary witness to an event or person. One reason for this was his failure to understand the nature of confirmatory evidences. His tendency was to speak disparagingly of the inductive-objective method as a "mere approximation-process."

Kierkegaard affirms that if something has an immediate existence and is immediately apprehended, then it can be known without error. But even then, all we can know is that it "merely is" (F, 69; cf. P, 32, 228). We do not know, for example, that it is an effect of a cause. Suppose we grant that we do not know this by immediate cognition, does it follow then that we only know the particular cause-effect relationship

27. (New York, 1940), ch. 4.
28. *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

by faith, by an act of the will, as Kierkegaard maintains? Is this not a judgment of the mind (or a belief which is not of the will apart from the mind) which may be inferred from reasonable evidences? Surely intuition and inwardness are not adequate here when used apart from a rational and inductive confirmation theory. Likewise, with the question as to whether someone (e.g., Christ) or some thing has been in existence. We may agree with Kierkegaard that the particular historical processes and continuities are not immediatealy known by the senses, yet there are valuable inductive historiographical procedures for reaching conclusions.

Modern existentialists like Jaspers, Brunner, Niebuhr, and Tillich are aware of some of the problems here, though it is doubtful if any of them offer us an approach to historical knowledge and the complex meanings of history which is satisfactory. As for Kierkegaard, the progenitor, if he is simply trying to tell his readers that the belief in the historicity of an event is *something more* than an immediate perception in the case of a contemporary witness, or *something more* than the accessible testimony of a successor, he has not adequately analyzed what that "something more" entails for the believer in Christ who also has some interest in the theory and practice of history.

One hundred years after Kierkegaard's death we may say that these are *his* problems of faith and reason. To a considerable extent, they are also problems for modern existentialism.

Essays on the History of Religions. By RAFFAELE PETTAZZONI. Translated by H. J. ROSE. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954. vii, 225 pp.

L'omniscienza di Dio. By RAFFAELE PETTAZZONI. Turin: Einaudi, 1955. 688 pp. 65 figures. 4,500 L.

An English translation of the nineteen essays of Professor Pettazzoni are welcome, since most of them were written in Italian and thus less accessible to the general reader, and a few in French. They show the author's breadth of interests, his scholarship, circumspectness, and sound judgment. Certain of them treat of important questions of principles. In the first essay he proposes his view of monotheism, namely, that it arises only as a protest against polytheism preached by a prophet. This will seem revolutionary to many, perhaps; personally, I think he is right as regards true monotheism. In the second essay he points to the fact, overlooked by some, that the truth of the myth is the truth of belief, and not truth in the ordinary sense of the word; on the other hand, he emphasizes the existential function of myth. The last essay advances the opinion that history of religion and phenomenology are two phases of research that ought to co-operate.

In other essays he treats of special problems, all of which cannot be mentioned here because of limited space. The student of the sycretism of Late Antiquity will be interested in the three essays on the cult of the god Time, which looms large in this age, in which the author seems to support an Egyptian origin. Other essays discussed the Thracian religion of West Slavic paganism, the *deus regnator omnium* of the Suebi, whom he rightly considers to be a reflection of Tacitus (*Germania,* 9), and he gives an ingenious explanation of the gods represented on the so-called planetary vases, equating the enigmatic three-headed god with the Sun God. Two essays present a survey of his earlier great work on the confession of sins.

Very important is a second new work by Pettazzoni, on the omniscience of God. There is an English translation by Professor Rose, published by Methuen & Company. It is said to be abridged, but I do not know how much, since I have not seen it. The book is, in fact, a continuation of another, published more than thirty years ago, *Dio, formazione e sviluppo del monoteismo nella storia delle religioni* (1922). Only the first volume, with the title, *L'essere celeste nelle credenze dei*

popoli primitivi, has appeared. During the many years which have elapsed, the author has been continually occupied with the problem of the High God, and has published some preliminary papers. In this work he has selected the omniscience of God as the most important aspect. His method is an example of the union of historical research and phenomenology which he asked for in one of the essays.

The bulk of the book consists of a survey of all religions (except Christianity, of course) in regard to the problem posed. It is not possible to review these chapters here, but they will be of great interest to specialists in various fields. Some of the problems treated in the essays recur here. The general standpoint of the renowned author in this controversial subject is of great importance. In the Introduction he lays down the fundamental principles of his work. He distinguishes two kinds of omniscience: first, magical, possessed by deities, shamans, seers, etc.; second, visual, belonging to the heavenly bodies—sun, moon, and stars—who see everything. They may be personified, or regarded as the eyes of a celestial deity. Omniscience is not an attribute of all gods, but it is sometimes extended to those who do not possess it by their own nature. As an atmospheric phenomenon, the wind belongs to the celestial region and has relations with the celestial deity; thus he too is omniscient. On the other hand, the dumb and dark earth and the underworld are not omniscient. Sometimes it is added that the deity hears everything. Because of its visual origin, omniscience is relative; its objective is particular, man and his actions, but it is sometimes extended to his words and thoughts. The author summarizes thus (p. 39): The *subject* of omniscience is not divinity in general, but a special category of deities; the *object* is not all that can be known, but man and his activities. Finally, the contrast between the omniscient deity and the Creator is expounded. The latter is a *deus otiosus;* the former, dynamic. He dispenses punishment of transgressions by meteoric means—lightning, storms, rains, etc.

The last chapter contains a summary of the results (pp. 626 ff.). The notion of a High God is not an abstract monotheistic idea, but a historical formation of various aspects, according to the cultural milieu. Among agricultural peoples the Earth, Terra Mater, appears as a High God. She is a creator, but not omniscient. The celestial High God belongs to peoples who are not real agriculturists, nomads, e.g., the primitive Indo-Europeans and the Semites. The culture of the nomads

springs from the culture of hunting tribes. The culture of the Pygmies is not original, but among them and many African tribes there appears a Lord of the Wild Things, a Lord of the Animals, traces of whom are found also among widely dispersed peoples. He pertains to hunters and food collectors. Among those who are a little more advanced, the Celestial God also appears. There is a certain connection, for the issue of the hunt depends on the weather. Finally, the author returns to a subject which he has treated in several preceding chapters, figures with two or more heads, which represent a being who sees and hears all.

To conclude, I translate the italicized words of the author (pp. 648 f.):

> The idea of a High God is not an absolute a priori. It springs forth from the conditions of human existence, and as these vary in different phases and forms in primitive cultures, so varies also with them the form of the High God. He who, in the archetypal projection, is the Creator who guarantees once for all the stability and duration of the world, provides in everyday life for everything necessary for human existence. Just as Terra Mater is the High God of primitive agricultural societies because man's sustenance comes from the earth, and just as the Celestial God is the High God among nomads because the rain makes the grass, necessary for the herds and thereby for human existence, spring forth and grow, so in the culture of hunting peoples the Lord of Animals is the High God, because the catching of animals and the luck of the hunt, which is of vital importance to man, depends on him.

Professor Pettazzoni's book is the most important contribution to the discussion of the High God problem. Objections will certainly be raised from certain quarters, but his learned and clear exposition should be read and considered closely by everyone interested in this cardinal problem.

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The Myth of the Eternal Return. By MIRCEA ELIADE. (Bollingen Series, XLVI.) New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. xi, 195 pp. $2.75.

Images et symboles: essais sur le symbolisme magico-religieux. By MIRCEA ELIADE. Paris: Librairie Gallimard, NRF, 1952. 238 pp. 590 fr.

It is a pity that the work of Mircea Eliade is not better known in this country, for Eliade has important things to say in the domain of religious history and psychology, and he is one of those rare scholars who

can place technical scholarship in wide perspective and who can use erudition and specialization to illumine rather than obscure.

In *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (admirably translated from the French by Willard R. Trask), Eliade's thesis is that ancient man envisaged events not as constituting a linear, progressive *history,* but simply as so many creative repetitions of primordial archetypes. Moreover, he says, the conception that all events were mere reproductions of what had originally transpired *in illo tempore* had its counterpart in the view that all important places were but replicas of what existed *in illo loco.* Territories, cities and temples, for example, were regarded alike in Iranian as in Semitic thought as mere replicas of celestial, "otherworld" models. Settlement of a new area was formally inaugurated by rites reproducing the creation of earth from chaos. Domestic and public rituals were validated as reproductions of primeval precedents, as when the Jewish sabbath was said to reproduce the repose of God after fashioning the world, or when, in Vedic times, bride and groom were assimilated, in the marriage service, to earth and heaven. Coronation, too, was, according to Eliade, merely a terrestrial reproduction of the manner in which an archetypal god had once assumed sovereignty over the world.

The same basic concept, it is claimed, also governed the attitude of ancient man towards notable characters of history. These were not remembered for their actual deeds or in their actual settings, but acquired significance only as avatars of an ideal archetype. An historical champion, so to speak, lived in popular consciousness not for his historical triumphs, but simply because he became a St. George who fought the Dragon.

New Year rituals, Eliade contends, afford an excellent illustration of his thesis, for they almost always assume the form of a repetition of creation. The parade example is, of course, the *akîtu* of the Babylonians, at which the story of creation was formally recited and possibly even enacted. Something very similar seems also to have obtained among the Hittites, and, following the well-known theory of Mowinckel, Eliade would even find traces of it among the Hebrews. In the same vein, he reminds us, among the Tatars of Persia, New Year is marked by the creative rite of planting seeds in a jar of earth, and elsewhere by the kindling of new "generative" fires.

Eliade suggests—and this is at once the most striking and the most

original portion of his work—that for ancient man it was only by this concept of cyclic existence that the events and circumstances of life were made tolerable. For it is, indeed, only against the background of an over-all pattern or scheme that calamity and suffering become intelligible, and when that pattern is envisaged as a constant repetition of the process of creation, man can always draw solace from the thought that the dark periods may be simply those of a chaos to be succeeded inevitably by cosmos. This, he adds, is precisely what we find in the familiar concept of eschatological "renewal"—the *Urzeit-Endzeit* equation, the notion of the "Great Year," the assurance of "a new heaven and a new earth."

The Hebrew prophets, we are told, challenged this conception with the alternative view that historical events constituted a systematic unfolding of the Divine will in temporal sequence. At first, Christian writers followed suit. Gradually, however, the older view began to reassert itself. Christ, it was argued, had died once for all—as an archetypal fact. All subsequent events were governed by that "primordial" fact, and all was moving towards an eventual renewal or redemption. Moreover, he concludes, it is not only Christianity that is now finding the key to existence in this ancient formulation. Marxism too, for all its insistence on the purely material basis of events, nevertheless combines with this "realistic" approach a philosophy of meliorism which harks back ultimately to the concept that a primordial state of economic grace will be restored, or brought out—in terms of the cosmogonic myth—from the welter of chaos.

The foregoing summary will suffice to show the rich suggestiveness of Eliade's thinking. Nevertheless, some disquieting objections almost immediately present themselves.

In the first place, one wonders whether what Eliade sees as an *archetype* is not really a mere counterpart of the actual on the plane of the ideal, and, consequently, whether what he regards as reproduction is not really mere parallelism. The renewal of creation at each New Year, for example, is not simply a repetition of archetypal creation, because such archetypal creation did not itself exist at any particular point in time. It is something that exists duratively, "in eternity," and it is given punctual realization in time by the periodic New Year ceremonies. Similarly, when cities have their counterparts in heaven, they do not merely *reproduce* them; what they do is to *actualize* them in this world of men.

And so, too, when historic characters live in popular consciousness in an unhistorical, mythic fashion (e.g., as a mere "St. George"), it is not that they reproduce an archetype, but that they materialize an ideal. In short, what seems to be involved is the relationship between punctual and durative, real and ideal, rather than between archetype and replica.

In the sphere of eschatology, what this concept produces is not, as Eliade supposes, a belief in reversion to the archetype but, rather, a conviction that man can and will escape the woes of his present situation by absorbing himself more consciously in the ideal than in the real. Eliade himself has come very near to seeing this in the most beautiful sentence of the entire book (p. 129): "For him who shares in the eternal *nunc* of the reign of God, history ceases. . . ." It is, therefore, this "eternal *nunc*" that Eliade misprises as an "archetype." It is not, as he constantly describes it, *illud tempus,* in the sense of primordial antiquity; rather might it be described as "the larger *nunc*" in which all events and moments are immerged.

Secondly, Eliade's thesis seems to be somewhat weakened by his failure to perceive that the relation of the "archetypal" to the "actual" —or, as I should prefer to call it, of the ideal to the real—is a two-way relationship. It is not always a question of the actual's being a repetition of the archetype; equally possible is a translation of the ideal into terms of the real. Thus, while it is true that historic heroes tend to survive as mythological figures, it is equally true that broad mythological figures are not infrequently historicized in order to give them intelligible dimension. A parade example may be found in the way in which the mythological Ritual Antagonist of the primitive Seasonal Combat gets transmogrified, in the English Mummers' Play, into "Turkish Knight" or even "Napoleon Bonaparte."

To be sure, one can cavil about details. The Semitic material, for instance, seems to be quoted mainly at second hand, and the late Alfred Jeremias is scarcely a reliable guide in matters of ancient Mesopotamian cosmology. Exodus 25:9, 40 does not say that God showed Moses the plan of a celestial sanctuary, but only that on Mount Sinai he showed him the blueprint of the earthly one. Judges 21:19 does not necessarily or explicitly refer to the Feast of Tabernacles, as Eliade states (p. 61). The Mishnaic treatise Yomâ is barely recognizable as "the *Yomâ*" *tout court* (p. 55). The Talmudic statement (p. 63) that "God hath three keys, of rain, of birth, of raising of the dead," does not bear the implica-

tion which is placed on it; it is simply a play on the three senses of the word "open" (whence the Hebrew noun, "key") in the Old Testament. The Sumerian term for New Year is Zagmuk, not Zakmuk. The Jewish month is Nisan, not Nišan. The Babylonian word for "open, begin" is *šurru,* not *šurri.* And so on. These, however, are petty errors which can easily be corrected. They do not detract from the merit of a luminous, profound, and extremely stimulating work, for even if one disagrees with Eliade's particular formulation, his perception is of enormous value. This is, indeed, an essay which everyone interested in the history of religion and in the mentality of ancient man will have to read. It is difficult to speak too highly of it.

Images et symboles is a slighter performance. It is an attempt to illustrate the basic nature of ancient symbolic thinking by examples such as the notion of the Center, figurative expressions for time and eternity, and the like. Much of the material has already been treated by the author in his *Traité de l'Historie des Religions* (Paris 1949), and some of it has been utilised also in the argument of *The Myth of the Eternal Return.* Nevertheless, this collection of essays may be very warmly recommended, not only for its own interest, but also because it will serve to acquaint readers with another side of its author's scholarly activity—namely, his marked ability in handling particular themes as well as general over-all concepts. This is a work which would well merit translation.

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Spirit and Nature: Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. xvi, 492 pp. $5.00.

This volume starts another gigantic scheme of the Bollingen Foundation, greatly enhancing the value of its project No. XX, "The Collected Works of C. G. Jung," which is planned to run into eighteen or more volumes, of which four volumes have thus far been published. Project XXX, gathering chosen articles from the *Eranos Yearbooks,* is planned to run into eight to ten volumes, not to speak, of course, of the future volumes of *Eranos.* For all those students who are deriving stimulation

from C. G. Jung in the field of comparative religion, symbolism, mythology, aesthetics, and related realms, this new project will doubtless prove to be a mine of information. One of the particular attractions of these volumes lies in the fact that, being symposia, they depersonalize the approach to this whole study field as far as language and expression are concerned; the personality of C. G. Jung hovers above the entire enterprise in a rather more "archetypal" way, to use his own expression.

Few students in our time are unaware of Eranos, this powerhouse of psychological anthropology, this laboratory of spiritual development, which may aptly be compared to the workshops of the alchemists in times past. The great theologian Rudolf Otto, of Marburg, originally suggested the name "Eranos," to this yearly congress for a free and constructive exchange of studies and visions. The meetings were started more than twenty years ago by a far-sighted and energetic woman, Frau Olga Froebe-Kapteyn, in Ascona, Switzerland, in her lovely garden-residence by the shore of Lago Maggiore, and has developed through the years into a kind of western ashram, of which, to stay in the picture, Frau Froebe may be considered the guarding Mother. This reviewer, who witnessed the growth of Eranos during the first years of its existence, can well testify to the validity of the words of Joseph Campbell, chief editor of the entire series: "These meetings stand as living witness to the inevitability of a profound harmony among men where good will and intelligence prevail." Frau Froebe-Kapteyn rightly stresses, in her preface to this first volume, that the Eranos enterprise depends upon its essential flowing character, which implies the absence of dogmatism or rigidity of form. She also notices that the primary value of all these meetings is evocative, and that they have come to play a part in the *Geistesgeschichte* of our times.

The thirteen articles of this first volume present extremely well-chosen examples of Eranos discussions and aim, all of them, at the central subject, "Spirit and Nature." The first and last of the articles are by Jung himself, properly so, since his fathering personality gives the frame to all the other documents. The rest of the articles deal with a variety of subjects, and are written from many different viewpoints. There are two main groups of essays: those presented by scholars of the Christian and Oriental religious traditions, and those by scientists, predominantly biologists of a greater than usual world perspective.

In his all-important initial article, Jung shows himself in the true

style of Eranos presentations, more outspoken and powerful than in many of his more formal books. One provocative statement is chasing the other. Investigating the long winding history of the word "Spirit," Jung finds that

> a transcendent spirit superimposed itself upon the original, natural life-spirit and even swung over to the opposite position, as though the latter were merely naturalistic. The transcendent spirit became the supranatural and transmundane cosmic principle of order and as such was given the name of "God," or at least it became an attribute of the One Substance (as in Spinoza) or one Person in the Godhead (as in Christianity).

In this context, Jung runs into the problem of matter and arrives at the following bold statements: "It is not easy to see why our hypothetical 'matter' which looks quite different from what it did even thirty years ago, alone should be real, and spirit not. Spirit and matter may well be forms of one and the same transcendental being."

Does man have spirit? If he thinks so, it is only a misconception based on a dangerous ego-inflation.

> So much, indeed, does it pervade his whole being that he is in gravest danger of thinking that he actually created the spirit and that he "has" it. In reality it has him, and what is more, it possesses him in exactly the same way that the physical world appears to be the willing object of his designs (pp. 8 f.).

This does not exactly present us with an easy optimistic view of our future:

> The grand plan on which the unconscious life of the psyche is constructed is so inaccessible to our understanding that we can never know what evil may not be necessary in order to provide good by enantiodromia, and what good may very possibly lead to evil. Sometimes the *probate spiritus* recommended by John cannot, with the best will in the world, be anything other than a cautious and patient waiting to see how things will finally turn out (p. 11).

It is puzzling to notice that John has crept into this sentence when the original German text of the *Eranos Yearbook* (1945), rightly mentioned Paul in this place.

In the conclusion to this article, Jung mentions that "the integration of the spirit means nothing less than its daemonization, since the superhuman spiritual agencies that were formerly tied up in nature are introjected into human nature, thus endowing it with a power which extends the bounds of the personality *ad infinitum*, in the most perilous

way." Jung closes by calling unconsciousness man's worst sin. To exorcise him may be the most vital task of civilization.

Project XXX one might expect to become a truly immortal work, if the series is continued, as it undoubtedly will be, in the same spirit and with the same care that has become the trademark of all Bollingen publications. The volume is beautifully bound, and may in itself be considered a work of publishing art excellency, worthy of this whole venture.

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Ormazd et Ahriman: L'aventure dualiste dans l'antiquité. By J. DUCHESNE-GUILLEMIN. Paris Presses Universitaires de France, 1953. 153 pp. 300 fr.

This is a book on Zoroastrianism, and even though its title suggests that it is on Hormuzd and Ahriman, the work is not limited to a discussion of these two important entities of Zoroastrian theology or just the problem of dualism. The perspective of the author is historical rather than theological—there is, for example, no discussion of the Zoroastrian creed. However, taken as a historical survey of the intellectual, mythic, spiritual, and practical aspects of Zoroastrianism, this book—deceptively small in size—is a very interesting and remarkably complete account. The inclusion of a discussion of the relations between Iranian conceptions on the one hand, with Judaism, Greek thought, and Gnosticism on the other, will be of interest to many.

The introductory chapter deals with the time, place, and personality of the prophet, Zarathushtra. The rest of the nine chapters, seriatim, deal with the following topics: Ahura-Mazda, the monotheistic tendency; Angra-mainyu and dualism; rites and myths of the cosmic drama; after Zarathushtra—the Avestan religion; Iranian similarities in Judaism; Greek thought and Iran; asceticism, Gnosticism and the myth of Man; Zervanism; and finally National Mazdaism—its advent, fall, and survival.

In the first chapter—the introduction—the author raises the question of interpreting Zoroastrianism as a monotheism or a dualism. Of course, the religion of Zarathushtra was not a metaphysical theory; it was not an attempt to solve the problem of the one and the many; and one must

distinguish, as the author well points out, the Zoroastrian conception from the conception, say, of Parmenides. The cosmology of Zarathushtra is an attempt to comprehend the world in moral terms, it accounts for disorder and unhappiness, its motive force lies in the prophet's conception of a moral and social reform rather than a theoretical vision. The shift of emphasis from the theoretical to the practical which the author suggests, is a very salutary one. Historically, it is very difficult to discover the balance between the monotheistic and dualistic beliefs of the early Zoroastrians; there were certainly tendencies in both direction. Future evidence which may help us in the resolution of this problem would most reliably come from early Iranian sources. The author mentions Herodotus, who was unquestionably a good observer, but whether we can rely on his understanding of a foreign theology is a moot point. In the Gathas we have a reference to the two spirits—twins eternally coexistent, but we also find references to Ahura-Mazda as the supreme lord, and also to the ultimate destruction of evil. Perhaps, there is a difference between historical and theological *time,* and what may be historically equal and coexistent may not be theologically so. The author traces the roots of this conflict through history and myth, particularly of the early Indo-Iranian practices, myths, and lore.

In the second chapter he indicates the emergence of the concept of Ahura-Mazda from the early (and Vedic) Mitra-Varuna dieties and appropriately brings out the notion of Ahura-Mazda as the giver of Order or Law. He discusses the question of whether the Achemenians were believers in Ahura-Mazda and the religion of Zarathushtra and inclines to a negative view. One wishes this discussion were fuller and more detailed, because of its historical implications and also because the view is not outside the realm of controversy. The chapter on Ahriman squarely faces the problem of dualism—whether this dualism is limited or ultimate. The lucid formulation of this often confused problem leads to the recognition of the moral concept of free choice, repeatedly stressed by Zarathushtra. This perspective introduced by the author, pointing to the feeling of reform and practical urgency in the prophet's mission is very illuminating and close to the spirit of the prophet's teachings.

The much discussed questions of the time and place of Zarathushtra are given brief but clear treatment. Here, the author's views are along traditional lines. In a book such as this there would not have been any

point in going into a detailed scholarly discussion of these issues. This reviewer feels, nonetheless, that some indication of the linguistic nature of the Gathas being evidence against the traditional dating of Zarathushtra in the sixth or fifth century B.C. might have been mentioned with advantage. There is also a brief, simple, yet highly adequate statement of the personality of the prophet.

The treatment of rites and myths, in Chapter IV, is, in that compass, one of the very best that can be found. We are given a simple classification of the rituals—the blood sacrifice, the intoxicant, and the fire. There follows a discussion of their origins, and an analysis of the clear rejection of the first two and the transformation of the third by Zarathushtra. The creation and eschatological myths have also been presented in their historical Indo-Iranian context and the context of the social and moral reformation introduced by Zarathushtra.

The remaining chapters are mainly concerned with historical influences. The chapter on Zervanism is very thought provoking and scholarly. This is the doctrine of Infinite Time imbued with theological implications and having some clear parallels with the Cronos conceptions. And, though in some periods of Zoroastrian history, Zervanic elements did find their way into the liturgy, one is not sure that there has not been among scholars a tendency to exaggerate its influence on fundamental Zoroastrian thought.

The concluding chapter, on the late history of the religion, is very interesting and clear, integrating many relevant but forgotten points and carrying the account right up to the present in the Parsees—the descendants of the Iranian Zoroastrians living in India today. One sees the continuity of some of the old problems (and also misunderstandings) in the contemporary theological controversy between Wilson and the Parsee theologians.

This is a most welcome book on a subject not too accessible to many in a clear and reliable form. The scholarly books are too filled with polemical material, and most of the earlier ones distorted one way or another. This book is clear and deep, coming from a scholarly and balanced author. It is to be hoped that it may be translated into English and become available to the large English-reading, intellectual, and educated public.

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Die Religionsquellen der baltischen Völker und die Ergebnisse der bisherigen Forschungen. By HARALDS BIEZAIS. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1954. (Reprinted from the magazine *ARV 1953.*) 66 pp.

The present study is a survey of the sources of information about the pagan religion of the Balts (Prussians, Lithuanians, Letts) prior to their Christianization. The author rejects as unsatisfactory the research done in this field before 1920 because it was mainly carried out by non-Balts. "Not until native investigators stepped in, did the true phase of the research in religion begin" (p. 120), and the results of these new studies are said to have remained unknown to Western scholars because they were written in Lettish or Lithuanian. The only new contribution of these native researchers was the introduction of modern folklore as a source of information. There is an attitude among some European "scholars" which considers it a national disgrace if no traces of the original pagan religion can be found; therefore, they do their best to remedy the situation. The present study is a good example of this attitude. From the point of view of scholarship, it is a step back into the time of Romanticism, that is, the period around 1800. Even at that time, however, there were some sober scholars who objected to this method. Thus, the Lithuanian, Simonas Stanevičius, recognized only the old historians and chroniclers as sources for Lithuanian mythology, as can be seen in the monograph, *Simonas Stanevičius* (p. 263) by Jurgis Lebedys (Vilnius, 1955). In 1829, the same Stanevičius stated in the preface to his edition of Lithuanian folksongs (*Daynas Żemaycziu,* republished in Vilnius in 1954), thus refuting claims made then by folklore enthusiasts: "None of the songs found today originated before the last Swedish-Polish wars of the beginning of the 18th century."

Studies in Germanic mythology are quoted only when they suit the new attitude. This is well exemplified on page 98, where Biezais cites (with apparent approval) the statement made by H. Lullies in 1904: "What would we know about German mythology, if we were to limit ourselves merely to Tacitus and Caesar?" The same Lullies is quoted on page 94 as advocating the method of generalizing for all Baltic tribes such reports which actually refer only to a single tribe or region, "just as Jacob Grimm did with Scandinavian mythology for German mythology." If the students of Germanic mythology have had good reasons for discarding the earlier views, these earlier views certainly

have lost their conclusiveness for corresponding Baltic studies. Concerning the present situation in Germanic mythology, cf. Jan de Vries, "Die Bedeutung der Volkskunde für mythologische und religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen," *Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift,* XX (1932), 27-39, and Ernst A. Philippson, "Die Volkskunde als Hilfswissenschaft der germanischen Religionsgeschichte," *Germanic Review,* XIII (1938), 237-51.

The one part of the present study which this reviewer considers valuable is the bibliography (pp. 121-28). However, the above-mentioned Lithuanian, Simonas Stanevičius, is not listed there. An important study, written in English by a Lithuanian, namely, the Rev. W. C. Jaskievicz, and published in *Studi Baltici* IX (Florence /not Bologna!/ 1952), is listed in the supplementary part of the bibliography as No. 202, but with no indication as to its contents. Actually it deals with Jan Lasicki's *De Diis Samagitarum,* discussed by Biezais (pp. 76 f.).

This reviewer considers the author not sufficiently qualified for the task undertaken, because of his nationalistic temperament, and because of unsatisfactory scholarly preparation in the field of the subject matter. Moreover, the author is unfamiliar with the methods that must be used in historical research; the very advocacy of modern folklore as a source of information proves this. He is altogether on strange ground when he speaks of the relations with Primitive Indo-European. On the one hand, he scolds the West European scholars for not recognizing "many interrelations" between the Baltic religions and the Primitive Indo-European religion (as if we really knew what this was), while, on the other hand, he claims that the linguistic relationship of Baltic and Primitive Indo-European has already been known for more than fifty years (p. 86). Actually this has been a matter of textbook knowledge for almost 150 years. His ignorance in matters of Indo-European philology is shown by his statement (p. 119) that Lettish *Debestēvs,* "Heavenly Father (translation of German *Himmelsvater,* certainly a Christian expression), is identical with Sanskrit *Djeus pita,* Greek *Zeus pater,* and Latin *Jupiter.* Ignorance of Baltic philology is demonstrated by the assertion that J. Endzelin's publication of 1943 (Riga, Latvia) is "the first more or less complete" Old Prussian grammar and dictionary. A long list of similar mistakes could be drawn up.

More important from the standpoint of history of religion are the

following facts: superstition is identified with religion; Slavic influence on the Letts is not mentioned at all. A. Brückner's studies are rejected (p. 94 f.) because of the "predominance of the Pan-Slavic standpoint." Actually, a strong Slavic influence lasting for many centuries is an indisputable historical fact. According to the author (p. 86), the Christianization of the Baltic people does not begin until the end of the twelfth century. Apparently, he knows nothing of the first Russian-Orthodox mission among the Letts and the Lithuanians, which must have been successful, judging from the indelible linguistic imprints it left. This belies also the claim (p. 86) that the Christianization of the Baltic people remained without effect for many centuries. Statements as to the existence of pagan practices among the Lithuanians must be considered as impatient exclamations of religious zealots. They were also part of Polish political propaganda which described as pagan anything not Roman Catholic, consequently also the Russian Orthodox Church. The Reformation is said to have found no echo in Lithuania. The very fact that a Counter-Reformation was necessary would disprove this claim. Moreover, the first fifty years of Lithuanian literature are exclusively Protestant. Even today, Prussian Lithuania (the Memelland) is completely Protestant (Lutheran), while there still are remainders of Calvinism in Lithuania Major.

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Meditation and Piety in the Far East. By Karl Ludvig Reichelt. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. 171 pp. $3.00.

If I remember correctly, it was about twenty years ago that the late Dr. Karl L. Reichelt visited me at my Kyoto house and we had a pleasant afternoon talking about his views of Buddhism, especially Zen Buddhism, from his point of view as a Christian missionary in China. Shortly before this visit I read his book on *Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism,* which interested me because he was not at all antagonistic, as most Christian missionaries in the Far East are, to the religions of the country where they are stationed. In fact, Reichelt showed me a symbol made up with the cross coming out of the lotus. This according to him represents his idea of Buddhism in relation to Christianity. Of course, as a Christian missionary he did not mean that Chris-

tianity could be grafted on to Buddhism or that two forms of religious experience could be amalgamated as one syncretistically. The symbol simply indicated his tolerant attitude towards Buddhism and his full appreciation of what Buddhism stands for. His Ching-feng Shan ("Mountain of the Clear Wind") near Nānking must have been organized in accordance with this spirit of his.

The present book, *Meditation and Piety in the Far East,* breathes the same spirit which permeated his preceding work. The spirit of understanding and tolerance has been steadily growing among the missionaries, but their fundamental attitude towards followers of other religious beliefs still retains something of the superiority complex which they cherish. As long as this feeling persists there cannot be any mutual approach between religions of East and West. The author of this book is a remarkable exception to the general rule. Of course, being a Christian missionary, he cannot help referring to a "special revelation" as distinguished from "general revelation." But we must not forget that every devout spirit whose religious experience goes really down to the depths of his being feels that he is the only individual favored with it or, to use Christian terms, one who has been especially favored with divine grace. As with the individual, so it is with the religion to which he belongs, for now he will cherish it as "the revealed religion" or "an esoteric communication." This is, indeed, what stirs up the missionary spirit, but at the same time it has its weaknesses. We are all ego-centered, selfishly or unselfishly.

It is noteworthy that Reichelt opens the book with a short remark about what he calls "the religious 'breaking through.' " This topic is not generally taken up by Christian writers, especially by missionaries. The "breaking through" is no other than the experience of enlightenment. Reichelt wants, however, to distinguish it from the Christian experience of conversion or new birth, which, according to him, when it is really thorough, reaches down to "the depths of conscience." Here the use of the word "conscience" is significant. Christianity is always conscious of sin, and therefore when its devotees have a new experience, they refer it to their "original sin" which they feel now is washed clean by the blood of Christ. With Buddhists or Taoists or Confucians it is altogether different. They have no sense of sin as it is interpreted by Christians, nor have they anybody's "blood" with which to wash it away.

Therefore, their "breaking-through" goes even beyond the limits of conscience. The idea of conscience, in fact, is rooted in the idea of power from which issue such ideas as command, punishment, forgiveness, etc., and this power is, in Judaism as well as in Christianity, concretely represented as a personal God, who is lord, king, lawgiver, and judge, that is, the one who can pardon or forgive sinners. "Conscience" is something which grows in the hearts of "sinners" constantly trembling under the sway of Power.

Strictly speaking, Christianity, as is held by the orthodox, cannot have any "points of contact" with the non-Christian religions, and naturally Reichelt found it difficult to make them come to his way of believing—which is perhaps the fate of every Christian missionary in the countries outside his own. In fact, any religion, after it has reached the highest stage of development along its own line of thought and feeling, finds all kinds of obstacles in translating itself into the language or symbolism of another religion. But as long as a missionary is a missionary, he has to try to discover some points of contact with the religious experiences of the people among whom he is working. And I am sure if he is really broad-minded and deep-thinking, he will surely find the roots everywhere from which "special revelation" as well as "general revelation" sprouts. All religions, however primitive, have something reflecting the deeper nature of the human mind, which forms a common basis with the higher ones.

I sometimes feel that, in these modern days of free and independent thinking, missionalization is a kind of intellectual and moral intrusion systematically carried out. Communist propagandism is ostentatiously political, and when it is too aggressive, it turns out to be obnoxious. In a similar way, religious encroachments of an aggressive nature are to be avoided. Exchange of information on religious experience is desirable, as in other cases of mutually beneficial enterprise, but to try to persuade others by every possible means to embrace the religious belief one particular individual happens to cherish is, to a certain extent, interfering with human rights or freedom.

The second part of *Meditation and Piety* deals with meditation as practiced by the three religions of China: Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. Meditation is perhaps one of the most prominent features characterizing Oriental spiritual culture as distinguished from Western cul-

ture. In Christianity, for instance, the devotees are encouraged to practice praying to an external agent who is endowed with power to answer prayer. Their minds are generally oriented outwardly. When they turn inward, they are to deepen the sense of sin or guilt, and thus they come to think and talk more about conscience. Meditation, however, has an altogether different function with Orientals, for it is meant to realize (*ti-teh* or *teh-liang*) Tao in themselves. They aspire to be a True Man *(chen-jen),* one who has Tao within themselves. Tao in the Oriental mind is never left alone, it always comes in connection with the man. Tao is not generally defined by itself, its characterization comes along with Tao-man, and his virtues are highly exalted, which primarily belong to Tao.

In this respect, Reichelt's hesitation to give Tao a strictly Western connotation is justified:

> It may be questioned, however, whether we are not doing injustice to both Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu by introducing our Western ideas of "theoretical-abstract" and "principle" in relation to *Tao*. These terms are to some extent legitimate but they do not convey the whole truth. After all, Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu's conceptions approximate so closely to the supra-personal and divine that it is easy to miss the world of ideas of ancient China if we allow ourselves to be guided entirely by the religious-psychlogical terminology of the West (p. 98).

Western languages are more abstract and intellectual than the Chinese. The latter is a sort of feeling-language and not an intellect-language. The feeling-language is rich in words and expressions which evoke concrete images appealing directly to the imagination and not to the intellect. This office is performed in the Chinese language by the abundant use of the so-called reduplicatives and the semi-reduplicatives with adverbial particles attached. Perhaps this is the reason why Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu and the ancient writers give more importance to the personality who activates Tao than to Tao itself. This Tao-person is variously designated: Chuang-Tzu, for instance, has various appellatives for this type of personality besides *chen-jen: sheng-jen* (wise man), *chih-jen* (perfect man), *ta-cheh* (accomplished one), *shen-jen* (divine man), *ku-chih-jen* (ancient man), etc.

While it is most unlikely that old China had any system of meditation *(dhyāna)* such as we see practiced in India, it is probable that the philosophers such as Lao-Tzu or Chuang-Tzu had something of their

own whereby they tried to attain a state of emptiness *(śūnyatā)* which they called *hsü* and not *kung*. Reichelt takes up Chapter 16 of the *Tao-teh-ching* as describing "the beneficient results of proper meditation" (p. 85). But it is doubtful that this chapter, when closely analyzed, has anything to do with his interpretation. His translation, for one thing, I do not think is correct. The chapter is an attempt to describe Tao itself by means of the Tao-man, which is characteristic, as I said before, of the Chinese philosophers. My reading of the passage is as follows:

Realize the Emptiness to its fullest end;
Let the guarding of the Stillness be firm.
While the ten thousand things rise and are busy working all around,
I see where they are to return.
For however thickly things may be growing
Each one of them goes back to its root.
"The returning to the root" is called the Stillness.
The Stillness is "returning to the natural order of things."
"The returning to the Order" is the always-so-ness[1] of things.
"To perceive the always-so-ness of things" is illumination.
To be up and working blindly, with no perception of the always-so-ness of things, is disastrous.
When the always-so-ness of things is perceived there is broad-minded-ness.
Broad-minded-ness means fair-mindedness.
Fair-mindedness is kingly quality.
Kingly quality is heavenliness.
Heavenliness is Tao.
Tao is everlasting.
[He who realizes this] knows no disaster, while his body may be subject to destruction.

Whatever form of meditation they practiced—Taoists and Confucians—they used it for perfecting the moral and spiritual nature. They frequently refer to *shang-ti,* but this notion has rarely anything to do with the inner spirituality of the individual as such. The function of *shang-ti* is principally with the state. The rulers may worship it, but the people individually and collectively remain unconcerned. What concerns them is Tao and its working in them as individuals. For this they cultivated quietness *(ching)* to keep the mind well collected. It was only after the introduction of Buddhism that they made a full use of meditation as

1. "The always-so" for *ch'ang* is borrowed from Arthur Waley, which I think is quite a happy rendering.

the important method of spiritual cultivation. This is conspicuously demonstrated in "Later Taoism" or "popular Taoism," and also in Neo-Confucianism.

While I have something more to say about the English translations of the Chinese texts, generally as well as particularly, there is no doubt that the author has achieved a good deal in making Chinese thought intelligible not only to the missionaries but to the West in general. His stories of Wang Yang-ming and Moti will be found especially illuminating, the former as a striking figure in the history of Confucian thought, and the latter as quite a unique thinker in the long history of Chinese culture.

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Conservative Judaism: An American Religious Movement. By MARSHALL SKLARE. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955. 298 pp. $4.50.

It has long been recognized by students of the history of religious movements that the bases of sectarian and denominational distinctions are social rather than theological. This is a truth that relatively homogeneous societies conceal from all but the sharpest observers, and that the heterogeneity of American society and the consequent proliferation of sectarian variation in American religious life have forced upon the attention of all students. Religion, in a private sense, may be what people believe as a result of what they consider their insights into the spiritual character of the universe. Religion, in the public sense in which the term is more frequently used, has only a nominal reference to beliefs; it is a matter of what people do—what group or groups they join, how they dress, what they eat, how they act at the great moments of life, whether joyful or sorrowful, where and in what company, language and mode they worship. What people do, their overt religious behavior, is, in turn, the product of pressures from the social environment. Religious behavior is conditioned by ethnic, economic, and residential factors, among others. In America, settled by comparatively recent emigration from many parts of the world, manifesting a very wide variety of ethnic backgrounds, class, occupational, residential and economic situations,

the dependence of denominationalism on diversity has been most clearly revealed.

Dr. Marshall Sklare's able analysis of Conservative Judaism on the American scene demonstrates conclusively that denominational affiliations among American Jews are produced by social forces of the same sort that have molded America's fragmented Christian denominations. The virtues and defects, the patterns of conformity and of inconsistency, that have entered into the making of Conservative Judaism are familiar to anyone who has studied the history of American Christianity. It is perhaps trifling to point out that the entire course of Sklare's argument demonstrates that the subtitle of his book is inaccurate—that while Conservative Judaism is unquestionably an American religious *phenomenon,* it is, by the author's showing, not an American religious *movement.* In order to justify such a term as "movement," some unity of direction and purpose, some over-all control, should be evinced. It is only in the zoölogical sciences that one can talk of "random movements."

Sklare finds three disparate elements in Conservative Judaism: the laity, the schoolmen, and the rabbinate. The laity, as in all American religious groups, constitute the dominant element in fact, whatever may be said in theory. For the laity, Conservative Judaism is a socially acceptable, Westernized form of worship, of fraternization, and of education that leaves to the individual discretion the degree of strictness in the maintenance of traditional patterns of eating, dressing, or observing legal minutiae with respect to Sabbaths and holy days. Without taking on the detested label of "Reform," indeed with the smug sense of satisfaction that attaches to the label of "Conservative," it is possible for the "Conservative" Jewish layman to be as unobservant as he pleases, as unobservant as his Reform neighbor, without withdrawal from the synagogue or social disapproval. The lay-controlled Conservative synagogue makes it possible for one to "belong," with all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of belonging. The schoolmen, the faculty of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, are presented by Dr. Sklare as the opposite extreme of the Conservative Jewish spectrum. They are dedicated to an interpretation of the Jewish tradition (viable or not) that allows for minuscule changes by a process of slow adaptation. They are committed to scholarly research and cautious investigation before even the slightest breach in tradition is sanctioned. The author might have pointed out that, as an inevitable result, their work

becomes increasingly irrelevant; they feebly attempt to sweep back a tide (partly created by their predecessors) with an old broom. An aspect of this irrelevancy that Sklare does discuss, very well, concerns the training that the schoolmen provide for the rabbinate. Conservative rabbis, like ministers of other American denominations, engage in a wide variety of pastoral and administrative duties, spurred to enter into these multifarious activities by the demands of their congregants. The training they receive from the schoolmen is of no use in preparing them for the activities in which they actually engage, but it does prepare them well for the traditional rabbinical role of legal experts, which they are seldom if ever called upon to fill. Dr. Sklare's book leaves the reader with a great deal of sympathy for the rabbinate; torn between a laity that has no interest in theory and a body of schoolmen who have no concern with practice, theirs is, we feel, an unhappy lot.

Brief mention can be made here of several other points that are brought out in Sklare's work. He is particularly incisive in pointing to the virtual absence of a theological grounding for the Conservative Jewish drift in American Jewish life; Conservatism, he suggests, succeeds because it requires no understanding. Again, he brings out well the relation between the independent individual congregations and the national organization of Conservative congregations, the United Synagogue of America, their theoretical voice. On this matter we find again a reproduction in Jewish circles of patterns familiar in American Christianity. The central organization is little more than a thin paper facsimile of what a vital center ought to be; it serves a certain limited advisory role, and it makes statements, but the congregations are independent of it. They need neither take the advice nor subscribe to the statements of the United Synagogue, which is thus relegated to the status of a more or less expensive luxury. A third point worthy of mention is that, by providing considerable flexibility in the possible number of days and hours devoted to religious education, the Conservative synagogues have apparently had some measure of success in attracting and holding their young as pupils. Here the instinct to compromise, manifested in so many of the aspects of Conservative Judaism, is once again shown to be equivalent to the instinct to survive. Ideologies are insignificant in the face of this urge to survive. Anything that promotes the continuance of a sense, however slight, of Jewishness is an acceptable expedient. The essence of the program of Conservative Judaism be-

comes the survival of Jews; and there is much to justify this approach, for without Jews, what would Judaism be? However interesting a null class may be to the mathematician and logician, it provides no places for religious functionaries and supports no religious institutions.

Much of Dr. Sklare's book is written in the peculiar jargon of the professional sociologist. This is unfortunate, for both the subject matter of his study and its development are far too interesting and important to be veiled in any private language. If only Dr. Sklare and other sociologists would learn that anything worth saying can, with a little effort, be said in English, enough people might be persuaded to read their books so that the effort they put into the writing would be justified.

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English Religious Drama. By HARDIN CRAIG. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. vi, 421 pp. $6.75.

The drama of the Middle Ages before our records of the earliest farces is to an important degree religious, and in a still more important degree what it would be supposed to be, namely, art. One of the most recent books describing it, Hardin Craig's *English Religious Drama,* is a work of much authority by a veteran scholar. It not only brings the broader aspects of textual scholarship up to date but takes its eminent place as a source-book beside the two voluminous works by Sir Edmund Chambers and Karl Young. Like these works, this may fairly be considered a landmark. One hopes that it may be a landmark or boundary-mark in still another sense, that is, in being the last of its kind. Its task according to its own frame of reference is excellently performed. The work is largely summary of a field now thoroughly tilled if not exhausted in its own terms. One reads with admiration but with an almost religious prayer for finality. It is difficult in the end not to repeat the dramatic cry, "hold, enough!"

Since the beginning of the present century, the religious drama of the Middle Ages has been approached chiefly from three angles. There have been numerous historical studies of texts and references to stage production; there have been at least a few signs that the plays hold important evidence for the student and advocate of religion, especially as seen in Catholic countries; and there has been a most striking

upsurge of interest in this drama, with many revivals of the plays enjoyed as art and, still more important, ever since Strindberg, an important fertilization of the techniques and to some extent of the spirit of our contemporary theatre. The present writer recalls Bernard Shaw speaking in behalf of medieval drama as produced in a festival before the walls of Tewkesbury Abbey. So far as *Desire Under the Elms* is a work of art, it marks a yearning not for Freud but for the imaginative technique of the medieval multiple-set stage. All Expressionist drama, as Strindberg's *To Damascus,* marks a rediscovery of the symbolic, imaginative, and poetic technique of the medieval theatre. As our playwrights cultivate a subjective or metaphysical vision, *sub specie aeternitatis,* they gain valued encouragement from the earlier stage.

The unhappy diaspora of modern intellectuals appears most strikingly in these fields. None knows what the other is about. The books by Chambers, Young, and Craig are not meant to be read and cannot be read. Works of monumental scholarship, so far as the literature of the humanities is concerned, they are stones, not bread.

Some difficulty confronts the explanation of the paucity of serious study of the drama in terms of religion, especially in England and America. A possible explanation is the original popularity of the drama. Mind grapples most readily with mind; the modern theologian turns naturally to his predecessor; the modern academician to the Scholastics themselves. The popular plays present many problems in the folk-psychology of religion but few in terms of its doctrines.

Theatrical directors and playwrights and, to a less degree, active theorists in the aesthetics of the theatre, have been the groups gaining most from familiarity with the drama. In Europe many of these men have been professing Catholics. For England and America the religious motive has been much less conspicuous. In the broadest terms, the outstanding figure for the last half-century has been that most practical, if not cynical, producer, the eminently cosmopolitan Max Reinhardt.

Medieval theatrical scholarship, as well as medieval studies in the fine arts generally, have most nearly approached normality in France. Gustav Cohen, most esteemed of Franco-Belgian students of the theatre, himself directed plays before the portals of Notre Dame de Paris. Émile Mâle found it possible to write on medieval art, including the theatre, in a manner attractive to French playwrights, actors, artists. After all,

he had symbolically at his side Paul Claudel and Georges Rouault. The three scholars writing in English have, as Ibsen would have said, the strength to stand alone.

Professor Craig's book is a scholarly statement in its own terms but may quite as rightly be described as antiquarianism. Most of it ably summarizes earlier studies; some of it represents its author's own effectual researches. At least it acknowledges in a sentence or two the happy coincidence that the feast for whose ritual St. Thomas wrote such moving poetry was also the occasion for the cycles of professional plays proceeding with such majesty from the creation of man on earth to his recreation in Eternal Hell or the Celestial Paradise. In an unusual prefatory note Professor Craig acknowledges that he has possibly been petulant in his treatment of the French scholars whom he so little resembles. But he should be praised for his thorough command of the history of the medieval drama of central Europe. He argues effectively in behalf of the historical integrity of the individual plays that only during the latter part of the period were assembled in the great cycles. On the York Passion Plays he glances with an unexpected warmth and appreciation. His passing remarks in criticism of the Hegge Plays have the air of judicial fairness. His defence of Lincoln as the home of these plays, a conjecture already raised by Roger S. Loomis and others, is especially able, as well as his own research into the history of the two plays from Coventry. His summary and conjectures on the obscure Crede and Pater Noster Plays are exceptionally welcome.

The bill of complaints unhappily requires more space, though is not on this account to be thought the weightier. As already remarked, the work advances remarkably few ideas. This is certainly not because its author is himself thoughtless, for the contrary is well known; one recalls *The Enchanted Glass,* his volume on the drama of the succeeding age, the English Renaissance, a work found by some of its reviewers almost turgid with speculation. A strong tradition in English scholarship has evidently aided his approach to this particular subject. The present book contains virtually no speculation on religion, and much of the extremely brief speculation on drama is both erroneous and curiously outmoded. There is also an element of contradiction. Although it is repeatedly stated that the plays are not to be regarded as art (Craig, however, is gentle in comparison with G. R. Coffman), some

casual remarks give an impression that at heart the author by no means despises all the plays as literature nor condemns them as theatre. His vehement insistence is that they are religious. So far, however, as he establishes contact with theories of theatrical art, his views are identical with those of William Archer, whose writings from the standpoint of theatrical naturalism half a century ago are generally regarded today as among the most obtuse ever penned on the subject.

Quotation from Professor Craig's book is necessary, since a summary might scarcely be credited. He writes:

> The religious drama had no dramatic technique or dramatic purpose, and no artistic self-consciousness. . . . Writers of medieval religious drama had no doubt their own ways (however simple) of presenting their religious themes effectively, but these techniques . . . have no connexion with the vast body of doctrine usually referred to as "the technique of the drama." Few studies of the techniques of playwrights and actors of the medieval religious drama have been made, except by persons who have not understood this aspect of their task, and perhaps for lack of definite materials none can be made, because we have here a strange case of a drama that was not striving to be dramatic but to be religious, a drama whose motive was worship and not amusement.

Under these terms, of course, almost all medieval art would be rejected.

But of this drama of "simple naturalness" it is more wisely said: "the field, moreover, is extremely varied. The medieval religious drama is of such extent and complexity that it is impossible to give more than a brief description of it."

The thoughts are underscored, with condescension:

> When one considers the origin of the mystery plays within the medieval church, an origin without thought of dramatic or histrionic effect, and when one considers also how these plays passed into the hands of very simple medieval people —authors, players, managers, and all—one can see that their technique was inevitably naive and firmly conventional. Their distances were symbolic distances, and their time was symbolic time.

Mr. Archer expressed the following ideas more eloquently over a generation ago. The words are Professor Craig's:

> The drama of the medieval people was anachronistic because it was symbolic and not realistic and because, like most Elizabethan also, its portrayers had not in the modern meaning an historical sense . . . when it succeeded its success came from the importance of its message or from the moving quality of some particular story it had to tell.

It is admitted that a dramatic spirit enlivens ritual, but the ritualistic origins of the drama are held against it as art. Few will agree, especially as we remember Aeschylus or the drama of India and Japan.

Concerning the old technique he writes: "The movable stage on the pageant was therefore still a composite stage, still making use of the naive convention of disregarding distances." He jokes at the creaking clouds and stage machinery, presumably no more "naive" than similar devices in court masques of Stuart times. "For some of these visions or assumptions the players employed windlasses, pretty crude affairs no doubt, and for the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary the clouds used were made of white linen." How one would like to have seen this!

Of the poetry he writes what conservatives have urged on innumerable occasions for centuries. "It is crude and awkward, but it is sincere." Alexander Pope said as much of John Donne. Using a manuscript dated about 1220 regarding plays at Beverley, Craig quotes: "There were gathered together a great multitude of people of both sexes drawn thither by a variety of motives, such as pleasure, or because of curiosity, or for the sake of a holy desire to awaken devotion." Apparently the author of this Life of St. John of Beverley conceded only a third of the motivation for seeing the plays to devotion, two thirds to entertainment, much of it presumably aesthetic. The medieval commentator is thus much less austere than his remote successor.

Virtually nothing is said either sympathetically or understandingly regarding the humor of the medieval drama. This would seem equivalent to depicting Chaucer without awareness of his sense of comedy—much like gazing at Mount Blanc and overlooking its existence. Concerning one of the most skillful of all comic dramas, "The Second Shepherds' Play," the author says absolutely nothing critical on his own score, morosely alluding in a single sentence to the view of a scholar writing half a century ago. He invariably regards humor as ipso facto "secular," the pious Aristophanes notwithstanding, and almost always deplores its introduction into the plays as "late" and "degenerating." The gargoyles might be expected to snap, had they not long before been put to sleep by a pedagogical third person plural pronoun ten times in the first two pages. Closely associated with humor is the grotesque. That remarkably skillful example of grotesquerie, "The Play of the Sacrament," receives scant shrift. On the other side,

the highly impressive tragic tone of the so-called "Pride of Life," fails to arouse comment.

Humor and the grotesque are not alone in being under suspicion. Almost all references to the fifteenth century place this period beneath a cloud. Deceived by its late flowering, like chrysanthemums, Professor Craig seems not to realize that the drama came last of the great medieval arts into its full glory. There is want of serious consideration and almost petulance in this sweeping disapprobation for an entire century, which surely produced some very great work along with an always-to-be-expected mediocrity. He fails to see that the early Chester Cycle is most commended today because it is the easiest for modern actors to speak and modern readers to understand.

The book is generous to the Germans but harsh toward the Dutch and Flemish. The undoubted grandeur and probable priority of *Elckerlijk,* the more impressive form of "Everyman," is strangely overlooked. In its account of the decline and fall of the Mystery Plays the book accepts too fully the account, often excellently documented, by Father H. G. Gardiner, S.J., failing to recognize that the plays were swept away in a tide far more comprehensive than any of explicit theatrical concern. They simply died out as a cloud in its sunset, along with the general waning of the Middle Ages. All specific explanations necessarily miss the main point. But the book is almost everywhere pointed in terms of detail.

This is perhaps well, since its few generalizations contribute its only soft spots. The contention that the strength of Elizabethan drama is an inheritance from the Morality Plays fairly overturns the tables of history. Artistically considered, Elizabethan drama is a holiday from the graver Elizabethan concerns for both God and morality. To an extraordinary degree its peculiar quality is opposite to that of the medieval religious drama, though it shares much with such a glorious farce, actually medieval and akin to Chaucer's fabliaux, as "Johan Johan, Tyb and Sir Johan," dubiously ascribed to John Heywood but, as one might suppose, unmentioned in the present volume. Professor Craig's description of the English tradition as peculiarly moral better fits a later period.

Still other outstanding features of the old plays are overlooked. The complete silence of Jesus in his mock trial before Herod in the York pageant provides a typically brilliant irony whose force seems lost upon its latest historian. On page 333 is a lonely reference to music, so

lonely that, in Emily Dickinson's phrase, it freezes to the bone. The medieval plays were to a considerable degree musical. To discuss them with such small reference to this feature shows a typical and not an inconsiderable oversight. The inference that not until Charles Davidson's description of the versification of certain York pageants as in the manner of the so-called "Alliterative Revival" could they be truly understood and enjoyed is especially unfortunate. It is as much as to say that a flower in one's room cannot be enjoyed without knowledge of its Latin name. This is M. Jourdain's fallacy. Nothing in the history of the language can be clearer to any reader than the presence of the alliterative style in these brilliant works. Davidson's study is commendable, not because it contributed anything new but because, being well stated, it was, like virtue, its own reward. Like scores of others, the present reviewer has read the pageants many times before and since the appearance of Mr. Davidson's study, thankful to him of late, not because he contributed a particle to the pleasure but only because his own essay, like the play or the flower, possesses the charm of a thing well made.

"The play shows an inconsistency in the number of doves offered in the temple." This sentence not unfairly represents the philosophy of Professor Craig's book, which, though bearing the words "religious drama" in its title, is a critique of neither the religion nor the art of the plays. It is probably the ablest antiquarian study in medieval dramatic documents to appear in nearly a score of years. We are truly grateful. But while the doves are meticulously counted, their relation to the mysteries of the faith are considered scarcely at all. Thanks to Professor Craig, the hard facts concerning the medieval religious drama are now recorded as fully and ably as they possibly can be recorded. It still remains for these facts to be interpreted, both as art and as religion.

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Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution. By WILLIAM HALLER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. xv, 410 pp. $6.00.

Professor Haller has brought a life-long interest in Puritanism to a most impressive conclusion in this history of the movement between the outbreak of civil war and the execution of the King. His unrivalled

knowledge of the pamphlet literature, his grasp of the dynamics of Puritanism, his wise and friendly understanding of the whole cavalcade of pilgrims, have enabled him to write an account which is almost beyond criticism, within the scope of its aims. Ungrudging gratitude ought to be the tribute of every student who has tried to order for himself the chaos of these years.

The intention was to present the history of a discussion—if such a storm of argument can be so coolly described—and the method used was a narrative exposition. The author begins by sketching his familiar thesis: that English Puritanism was essentially a brotherhood of preachers committed to the exposition of a way of life; that their prime object when the old regime broke down was to confirm and amplify the liberty to preach; and that through this freedom they expected Englishmen, under the providence of God, to redeem themselves and the world. But this very freedom, with its encouragement to protean congregationalism and to every kind of "vocationalism" which might occur to a roused conscience in a revolutionary crisis, inevitably destroyed the unity of the preaching brotherhood and their authority over the layman, ended forever the ecclesiastical agreement of Englishmen, and made liberty the condition of England's future life in both church and state. What the pilgrims had built was not a New Jerusalem, but a free society.

This theme is worked out in a series of chapters coinciding with the march of revolutionary events. Between 1638 and 1641 we are shown the thrust for a preaching ministry and the shelving of the problems of ecclesiastical order. In 1642 we are taken through the Smectymnuan debate to show the undefined presbyterianism of the brotherhood and to be introduced, through Milton's anti-prelatical tracts, to the first intimations of coming schism. If God's will has been revealed to all through Scripture, if believers are equal, if the prophet-poet has as sacred a mission as the clergy, if there must be some error for truth to manifest itself, what security could there be for the uniformity which the brotherhood took for granted? Meanwhile, before the problems of church government are fairly faced, the preachers are involved in the defence of Parliament against the King and Puritanism develops its doctrines of consent. In this third chapter, covering the first two years of civil war, Milton is again used to exhibit the revolutionary possibilities within the widening framework of Puritan thought. After show-

ing the unstable combination of notions which was used to justify resistance—a threefold concept involving the liberty of the elect soul, the liberty of Englishmen under the common law, and the liberty of all men under the law of nature—Professor Haller deals at length with the divorce pamphlets as an application to the marriage contract of the reasoning which was dissolving the political contract.

It was in the last two years of Civil War (1644-1646) that the full confusion of the brotherhood became apparent; the years of the Westminster Assembly, of the Toleration Controversy, and of the organization of the New Model Army. These are the subjects of Chapters IV, V, and VI. While an un-committed Parliament faced an undefeated King, a debate over ecclesiastical government raged unchecked in the pulpits, the press, and the armies. Chapter IV traces its course in the Westminster Assembly where Scots and English presbyterians strove for the power that meant liberty to them. Chapter V shows the full range of independency and radicalism among such figures as John Goodwin, Roger Williams, Henry Robinson, William Walwyn, Richard Overton, and John Milton. Chapter VI reviews another series of saints who had risen to confound their preachers—the embattled saints whose doctrine of free justification through an indwelling Christ spelt the end—as Baxter discovered to his horror—of all orthodoxies.

The defeat of the King had to be followed by a decision, and as a presbyterian decision began to take shape in the Parliament and the Assembly, resistance was marshalled, first by the pen, then by the sword. The welter of confusion which followed the military victory took nearly three years to reach its climax. Professor Haller's path through the labyrinth leads him first into the circles where learned gentry and divines argued the merits of orthodoxy, then among the Levellers, and finally into the struggle for the control of the army which culminated in the regicide. The position of each party in this impasse of the Puritan crusade is reviewed; loss and gain assessed.

The strength of this narrative lies in its grasp of Puritan ideas, character, and idiom, and in its power to translate the outpourings of the Puritan spirit into comprehensible, human terms. A more intellectual mind might have devised a more abstract method of organizing the history of a debate. Professor Haller has chosen to analyze people in action, with the help of a few basic notions about the nature and logic

of Puritanism which are none the worse for being simple. At the level of general ideas, his chief contribution to the question, how did common premises yield so many different deductions, lies in his insistence that the essence of English Puritanism lay in the shifting congregations of likeminded souls organized around a preacher, and in his repeated demonstration of how the preacher preached himself out of a job by liberating his converts from all clerical aids. But the test which Professor Haller really invites by his method is a scrutiny of his portraits—products of the camera that roves around the stalls and prisons and campfires as well as in the halls of Westminster. Few will doubt that he passes it to admiration. Better judges than this reviewer will have their say about his Milton, that grand exemplar of the Puritan spirit who has impressed posterity far more than his contemporaries. The Cromwell, Baxter, and Williams, if in no way novel, are sure likenesses. More revealing, because either less familiar or more controversial, are the presbyterian divines, the Goodwins, the army chaplains, and above all the Levellers—Lilburne, the "Foxian" martyr and "folk hero," Walwyn, the "vernacular humanist," Overton the reckless, dogmatic pamphleteer whose importance for his own day ought not to be inflated because he let some modern light into a twilight debate. The absence of some figures, especially among the lay Puritans, may be noted; what can be said of the Parliamentary chiefs of the presbyterian party, where is Clement Walker, Vane, Ludlow, Lucy Hutchinson, the Millenarians? But when so much is offered, it would be ungracious to regret these.

If criticism be permitted, two observations may be made. One is less a criticism than a sigh for the unattained and perhaps unattainable perfection. The ideal history of this tragedy in the politics of enthusiasm would treat the events of 1640-1660 as a dramatic unity and employ whatever art is needed to convey both the heights and depths of the experience. But Professor Haller has mapped only half the pilgrimage (the less punishing half), and he has done so in a spirit of equable cartography which has inevitably flattened the contours of feeling. But to say so is simply to say that the power to fuse this narrative with a blaze of imagination has not yet been given to any historian.

The second observation may be more material. It relates to the kind of judgment which is deemed proper in the historian's exercise of his

function and which may be passed on this particular historical experience. Professor Haller belongs to the school which has sought to substitute understanding for judgment. Its virtues are great, but pressed too severely its canons tend to abridge the humanity of its subject. The intellectual history which is engrossed in the explanation of an idea to the exclusion of every consideration except its structure is an inhuman discipline. Fortunately, Professor Haller frequently abandons his austerity for the common duties of reflective mankind, and the results as we have said, are highly rewarding. There is, however, one overall judgment which raises some sceptical doubts. Did the Puritans really establish liberty as the condition of England's modern life? Were they not rather, in almost all their bristling branches, men who subordinated the liberties of ordinary mortals to the liberties of the elect? Space is too short here to deal with the warfare in the Puritan soul between the urge to be free and the urge to make righteousness prevail, but this reviewer is left with the feeling that the decent liberties of modern Englishmen owe less to these ambiguous warriors than Professor Haller implies.

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The Irish Catholic Confederacy and the Puritan Revolution. By T. L. Coonan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. xii, 402 pp. $6.00.

The student of Irish history of the period from the Anglo-Norman incursions till the close of the seventeenth century contends with sources which present, perhaps to an excessive degree, those difficulties which generally obtain in the historical field. Primary sources are scattered. Some such seventeenth century sources have come to light as late as the nineteenth century and have still much to contribute to a judicious, comprehensive presentation of the Confederate period. Much secondary literature hiterto has displayed partisan tendencies varying between acrimonious polemic and the less blatant partisanship which a scholarly, conscious apologetic, whether Protestant, Catholic, pro-English or pro-Irish, evidences. Accordingly, a work on the Confederacy which has claims to comprehensiveness, which is instinct with sound

scholarship, and which represents a sincere attempt to avoid partisanship, will be welcomed.

Coonan treats of the constitutional aspect of the Catholic Confederate cause at some length, urging most persuasively and substantiating plausibly the thesis that a dominating demand of the Confederates was for legislative independence in Ireland. This demand was compatible with loyalty acceded to the Crown and was aimed at curbing the overreaching power of the English Parliament. The American Revolution and British Constitutional development are pointed to as repercussions of a popularization of this earlier Irish idea. As well, it is recognized that the Confederate cause was the cumulative effect of many factors making for unrest in Ireland. Forces, religious, economic, and others, motivated the movement. A synthesis of these is achieved. It may be that Coonan, in assigning the degree of prominence to each, is inclined to understate the religious and overstate the importance of the constitutional factor.

An initial chapter treats of Irish Patriotism and British Imperialism. Successively, the following themes are taken up and developed. Anglo-Irish relationships since the inception of the same in the reign of Henry II until the establishment of complete English dominance (theoretically at least) at the end of Elizabeth's reign, are summarized excellently. Reference is made to the Plantation, executed with thoroughness in the reign of James I, and subsequently to the policy of Wentworth. Unhappy Anglo-Irish relationships were aggravated by the Plantation, Wentworth's policy, etc., and the result was the notorious Irish Rebellion of 1641. With justification, we think, it is urged that the Rebellion was not the brutal massacre many contemporary commentators and writers of polemic hitherto have considered it to be. Out of the anarchy subsequent to the rebellion the Confederacy arises, and it is considered in its relationships to the almost contemporaneous English civil strife. Within the Confederacy, differences of cultural background, aim, and emphasis, are shown to have militated against the unanimity of the factions. Moreover, the duplicity of leaders of the Confederate factions, and especially the duplicity of the Protestant Royalist Ormond, was an impediment to unanimity. The resultant was confusion, internal strife, and vacillation. The cumulative effect was disaster. Cromwellian intervention, culminating in the final defeat

of the Confederates, is described graphically. A final chapter dealing with the aftermath manifests great insight and balanced judgment.

Throughout, with consummate skill, Coonan delineates the central figures involved. Ormond is seen as a deceiver who was careful of his own and the Royalist interest, and who displayed a measure of indifference to the religious and other aspects of the Confederates' remonstrances. A masterly characterization of the Papal Legate, Rinuccini, is offered. There is a searching analysis of the character of the King, Charles Stuart, as it is revealed by his attitude to the Confederates throughout the contemporary English strife. Owen Roe O'Neill, the leader of the Old Irish faction, is seen as a rather altruistic, judicious, warrior. Cromwell's attitude is severely criticized. One is tempted to suggest that the assessment of the part played by the foregoing is indicative of pro-Irish, Catholic leanings.

Generally, the spirit of seventeenth century Ireland has been captured with, what seems to us, a great measure of success. The work is written in English the perlucidity of which elicits special mention. We feel that a very valuable contribution has been made to the literature of the Irish Catholic Confederacy and the Puritan Revolution. The book is most heartily commended to general readers and students of this period.

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Gottfrid Billings levnadsminnen till och med Vesterås-tiden. Edited by HILDING PLEIJEL. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelsens Bokförlag, 1955. 223 pp.; Kr. 11:— (paper); Kr. 15:— (bound).

This memoir of the colorful conservative representative of the Established Church of Sweden, Gottfrid Billing, provides an interesting insight into an environment which produced the kind of mentality Billing represents. Billing perhaps represents the best of a conservative aristocratic priestly cast found in Sweden during the last part of the nineteenth century. A psychologist might find the first volume of the memoirs of Billing of greater interest than a lay historian. Certainly, the environmental influences of the childhood home, Fridhem in north-

ern Scania, was to profoundly influence the character of the man who became a university professor, a bishop, and a leader of conservative forces in the First Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. The warped mind of a conservative the average psychologist would trace to an unhappy childhood environment. But if the memoirs of Billing are to be believed, Fridhem was not an unhappy place, or was it? Billing's father, a civil servant, played an unimportant role in Fridhem, as his duties kept him most of the time in Kristianstad. The mother as well as the father were pious, but both seemed quite incapable of expressing deeper feelings of love and affection. Fridhem was not a place for sentimentality. The mother came from an old aristocratic priestly family, and there is little doubt as to what person ruled Fridhem.

The value of the memoirs stems in part from the fact that they were not intended to be published. They center on the childhood home, Billing's own experiences as a student, and his married life with Frida Bring, with whom he enjoyed a happy life. Hospitality had been a characteristic with the Billings. With considerable frankness he relates, so to speak, to a circle of friends the impressions of people with whom he came into closer contact. Billing was not hesitant in criticizing and evaluating these people in terms of his own prejudices. Yet, it would be unfair to say that he was unkind and cruel. He was as proud of his piety and humility as he was of his "realistic outlook" and dialectical skill. The early part of the memoirs interested the reviewer more than the later. Billing was perhaps never too happy as a member of the faculty at the University of Lund (p. 208). He appraises the leaders of the pietistic movement in Scania, and the reader finds that Fridhem was often visited by Dr. C. A. Bergman, who loved a good argument. Bergman was a liberal and often a severe critic of the Established Church of Sweden. Billing's criticisms of Bergman are not entirely unfriendly, even though he felt that Bergman's theology never developed into "a systematic whole." Bergman was too much of a dreamer, an idealist, ready to further or promote anything that was new. T. N. Hasselquist also visited Fridhem and seems at one time to have been interested in marrying a sister of Billing. Hasselquist, who later emigrated, almost succeeded in interesting the entire Billing family to sell Fridhem and emigrate. The America fever was strong when young Billing was hardly more than ten years old. Billing, looking

back upon Hasselquist's visits to Fridhem, was glad that Fridhem was never sold and that his family decided to stay in Sweden.

Throughout the memoir the reader discovers that Billing cares to recall very little from his official career. He prefers to dwell upon personalities. He was, like Carl Olbers, an enemy of religious fanaticism as it expressed itself in the religious awakening (pp. 97-98). Billing might, on this score, even admit to Olbers' influence, yet, he found Olbers to be a very unsympathetic and unpleasant person. Olbers must have lacked that charm and personality which Billing valued so much, and often found in old aristocratic families in spite of economic adversities.

The reviewer has never liked Billing, but the memoirs present Billing in a new light which helps the severest critic to think more kindly of him as a person—a representative of the best of an aristocratic priestly cast in a decadent Church in a dying age, nineteenth century Sweden.

The reviewer would like to point out that Billing's memoirs constitute Volume 33 in *Samlingar och Studier till Svenska Kyrkans Historia* edited by Hilding Pleijel. This particular volume contains excellent and helpful references and a brief summary in English. The editor failed to check a number of inconsistencies in Billing's spelling. Billing must at times have used old spelling and at other times new spelling. Thus, *hava* is sometimes spelled *hafva,* sometimes *hafwa* (pp. 24 and 29). On the same page (p. 38) Winslöf is spelled with a V and with a W. Page 41 ends without proper punctuation, etc. But what does it matter if Billing were inconsistent in spelling, so long as he had an unshaken, systematic, theological sphere. Billing never got used to the new spelling nor to the twentieth century. The reviewer is unable to appreciate the legends of greatness grown from the history of the Established Church of Sweden during the last century, legends which Pleijel so eagerly seeks to perpetuate.

O. Fritiof Ander

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Henry George. By Charles Albro Barker. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. vii, 696 pp. $9.50.

In the reorientation of religion from theology to humanity in the late nineteenth century, Henry George played a pivotal role. Finding

the Episcopalianism of his family inadequate to explain his own personal hardships and post-Civil War events, George turned to Jeffersonian deism.

The reorientation in his own thinking began on the sidewalks of New York with "a thought, a vision, a call" of religious intensity. As a California newspaper editor, George had come to New York to plead with the Associated Press for equitable rates and service, but found himself a lone figure opposing private monopoly. Defeated, he wandered morosely through the New York of 1869, appalled by its "conjunction of wealth and want"; and in this public contrast, George, who once had begged money of a stranger to feed his starving baby, recognized his misfortunes as part of a vast social process. Then "every nerve quivered . . . and I made a vow . . . to seek out, and remedy if I could, the cause that condemned little children to lead such a life as you know them to lead in the squalid districts."

Within ten years, the vow was fulfilled. Having undertaken a study of political economy, then called "the dismal science," George brought a fresh note of moral purpose to it. Concluding *Progress and Poverty* in 1879, with its promise of "the culmination of Christianity—the City of God on earth," Henry George fell to his knees in tears; he had kept faith with "the vision," and, as he wrote his pious father, "the rest lay in the Master's hands."

Professor Charles Albro Barker, of Johns Hopkins, has recorded the full story in this definitive biography: George's financial difficulties as job-printer, husband, and newspaper editor; the California genesis of the four basic principles which underlie the eight books he wrote, "absolute free trade, the abolition of private-property values in land, the repeal of discriminatory taxes, and the public ownership of telegraph lines and other public utilities"; his career as a lecturer in the British Isles, where he developed an amazingly broad and varied following; his exciting and nearly successful campaign for the mayoralty of New York in 1886; his comradely association with Father McGlynn and their embroilment with the Roman Catholic hierarchy; and, in refutation of the customary emphasis on the single tax as central to George's thinking, his late development of the idea as an afterthought. "The Prophet of San Francisco" has too long been identified with fiscal reform, whereas broad political, moral, and intellectual forces

motivated him. The great public tribute to him at his death in 1897 bespeaks the complex range and depth of his appeal.

Barker makes this historic appeal very understandable. To millions of his contemporaries, George represented the finest traditions of religion and justice. Throughout the discussions of his theories of rent, interest, taxation, and wages, the reader is rendered keenly appreciative of George's "moral center." Distressed by the sight of California land being preëmpted by private interests, George undertook a search for traditions which respected both morality and wealth. He found them in Mosaic laws forbidding land monopoly, in old Spanish California's legacy of community-owned *pueblos,* and in the equalitarian assertion of the Declaration of Independence, all of which led him to the conclusion underlined in *Progress and Poverty:* "We must make land common property."

Although the first third of *Henry George* relating his California background seems parochial and pedestrian, the book picks up great power and point with its suggestive appraisal of *Progress and Poverty.* Here a classic in popular economics comes alive in all its strength and weakness: the contradiction in George's twin hopes for the abolition of government in the interests of liberty and the intensification of government in the interests of welfare; how his obsession with land-value taxation blinded him towards the complexities of American tax policies and farm ownership; the early emergence in his book of the marginal concept in economics and the frontier thesis in American history; and his inability to recognize that his views on land ownership favored the internationalization of land rather than the nationalization of it.

With sympathetic objectivity, Barker displays "the ethical magnitude and elevation" of *Progress and Poverty,* how even its contradictions and blindspots contribute to that exalted effect. And then, briefly but convincingly, Barker joins George's avowed belief in immortality to his economic pleas. By tacking on his famous statement on immortality, George "was saying in the most intense language he knew that this is God's world and we are His children, and that those who believe, with passion and without fear, have a resource to overcome . . . selfishness and evil."

Never has Henry George been analyzed so fully and so meaningfully. Although the list of writings about George is extensive and generally

admirable, no single work ever succeeded in depicting him "in the round." This was necessarily true, either because the studies were brief parts of larger works or, in the case of books devoted completely to George, the approach itself was circumscribed. In no single source can there be found the rich materials which Barker has collected and so carefully examined over a period of twenty years. This magnum opus is certain to be recognized as the standard reference book on George and a valuable supplement as well for understanding the social and ethical climate of modern America.

Further, this volume has intrinsic appeal in its wholesome concern with the availability to the public of the vital elements of land, light, air, and water—truly a note of sanity in these distracted times.

JOSEPH SCHIFFMAN

Long Island University

On Authority and Revelation. By SØREN KIERKEGAARD. Translated with introduction and notes by W. LOWRIE. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. xxvii, 205 pp. $4.50.

Dr. Walter Lowrie has had a hand in translating no fewer than eleven works of "the Danish Socrates" and is thus responsible as no other single writer for making Kierkegaard accessible in English. Now he celebrates the centennial of S.K.'s death by making available *The Book on Adler,* of which until now English readers have heard more than they have read. For this work S.K. had prepared three different prefaces and selected three different titles: The Book on Adler, The Religious Confusion of the Present Age, A Cycle of Ethico-Religious Treatises—Dr. Lowrie has seen fit, passing over all three, to add a fourth. Many will regret this decision as adding new complications to the picture. A defence can, however, be made for his choice.

The first title, *The Book on Adler,* preserves the initial occasion for the writing. Adler, a country parson, in 1842 claimed to have had a direct revelation from Christ, a vision of light which directed him to burn his early works (his Hegelian studies) and to hold to the Bible. Christ further dictated several sentences dealing with the relation of the spirit, body, sin and eternal life of Adam. Later Adler wrote several sermons with "Jesus' cooperative grace." The publication of this claim

with the sermons led to an examination by ecclesiastical authorities and to the defrocking (with pension) of the priest. S.K., deeply interested in the case, talked with Adler, and subjected all of his books to penetrating analysis. He was alive to the irony in the situation. Here was a Christian, a theological graduate, an ordained priest, who, only after several years in the pastorate, had had a curious experience which, by bringing him nearer to being a Christian, brought upon him official repudiation by the Church. S.K. discerned in Adler "an epigram upon Christendom"—in spite of the fact that S.K. supported the action of the clerical authorities. Adler's case, however, provided S.K. only with the occasion for the book, not with its focus of interest. He had more important objectives, although he knew that these objectives would mean that his book would be "read only by theologians."

The second of the three titles considered by S.K. is a more adequate description of the book's contents. "This is my interpretation of our age," he writes. At the heart of his age he discerned an endless religious confusion. The case of Adler had served simply to demonstrate this confusion. The age substitutes endless speculation for decisive obedience. It resolves itself into a world of atoms, each atom deluded by its enthusiasm for collectivities, for the amorphous and irresponsible crowd. Worldliness shouts about universal likeness and equality. It moves excitedly from one temporal event to another, hoping that "the temporal will explain in time what in time must remain a riddle." Evading the seriousness and blessedness of eternity, the age wallows in a passionate mediocrity and a drunken obsession with politics as surrogate for religion. From a dozen angles S.K. throws light upon the turbulent demonries of an age where nose-counting has replaced truth-serving. Dr. Lowrie might well have chosen to use this second title for his translation.

Yet there is much to be said in favor of his own new title. S.K. traces the religious confusions to their source—the lack of "clarity about certain dogmatic concepts" (p. xv). The key concepts treated in this cycle of essays are two, or ultimately one. "The whole book is essentially an ethical investigation of the concept of revelation . . . or, what comes to the same thing, . . . of the concept of authority" (p. xvi). The translator has rightly pounced on these two words for his title.

One chief value of the book, then, is its incisive, painstaking analy-

sis of the ways in which the political confusions of the age root back in religious confusions, and these, in turn, converge in the dogmatic concept of authority. In this analysis, S.K. accents the truth that no concept of revelation is fully Christian unless it survives "ethical investigation." "When relationship to ethics is abandoned (as, for example, by Adler) one may say that dizziness must come about by necessity" (p. 129). To identify revelation with aesthetics (in S.K.'s distinctive use of the term) or with unlimited conceptualizing, or with private religious illumination—all this is dizziness from which salvation can come only by seeking the ethical, which by its qualitative disciplines establishes a limited and specific task for each individual.

Revelation is not to be coveted as a means of providing what the age wants but is only to be received, in fear and trembling, as a disclosure of what the age needs. When hasty, fearful advocates appeal to revelation to defend Christianity before the age, they unwittingly destroy Christianity. When the appeal to revelation is made in order to solve temporal problems, the eternal is hopelessly compromised. Men are induced to replace obedience to the eternal authority of an apostle by aesthetic admiration for the temporal authority of a genius. Divine authority inescapably causes an offence, it brings suffering, and brings reflection to a standstill. The authority claimed by Adler on the basis of his experience created an aesthetic shock but not an ethical offence. It accented suffering, but of a fraudulent type. Rather than halting reflection, it gave to it an added impetus. Adler was not an apostle but a "squinting genius," a professor confused by his own insights. Adler's dizziness but mirrored the dizziness of the age.

Another of the values of this work lies in the revision of many current misunderstandings of Kierkegaard himself. For example, S.K. attacks Adler for holding a view of the Instant which many interpreters have attributed to S.K. For S.K. the moment of faith is *not* "like a galvanized frog which for an instant has a spasm" (p. 131). Again, S.K. deplores the passion for "the great idea, the brave and bold idea of the individual" and pleads for an "ethical sobriety" which counts the means essentially as important as the ends (p. 133). Contrary to many of his admirers and critics, he rejects all views which identify subjective certainties with objective truths. In faith, man encounters a "dialectic determinant" outside himself. "Christianity exists before any

Christian exists . . . it maintains its objective subsistence apart from all believers, while at the same time it is the inwardness of the believer" (p. 168).

Man has a dexterity for turning his own interior monologue into a specious dialogue, but this dexterity is a foe of faith. The Savior is not the believer's *"alter ego."* S.K. lampoons the age for its facility in absorbing all energies within the endless process of reflection, encouraging even the least qualified to engage in sophistical discussion of "the greatest problems." "Nothing," he writes, "is more injurious to digestion than constant reflection upon digestion" (p. 29). One consequence is the "neurasthenic impatience" of "religiously awakened individuals" to find a solution via extraordinary private revelations rather than via the steady fulfillment of their responsibilities.

The case of Adler forced S.K. to think through carefully again his own treatment of the relation between the fact of revelation and historical process. He gives in clear and succinct terms a summary of the *Fragments* and the *Postscript*. How are we to distinguish the eighteen centuries of the history of Christianity from the historical element in Christianity? "The fact that God came into existence in human form under the Emperor Augustus: that is the historical element in Christianity, the historical in a paradoxical composition. It is with this paradox that everyone . . . must become contemporary, if he is to become a believing Christian" (pp. 58 f.). Orthodoxy, however, has claimed the help of the eighteen centuries in making Christianity plausible, thus treating the truth as roughly as the thieves treated the Samaritan on the Jericho road. "The Christian fact," asserts S.K., "has no history, for it is the paradox that God once came into existence in time . . . this paradox never changes its position . . . though Christianity were to last another ten thousand years, one would get no farther from this paradox than the contemporaries were . . ." (pp. 60 f.). Orthodox defenders unwittingly transform this fact into a hypothesis. They intrude centuries, libraries, cultural changes, exegesis, and dogmatics between the modern man and the paradoxical historical fact. Adler chose one way of embarrassing the orthodox—by claiming an experience of direct revelation, but the effect of this was to throw everything into confusion. S.K. chose another way. "His merit is to have 'drawn' (as is said of a telescope) the unshakable Christian fact

(the immovable polar star) so near to the eye that the reader is prevented from looking askant at the 1800 years" (p. 62).

The publication of this book will add fuel to the controversy over the validity of S.K.'s existentialism. It will contribute to a fuller and more adequate grasp of his thought. It should aid in the clarification of a dozen or more theological categories as well as in the understanding of a dozen tendencies which are characteristic of our own age. It may well keep our own neo-orthodox from falling before the temptations of Adler. It is a strange book with a strange history, but few theologians who read it will not derive some benefit. Dr. Lowrie's work of translation, including his painstaking effort to record the hundreds of changes which S.K. himself made in the MS. before its delayed publication, is an example of a keen sense of responsibility in mediating to non-Danes the mind of this Danish "poet."

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Approaches to God. By JACQUES MARITAIN. Translated from the French by PETER O'REILLY. (World Perspectives, Vol. I.) Edited by RUTH NANDA ANSHEN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. xvi, 128 pp. $2.50.

M. Maritain's little book represents the first volume in a new series which, as the editor says, "is committed to a re-examination of all those sides of human endeavor which the specialist was taught to believe he could safely leave aside" (p. vii). The chief aim is to relate the religious, scientific, artistic, political, and economic aspects of man's life in a sustained effort to combat parochialism in thought and such fragmentation of knowledge as has plagued the modern world. Perhaps the editor overstates the case when she says, "Each author treats his subject from the broad perspective of the world community, not from the Judaeo-Christian, Western or Eastern viewpoint alone" (p. vii). For, in the first place, M. Maritain's book, despite the two brief selections from the *Upanishads* at the end, is confined to a restatement and development of his own Thomism, and, secondly, no current writer can be expected to write from the broad "perspective of the world community," since no such community exists for him. What can be done is

to seek mutual understanding and critical comparison between different religious, philosophical, and cultural perspectives from the particular standpoint occupied by an author. This more modest aim is praiseworthy, and from its attempted realization the modern world should learn much that is invaluable.

Approaches to God is difficult both to encompass and to assess. It attempts much more than could ever be treated adequately in such brief space, with the result that it can only raise more questions than it answers. Furthermore, in addition to the main theme concerning man's knowledge of God, the book carries on, in an indirect way, M. Maritain's inner dialogue with the current philosophy of existence. It is evident from such works as *Existence and the Existent* and certain parts of *A Preface to Metaphysics* that M. Maritain's Thomistic position is embarrassed by current *Existenz* philosophy. He will not condemn it outright, because he is sensitive to the human experience to which it points, and, in addition, he believes that what is "authentic in it can be found implicit in the Thomistic concept of the "act of existing." On the other hand, he is suspicious of the radical concept of existence in existential philosophy because it seems to him irrational and to strike too deeply at the roots of his own mystical and contemplative rationalism. In this situation he adopts the alternative of trying to cast the insights of the philosophy of existence in the form of Thomist metaphysics, drawing heavily upon the concept of act and stressing the pole of existence in the doctrine of being.

M. Maritain's relation to the philosophy of existence is a topic too extended for consideration here, but one clear complaint must be registered, since it concerns his basic approach to the problems involved. When it comes to the primary human experiences to which the philosophers of existence appeal, for example, the experience of contingency ("might not have been and will cease to be"), M. Maritain interprets them as "merely psychological" and without ontological import *(A Preface to Metaphysics,* pp. 21-25), whereas, when he appeals to the *same experiences,* as he does in the present book (pp. 3 ff.), he believes that he has but to find them within the "life proportioned to the intellect" in order to transform them into valid intuitions of being itself. This way of approach seems to me to be below the level of legitimate philosophical argument.

Approaches to God considers five main themes. First, it contains an account of man's primordial intuition of existence, taken as the "natural" or "pre-philosophic" basis upon which philosophy proper rests. Here we are introduced to what the author calls "human reason's eternal way of approaching God," and it involves a three-fold movement from the awareness of my existence and that of others outside me, to the awareness that my existence is threatened by death and nothingness, to the intuition of an existence characterized as "that Being-without-nothingness" (p. 6). This movement is called a movement of ordinary consciousness, and, while not itself metaphysics, it is said to be the material out of which explicitly formulated metaphysics arises.

Secondly, the book reformulates St. Thomas' five ways, states the principle upon which they all rest, and attempts to bring them up to date by considering objections and problems raised in recent years. This part—the greatest portion of the whole—is both clarifying and important, particularly the attempt to formulate the second way so as to prescind from any reference to time; the ontological order of causation is interpreted as purely intelligible.

Thirdly, M. Maritain offers a sixth argument for God. Of this way he says, "for a long time I regarded it as belonging to the domain of research hypotheses" (p. 72), but he now regards it as a rationally valid argument. This sixth way has no name, but it might be called the argument from the fact of existence and the eternality of thought. It is a strange argument compounded of an individual's knowledge of having had a beginning in time, and an ancient doctrine, found in many forms both West and East, according to which a being capable of knowing what is above time must itself be above time. The argument is as follows: It is not possible that a being capable of "purely intellectual thought" should once have been a pure nothing; nevertheless, that same being knows that it had a temporal beginning, a fact which, in relation to the first premise, leads to what M. Maritain calls a "*lived* contradiction" (p. 75). His solution of the antinomy is that the self has always existed, but not in itself, or within the limits of its own personality; rather it has always existed by a suprapersonal existence in a transcendent personality. How this sixth way is related to the "existential" approach of the first part of the book is by no means clear,

unless it is that, whereas human existence as temporal has radical contingency in it, there is, nevertheless, an aspect of the self, its capacity for purely intellectual thought, which is not infected by this contingency. It may well be that M. Maritain seeks to turn the tables upon the philosophers of existence; they stress so much the possible distraction from concrete existence which the very power of thought and contemplation makes possible, whereas he is engaged in exempting thought from the contingency of temporal existence and using its presence as a basis for reaching God and for showing the superiority of the self to time. It should be noticed that in so doing he is careful to interpret thought so as to avoid the charge that it is impersonal; "no operation [of the self]," he says, "is more personal than thought" (p. 78).

Fourthly, the author develops briefly and clearly the ways of the practical intellect to God—the moral, aesthetic, and mystical. The last is further developed in the fifth part, which is a moving discussion of the "desire to see God," which M. Maritain takes as a "natural" desire not in fact to be fulfilled upon the natural basis from which it originates. Man is the metaphysical animal (I would say also "religious") because he seeks to "see" (for Maritain this means "know") God as he is in himself.

It is unfortunate that M. Maritain confined his comment on Paul Tillich's criticism of the proofs for the "existence" of God to a footnote (p. 13), since it is clear that the present interpretation placed by Maritain on Thomas' proofs actually admits the very contentions Tillich is advancing. Tillich's claim is that those who defend the classic arguments actually "meant the reality, the validity, the truth of the idea of God, an idea which did not carry the connotation of some*thing* or some*one* who might not exist" (*Systematic Theology*, I, 205). M. Maritain admits this when he grants concerning the arguments that "They give us only evidence of the fact that the divine existence must be affirmed, or of the truth of the attribution of the predicate to the subject in the assertion 'God exists' " (p. 13). Moreover, he admits the very point which is the basis of Tillich's entire criticism when he goes on to say "the word existence, in order to apply to God, must lose the connotation which thus refers it to created things" (p. 14). In order to support his view after having made this admission, Maritain introduces

an "analogy of existence" which, he claims, is as much required as the *analogia entis*. On my view he has granted all that Tillich requires.

Regardless of any criticisms that may be advanced, *Approaches to God* is an important little book. Among other things it serves to show that some of those who follow after Thomas Aquinas are still engaged in an effort to reinterpret his thought in order to make it relevant to each new historical period.

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Irrationalism and Rationalism in Religion. By ROBERT LEET PATTERSON. Durham: Duke University Press, 1954. vii, 155 pp. $3.00.

This interesting little book has considerable merit. It is, to be sure, as the author partly admits, oversimple, at times to the point of crudeness (for pedagogical reasons, as he explains), in its presentation of doctrines to be refuted; and, as the author also candidly admits, it does not arrive at a wholly coherent outcome. But it provides a stimulating analysis of some of the possible senses in which one may affirm or deny the "rationality" of the universe and of the arguments relevant to such affirmation or denial. The author inclines to go the whole way with extreme rationalism, and to affirm the necessity of every item in the universe as a mutually implicative system. Yet he admits, and I honor him for this, that the experience of temporal passage and of freedom has not, so far, been satisfactorily described in harmony with such a doctrine.

Patterson is forceful in attacking extremes of irrationalism, whether the complete denial of internal relations, as in Hume and his many associates, or the Barthian rejection of secular reason in relation to ultimate questions. But the division of possible theories among which we are asked to choose is inexhaustive, and the discussion sometimes seems to fall into the fallacy of trying to establish a view by refuting the less intelligent forms of its alternatives. A doctrine of becoming according to which "there are no permanent factors" and no intrinsic relations may well be demonstrably untenable; yet the opposite doctrine that the permanent factors include all reality, so that there is no genuine novelty, is not thereby shown to be tenable. A long list of

thinkers—Bergson, Whitehead, Montague and many others—hold neither view. The modern philosophy of process is not a "doctrine of momentariness." It is a view which takes internal relations as asymmetrically retrospective: the cause is logically contained in the effect—so far Hume is held to be wrong—but the effect is entailed by the cause only in approximate or statistical characteristics, i.e., determinism is rejected. Our author himself has misgivings about determinism: his suggestion that the self may *initiate* causal chains does not do away with the fact that its acts have antecedent conditions or causes; the proper question is as to the *relation* between cause and effect, is it an absolute determining, or is it the outlining of a more or less narrow range of possible outcomes, *some* one of which *or other* will be actualized? Patterson suggests that, though human freedom could explain much of the evil in the world, and so make room for a teleological form of rationalism, it can explain animal suffering only if one assumes transmigration of souls. But why not regard animal spontaneity as a humble analogon to freedom, involving only trivial alternatives of detail, rather than of principle, but still sufficient to prevent a complete and smooth harmony in animal life? (It is, I think, a standing wonder to naturalists that the harmony is as great as it is. The vast majority of creatures are, at any one moment, doing something they feel like doing, to all appearances, with little or no indication of conflict or suffering.)

Considering the complexity of the author's own positive suggestions, it is not wholly excusable that he should dismiss from serious notice all those who have tried, even if in subtle and intricate ways, to conceive process as inclusive of an eternally identical element (rejecting only the converse proposition) and inclusive also of previous results of the process ("cumulative change"—Bergson, Montague—or the "immortality of the past"—Whitehead), giving as reason for this neglect a sort of imputation of guilt by association with the more simple-minded or crude partisans of mere becoming (see p. 93). The arguments against these turn, so far as I can see, on the crudeness or one-sidedness of their doctrine, and leave untouched the basic issue: does the novel include both antecedent and eternal factors, or does eternal being include all apparent novelty? Similarly, while the author shows the difficulties with a "finite God," he does not consider the "finite-infinite"

God of Brightman and others. Such arguments as are based on the supposition that a finite God must have an external environment would have to be dropped in dealing with some forms of the view that God has both finite and infinite aspects (Montague, Whitehead, Hartshorne). Perhaps the author is really with us at heart, but he might try coming within hailing distance.

The book is a pleasantly written discussion of some religious aspects of metaphysics, or some metaphysical aspects of religion.

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

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Intelligible Religion. By PHILIP H. PHENIX. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. 189 pp. $2.75.

The book is divided into two main sections after the introductory discussion of what is meant by intelligible religion. Half of the book is taken up with the five basic modes of experience which give rise to religious thinking. The first of these is the ineluctable fact of change, which, despite the efforts often made in religion itself to treat it as unreal, still remains a stubborn reality demanding some explanation. The second is the awareness of our dependence on factors beyond ourselves, whether these be physical or social forces which determine our existence, or the ultimate reality to which our reflection leads us beyond the more obvious and immediate sources of our lives. Third comes the realization that all experience has some structure or order and is not merely haphazard. The fourth fundamental component of religion is the consciousness of value. There are actual values, and there are imaginative constructs such as universal peace which have never been actually present in experience, but which nevertheless exert an influence on conduct. Finally, there is our experience of imperfection, which arises by virtue of the fact that every achievement is accompanied by some sense of a better-yet that lures us on.

Each of the chapters devoted to these fundamentals of religious life contains an extended discussion of the problems involved, and issues in a few paragraphs in which the author indicates the characteristic attitudes which the particular facet of experience engenders: The experience of change begets the sense of mystery and leads to expectancy and humility. The recognition of dependence gives rise to gratitude,

generosity, confidence and humility. Order is an avenue to insight and results in an attitude of confidence. The experience of value furnishes the basis for loyalty, zest in living, heightened sensitivity, and creative living. The sense of imperfection generates hope, humility, tolerance. This functional, experiential approach to the meaning of religion is very suggestive, but it inevitably leaves hanging all sorts of questions for the theologian. Are incommunicable experiences in religion unimportant, and can the mystical tradition be dismissed so readily? How does the sense of dependence engender confidence? Are not the different views of the meaning of change more important for religion than the fact that change is recognized? And how does the sense of imperfection develop hope?

So far the author has been dealing with the general characteristics of religion, using the specific doctrines and practices as illustrative of the functional analysis. In the second half of the volume he turns to the more specifically Christian aspects of belief and cult in the effort to illuminate them by reference to the foregoing analysis. Now arises the fundamental problem. Since the "traditional religious problems" with which he deals have arisen out of a supernaturalistic world view, how far can the more naturalistic approach here employed be said to do justice to the historic meanings of the concepts examined?

In the traditional systems of belief God is a personal being who created the world out of nothing, sustains it by perpetual action upon it, and directs it toward a consummation in the Kingdom of God. To one who accepts this theology, change is one-directional and is embraced within a divine purpose on which, though one cannot define it because it transcends human knowledge, one depends in faith. The order may be partially observed in the phenomenal world, but this is only a confirmation of the trust one has in the consistency of God, and it is in conformity to this over-all purpose that values are won by man, since he is really apprehending the good things which God has provided. This view has in recent years been reaffirmed by critical theologians who claim that it is the necessary starting point for Christian thinking, and, like all presuppositions of thinking, must be accepted in faith.

Now, Dr. Phenix starts from a different set of premises. Nature is the ultimate reality, and human community the ultimate good. Intelli-

gence, though not perfect, is our one guide in a constantly changing world; and the possibilities which reason reveals are the occasion for faith, as well as for a sober humility. The crucial question is, therefore, whether the *quality* of belief can be the same in both systems. Dr. Phenix is confident that it can. But is surrender in faith to a God whom we cannot understand the same as a humble acknowledgment of our limitation as we strive for values which we can achieve through intelligence in co-operation with our fellows? His declaration that the real is the intelligible reflects the rationalism of Hegel, and contradicts the basic tenet of the traditional faith that God is to be trusted even when he is unintelligible. What the author is offering us here is an alternative perspective from which to view the human struggle, and this is not merely a different conceptual structure into which the old terms can be translated, but a different attitude toward our world and the place of man in it. It is not simply a matter of semantics, but of orientation of the entire personality. This "existential" dimension of the problem Dr. Phenix has not really probed, despite his careful analysis of the experiential factors in religion. Consequently, his renderings of the traditional problems into the new perspective are not convincing. Is it the same to assert the omniscience of God as to accept "all that appears as intelligible"? And is it really equivalent to asserting the "creation out of nothing" to accept "the experienced fact of newness"? And if the omniscience of God is defined as above, how can he define miracle as "expressing the conviction that the nature of things is not just what it appears to be"?

The question with which the book leaves us is, then: Does not the way in which we define the nature of ourselves and our universe determine our experience quite as much as our experience determines our definitions? The attempt at too simple a one-way movement from experience to theology fails to take due account of the effect of our definitions upon our psychological experience. We do not originate all of our definitions, for there is already to hand a socially developed scheme of concepts by which society (in the persons of our parents and teachers) defines the meanings of our experiences, and this guides our reactions to our world. When we change our definitions in light of further experience, we also change the quality of the old experience, and there is some discontinuity in the process. It is thus doubtful if we

can capture for our new world view the qualitative meaning of the older one. To this extent Dr. Phenix has raised more problems for religious experience than he has recognized.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

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The Case for Liberal Religion. By WALDEMAR ARGOW. Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1954. 155 pp. $2.50.

Humanism as the Next Step. By LLOYD and MARY MORAIN. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1954. 118 pp. $2.00.

Religion and Humanity. By EUGENE KOHN. New York: The Reconstructionist Press, 1953. x, 154 pp. $3.00.

It is good to see, in these three books, evidence that there are people who believe that there is a "case for liberal religion." Somehow, in the hysterical supernaturalism and neo-orthodoxy of the last twenty years, the voice of religious liberals has been a feeble whimper in the wilderness. Yet, surely, through all these years when they have not made themselves heard above the din—*ex cathedra,* one might say—there must have been religious liberals. All thought did not cease forever when the Seminarians discovered Kierkegaard. And here, in these three books, liberal religion comes again to our notice. It is interesting that this liberal religion is decisively anthropocentric, humanistic, and humanitarian, whether, as in Rabbi Kohn's book, what is exemplified is liberality within a traditional religion or, as in the book by Lloyd and Mary Morain, it is the liberality of the fourth faith, Humanism, that is expounded.

Mr. Argow's book is the bellwether of this group. It is an attempt to speak directly to as wide an audience as can be reached by the printed word; that is to say, the author has deliberately tried to eliminate from his writing the over-intellectual distinctions and qualifications that have made previous statements of liberal religion read like academic treatises rather than outpourings of vital faith. The author raises the hope, always characteristic of liberal religion, that it is possible to set forth and to win adherents to a universal religion, based upon ethical conviction rather than theological dogma; freedom of belief rather than exclusiveness; a democratic faith rather than an authoritarian

one, devoted in practice as well as in theory to racial equality and brotherhood; finally, a faith in accord with science, rather than in a "cold war" with science. This, of course, is not merely a profile of any "universal religion"; it is also a description of Mr. Argow's liberal religion. So, out of his very liberality, Argow does precisely what he objects to in the Christian and the Muslim; he identifies his own religion with universal religion. To sympathizers with his position, this will seem a just evaluation of both liberalism and universality in religion; to opponents, it will appear as arrogance. Except for what I should regard as excessive claims of this sort, Argow's book is richly rewarding evidence that there is a core of likeness in the various liberal religions of our day.

The guide to Humanism by Lloyd and Mary Morain, subtitled "An Introduction for Liberal Protestants, Catholics, and Jews," is, for the most part, pervaded by a sweet reasonableness which emphasizes that Humanism is not a "cult" but a "point of view"—that of science, applied to ethical and religious questions. After this, however, the book does describe a cult: an organized religious group, with doctrines, rituals, and an institutional pattern. Modern Humanism may have started as a point of view; its adherents may not like to call it a cult, but its very apparatus as described by the Morains is that of a cult. Taken as principles of a cult, the discussions of basic beliefs, and of Humanism applied to personal needs and personal and social problems, are worthy of considerable respect. A great many people in this world must mean by religion precisely what we find in this book; the problem is to bring the cult and its potential adherents together. I should like to register a protest against the listing of distinguished humanists in the first section of the Morains' book; the implication is that they are not merely humanists, but also Humanists, which is, in many of these instances, not the case. Mr. and Mrs. Morain may draw inspiration from the thought of these men and women, but this is no criterion for their inclusion in a list of patron saints of Humanism.

Dr. Eugene Kohn is one of the leaders of the movement in contemporary Judaism known as Reconstructionism. Dr. Mordecai M. Kaplan, the founder of this movement, is included by the Morains in a special list of rabbis who have Humanist tendencies, "although they tend to express themselves within the traditional symbols." Now it is

true that Kaplan and his close associate, Eugene Kohn, have deep ethical convictions, but they are striving for a reformulation of theology that will undergird these convictions. They are ardently devoted to freedom of belief; yet they reinterpret rather than abandon the traditional Jewish concept of exclusiveness. In other respects both Kaplan and Kohn conform admirably to Argow's definition of liberal religion. There is an anomaly here; Kohn might be claimed by either traditionalists or liberals, and both would make the claim with justice. *Religion and Humanity* resolves the anomaly by showing Kohn as one whose object is to liberalize tradition, not to create a liberal religion.

The book mirrors an attractive personality. There are no exaggerated claims, no appeals to authority on behalf of anti-authoritarianism, no glib and superficial listings of beliefs. The book is an earnest effort to think through a series of problems, some of which are "eternal," and some of which are the special questions of our own age of disillusionment. There is no dogmatism in Kohn's presentation; all is tentatively and hesitantly, modestly and humbly, set forth. Kohn's is a genuine liberalism, whether he talks of the need for a reinterpretation of the God-idea in order to resolve the paradoxes of traditional theology, or whether he is engaged in the more patently "humanistic" enterprise of pointing out that "Skepticism about man and nature is a frail foundation for religious faith."

Joseph L. Blau

Columbia University

Be Not Afraid. By Emmanuel Mounier. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. xxvii, 203 pp. $3.50.

Be Not Afraid contains, under this encouraging title, the translation of two major works by the eminent Catholic philosopher and *moraliste,* Emmanuel Mounier: *La Petite peur du XXème siècle* consisting of three essays) and *Qu'est ce que le personnalisme?* A better choice could scarcely have been made among the author's varied publications, for in a single and relatively slim volume can be found the principles of Personalism, as well as their application to such vital problems as the H-bomb, industrialism, and the idea of progress. Miss Rowland's translation is generally accurate, often felicitous, occasion-

ally marred by a homiletical tone quite foreign to Mounier's forceful prose, but perhaps unavoidable in English. The subtitle on the dust jacket, "A Denunciation of Despair," is ever so slightly misleading, for the author respects the minority who have the moral courage and stamina to reach the limits of despair. His intention is to lead them to a more hopeful answer rather than to denounce their genuine insight into the human condition. He reserves his denunciation and his thunder for those who appear content to accept the convenient crystallizations of the modern world, the acceptable positions, and the easy solutions; from the first to the last page, Mounier launches attack after attack against the vested interests of the intellectual world, against every type of conformism, right or left, pietistic or atheistic. By temperament as well as by background, the author tended to prefer movements that showed signs of vitality and positive energy to all forms of entrenchment or escapism. He was indeed a disciple of Bergson and the true successor of Charles Péguy.

In the opening essay: "In an Hour of Apocalypse," the author ironically contrasts our contemporary fear of universal cataclysm, caused mainly by the H-bomb, with the so-called terrors of the year A.D. 1000—a period of tremendous creative activity, which found its truest expression in the building of the first great cathedrals. Although scarcely any effort is being made in our present age of catastrophe to tidy up the planet for the Second Coming, nobody can say that our activity has abated without being confronted by the feverish assembly lines of General Motors, Ford, and Volkswagen. The essential difference between the two periods is that today scarcely ten per cent of the people (of Europe?) really believe in a supernatural order, and only a minority of the remainder have faith in the validity of human reason. It appears, therefore, that man now has at his disposal the means to destroy a quite meaningless planet, whereas, ten centuries ago, he was merely awaiting the replacement of a flat, limited, but meaningful world by a perfect one. Mounier foresees—and this is the main point of his essay—that Europeans (and others) will use this unhealthy expectation of catastrophe as an excuse to do nothing about actual problems which cry for immediate and drastic solutions. Our modern Apocalypse is thus being used as just another convenient excuse for laziness and reaction.

In "The Case against the Machine," Mounier's main object is not to defend or attack modern industrialism, but rather *to exorcize the follies created by our fears of mechanization* (p. 64). The author unmasks the irrational, primitive, and instinctive origins of this widespread hostility towards industrialisation, and reveals the deep-seated rationalizations in its doctrines. Such hostility stems from the myth of Mother Nature which is *deeply rooted in the most primitive forms of collective symbolism* (p. 44). The opponents of mechanization are seized by a deep spiritual reluctance as soon as man's order begins to be substituted for the order of things. And the result is that they call inhuman precisely that which is most human . . . (p. 47). The machine, which is only an instrument, partakes of the greatness and misery of all human endeavor—a truth which the author couches in Bergsonian or Péguyist terminology: "No doubt the history of the machine, like the history of ideas, of individuals and of societies, will be composed of an alternation between poetic revivals and scholastic decadences" (p. 51). But Mounier does warn us against the most serious danger of the machine: its power of alienation, for it not only facilitates forgetfulness of man by increasing the isolating spaces between man and man (p. 59), but it makes mass murder impersonal, simple, and hygienic! However, before even this grave danger can be overcome, the whole complex problem must be removed from the realm of mystery or instinctive fantasy.

In "Christianity and the Idea of Progress," the author is more directly concerned with religion. The essay opens with an attack on historical pessimism, an attitude shared at present by one part of the Christian world which, in the past, had embraced the causes of a bourgeois epoch more readily than it had followed the inner exigencies of the Christian faith (p. 67). After partaking of its illusions, these Christians inevitably share today the despair of a vanishing social class and tend to slide into that philosophy of regret which is the real structure of reactionary thinking. Although Mounier unequivocally rejects the idea of endless, linear progress, which is bound to lead to alienation, he believes that history has a meaning, and that man through his own action is not condemned to inevitable defeat generation after generation. The idea of progress, far from being of secular origin, has its roots in the Judaeo-Christian tradition: the belief in a divine plan for

mankind, the awaiting of the Messiah, and finally, the grafting of *human history into the very heart of divine life, through the mediation of Christ incarnate.* In that manner, the three theological unities are inseparably welded together: the unity of God, the unity of history, the unity of the human race. It is in the solidarity of the three theological unities that we have the framework of the idea of the collective progress of humanity (p. 75). Mounier, basing his arguments on the Church Fathers, shows that Christianity is a collective—hence a personalistic rather than an individualistic religion: *Sin is not chiefly a degradation of the individual, it is primarily a breach of human unity by separating it from God*—it is an "individualization." The Last Judgment itself appears as a collective judgment, for—and the author quotes Cyril of Alexandria: The way to God can only be found when all men are gathered into one collective man, with Christ at its head (pp. 76-77). Moreover, the stressing of individual sin is a modern distortion of Christian doctrine. Christianity can be envisioned as a gradual and collective ascent towards Godliness: "Humanity *fara da se,* slowly, progressively. How could humanity, beatified, share however imperfectly in the aseity of God, unless it had contributed to its triumph with the labour of its own hands?" (p. 102). And Mounier, while deploring the stress on technological progress, reserves his most stringent criticism for what he calls "absentee Christianity," which has missed countless opportunities to take the initiative in the last two centuries or so of human endeavor.

What is Personalism? is one of Mounier's many attempts to define the nature and aims of his philosophy. As Personalism is by no means a system or a doctrine, but rather a way of life and a method of historical analysis geared to immediate action, its very principles require constant re-examination. Mounier, who wrote a book on Péguy, was tragically aware of what can happen to the best ideas when they become mired in practical politics; he knew of the fatal transformation of the "mystical" into the "political." By his courage and his vigilance, he was able to avoid the pitfall of ideological purity (which so often is the mask of impotence), as well as involvement in distasteful compromises in the manner of the M.R.P., which borrowed its principles from *Esprit,* but appears today as just another French political party. Personalism can be corrupted only by its so-called friends. Its foes, such

as Marxists and Sartrian existentialists, whatever may be their shortcomings, have contributed cogent analyses of the present situation which can be of use to the true Personalist. To a certain extent, Mounier prefers their lively aberrations to the shopworn spirituality of so many Liberals (in the French sense). He is indeed concerned because: "Modern Christianity is dangerously allied to capitalist and bourgeois Liberalism. The expression of its highest values has suffered, sociologically, from influences which partly drag it down into the failure of this world. The gulf between the Christian universe and the youthful energies of the new world grows larger and larger" (p. 170). For that reason, Mounier is opposed to any group whose chief aim is the defence and preservation of established and crystallized values. He goes so far as to single out the "defence of the person" as *the dominant theme of the narrowest form of social conservation* (p. 187).

It would appear that the greatest opponent of Personalism is none other than individualism. Personalism is a transcendental philosophy: it affirms the absolute value of the person, not in isolation, but by deepening human relationships and striving for the *emergence of ever vaster communities.* Instead of alienation, it seeks the enrichment of each existence by ever widening communication and by universal communion. Individualism, which is a form of alienation, is tied in with capitalism and avarice, the cardinal sin of the modern world: "The cancerous development of the love of possession has pulverised the privileged classes into a kind of deadly, egocentric flocculation" (p. 167).

It is clear that Personalism is a radical and most demanding philosophy or way of life, requiring not only the utmost in generosity and daring, but also eternal vigilance and lucidity. It is the philosophy expounded and practiced by a truly great person. This greatness, which can be discovered in every page of *Be not Afraid,* as well as in every important decision in Mounier's life, is characterized by the qualities of genuineness and grim enthusiasm, which he himself defined as "tragic optimism."

In addition to the two essays by Emmanual Mounier, there is a valuable introduction by Leslie Paul.

Judd D. Hubert

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BOOK NOTES

Religions of the Ancient Near East. Sumero-Akkadian Religious Texts and Ugaritic Epics. Edited by ISAAC MENDELSOHN. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955. xxix, 284 pp. $1.75.

In most courses on the history of religions the Ancient Oriental Religions are much neglected. Interest is usually focused on living religions, with the result that the dead ones can receive only passing comment. The teacher of history of religions, furthermore, is in the unhappy situation of being unable to have first-hand command of the sources in all fields even of the living religions, let alone of the dead ones. The old Oriental sources, too, have not been conveniently accessible to teachers or students, except in works in foreign languages. It is the purpose of the present work to clear that particular obstacle out of the path of teachers of religion and thus, perhaps, to tempt them to devote a little time to these ancient and intriguing sources that tell us of the religious ideas and ideals of the various peoples that made history before the star of empire passed westward. The work here reviewed is Volume IV in The Library of Religion, a project of the American Council of Learned Societies and, in particular, of the Committee on the History of Religions appointed by that Council. The Editorial Board is composed of distinguished scholars, headed by Horace L. Friess. In assigning to Isaac Mendelsohn the task of editing this particular volume, it acted wisely and has produced a volume that contains the best and most representative texts for study at a price that, it is hoped, will place it in the range of students in colleges, theological schools, and graduate schools of universities.

The volume covers the cuneiform field exclusively. The Egyptian, North Semitic, and South-Arabian texts have not been included. One can hardly quarrel with that decision, since a line has to be drawn somewhere. The translations used are, with the exception of the contribution of the Editor, drawn from the volume edited by James B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton University Press, 1950). This is quite praiseworthy, since the more expensive work can be in the hand of the teacher, who will not have the nuisance of diverging translations. Furthermore, the translations are so excellent in themselves and done by scholars of such competence that it would seem superfluous to do the work all over again after so short an interval of time. The myths and epics naturally contain the most attractive material, with Sumero-Akkadian Hymns and Prayers a close second. They deserve careful study, and it ought to be possible to interest the student in these productions of the Babylonian mind and soul. But of course the less attractive materials have their value and importance, too. That even holds good for the magical texts contributed by the Editor, for alongside the high religion of the cult there always runs the primitive superstition of the common people. The concluding selections are from the Ugaritic texts—a whole new world of Canaanite religion of the fourteenth century B.C., written in a cuneiform alphabet.

These translations are by H. L. Ginsberg, one of the pioneers in this field. The brief introduction to the volume, contributed by the Editor, will help the student of religions to approach the contents of the volume with the proper perspective. The book is warmly recommended.

EMIL G. KRAELING

Plutarch gegen Kolotes: Seine Schrift "Adversos Colotem" als philosophiegeschichtliche Quelle. By ROLF WESTMAN. (Acta Philsophica Fennica, Fasc. VII.) Helsinki: Akateeminen Kirjakauppa, 1955. 332 pp.

The conflict between uncompromising Epicureanism and systems which in any way deprecate ordinary sensory experience and deny the existence or qualify the effectiveness of external phenomena has underlain all philosophic discussion from Epicurus' own day to this, even though for far the greater part of this stretch, in the pagan as well as the Christian Roman Empire and in Christian Europe, "Epicurean" was a term of reproach. Defenders of unsuccessful causes tend to suffer the fate of the causes they defend; we can reconstruct Celsus' systematic polemic against Christianity only from Origen's refutation, and similarly we can reconstruct Colotes' polemic against rival philosophies only from Plutarch's.

Colotes was a favorite disciple of Epicurus, who literally adored the master, carried the implications of his teaching to their logical extreme, and wrote criticisms of antecedent philosophers, especially (like the Epicurean Metrodorus) Plato. His treatise became a kind of classic, with which defenders of other systems had to reckon. Cicero concludes his *Republic,* as Plato had concluded his, with an eschatological vision, but Scipio only dreams, whereas Er is resurrected; this softening, Macrobius tells us, was in deference to Colotes' criticism of Plato on this point. In the early Empire the great defender of Plato, and in general of the attitudes we should call religious, was Plutarch, and it was natural that Plutarch should at some time face up to the Epicurean classic, though in his day it was three centuries old. He composed his *Against Colotes,* he tells us, upon the request of auditors who had just listened to a reading of Colotes' treatise. His procedure is to cite or paraphrase a statement of Colotes in regard to a specific philosopher—those dealt with are Democritus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Socrates, Plato, Stilpo, the Cyrenaeans, Arcesilaus—and then show the absurdity or injustice of Colotes' criticism.

It is with Plutarch's refutation that Westman's admirable monograph deals. His principal concern, as his subtitle indicates, is to exploit the treatise as a source for a general doxography, and this he does thoroughly and usefully. But as prolegomena he discusses the manuscript tradition, the career of Colotes, and the probable arrangement and tone of Colotes' book, and throughout he gives ample evidence of fresh and competent examination of all relevant texts and discussions of them and offers attractive suggestions for emending both. What the student of Plutarch may miss is a discussion of Plutarch's own views and attitudes.

But these are, after all, implicit in Westman's general treatment. He himself preserves correct critical detachment, but his sympathy with the Epicureans is transparent. It is a sign of maturity, therefore, of the author and our age that Plutarch himself is not impugned. His approach, taking vulnerable phrases out of context, ridicule, indignation at derogation of such a saint as Socrates, is precisely the approach a traditional believer might use today in refuting a materialist book. The logician may find the refutation merely exasperating, but he cannot question its good faith if the apologist is so honest a man as was Plutarch.

It is good to see that Plutarch's importance in the history of European thought is being recognized, that the solid achievements of Epicureanism are receiving new appreciation, and that a small country like Finland can afford so competent and so beautifully produced a contribution to European humanism.

MOSES HADAS

Roman Civilization: Selected Readings edited with an Introduction and Notes. By NAPHTALI LEWIS and MEYER REINHOLD. Vol. II, The Empire. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. viii, 652 pp. $7.50.

This volume in the "Records of Civilization" series is excellent in every way and cannot fail to become a standard work for the teaching of later Roman history. The introductions are clear, informed, and precise, while the selections are wide in range and judiciously chosen. I doubt if any other work gives such a comprehensive and balanced picture of the state of affairs between Augustus and Constantine. The army, the law, the state religion, the circus, education, the place of women, the prices of commodities, agriculture—all these aspects of Roman life and many more are well illustrated. For readers of this journal the sections on religion will be of especial interest. Part IX is devoted to this and covers the imperial cult, Oriental religions, the persecution of Christians, the Christian Apology, and the final toleration by Constantine. Perhaps the one area which is not adequately represented is that of philosophy.

There is an extensive bibliography of English titles and a useful glossary of technical terms. The book is printed in clear type and is a pleasure to read.

C. C. R.

Visva-Bharati Annals, Vol. VI. Edited by P. C. BAGCHI. Santiniketan, India: Visva-Bharati, 1954. vi, 231 pp. Rs. 12.

This volume of *Annals* from Dr. Bagchi's research institute is devoted to two contributions in the field of Buddhistic studies. The first is a long essay on "The Decline of Buddhism in India," by Dr. R. C. Mitra. The second is a translation from Chinese into Sanskrit of the *Dvādaśamukha Śāstra* ("Treatise in Twelve Chapters"), by the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, done by N. Aiyaswami Sastri.

Dr. Mitra's essay (164 pages) is a condensation in English of his more extended

work in French, completed originally at the Institute of Indian Civilization in Paris in 1947. It is a survey based essentially on known materials in Western languages which are widely scattered among authoritative books and learned articles in technical journals. The story begins with the testimony of Chinese pilgrims in the seventh century and follows in detail the evidences of continuous decline through later centuries in Kashmir, Sind, Northwest India, Bengal, Assam, Nepal, Orissa, and South India. The result is an instructive, even if melancholy, picture of the vast recession of the religion in the land of its birth. The inevitable question arises, Why? Dr. Mitra analyzes the various assigned causes of the decline. As credible he notes Brahmanical opposition, sectarian persecutions, corruptions within the Buddhist Order, lack of integrated organization among its numerous communities, ineffectual relationship between monks and laity, the Muslim conquest, etc. All were factors. Yet, on the whole, Dr. Mitra agrees with most authoritative scholars that Buddhism, arising as a reform out of the parent stock of Brahmanism, gradually withered away and died as Brahmanism learned its lesson and eventually absorbed its insights, meanwhile permeating its Order and laity with the practices of Hinduism. What was rejected, however, as "an outrage on the spiritual craving of man," was its primary fault—atheism. Dr. Mitra's conclusions are not unfamiliar, but his assembling of full and relevant evidence is welcome and informative.

Fortunately for Western readers and all who are unversed in Sanskrit, Mr. Aiyaswami Sastri's work is accompanied by a summary in English of the gist of the treatise he has translated from one Oriental language into another. In following the Chinese original he has used the commentary of Chi-Tsang. This furnishes material for numerous footnotes which are very interesting for all readers familiar with both Chinese and Sanskrit. The philosophical treatise itself, as represented in the English summary, is what will interest the majority of readers. It unfolds in Nāgārjuna's characteristic dialectical style. He examines and negates a whole series of concepts, such as causation, existence and non-existence, causal conditions, composite entities, things characterized and non-characterized, unity and diversity, suffering, origination, etc. The drive of the whole is to prove that "all composite and un-composite things are non-substantial and so also all living beings." The unexpressed underlying conviction is that absolute truth (realized by the Buddha) transcends all statement and conception. As a brief statement of Nāgārjuna's position the treatise is useful. One could wish, however, that the translator had furnished a brief introduction to show his place in the history of Buddhist thought.

CLARENCE H. HAMILTON

Recovery of Faith. By SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955. xvii, 205 pp. $3.00.

The jacket of this little book carries a subtitle that is in some respects a better clue to the contents than the title: "the way toward a religion of the spirit." One wonders whether the author himself would have used the definite article

that appears here, but he is actually more concerned with the solution of the problem confronting the spiritually hungry modern man than he is with describing general trends. The book is fourth in a series, "World Perspectives," whose purpose is "to offer new vistas in terms of world and human development" (p. ix). The editorial assumption is that Christianity has failed and social and spiritual ferments demand a new formulation. The editor gives a description of the "new" world view that is startlingly identical with the ancient world view of Hinduism (p. xv). One concludes this volume convinced that he has never left the broad general outlines of Vedanta. It offers an exceptionally clear presentation of this philosophy for Western readers.

The author finds the way to recovery of faith in the mystical experience. He seems to equate the "spiritual life" with the gnostic experience. He traces the movement in the major religions of the world, and finds it the common factor upon which may be built hope for an ultimate world view in religion. He considers it a self-validating experience.

Professor Radhakrishnan sees as problems to faith in our present society the conflict between religious dogmatism and the more empirical spirit of the truly scientific temper, unsettling effects from a wider acquaintance with the findings in the field of comparative religions, the impact of technology on the life of the spirit, the rejection of the metaphysical by the logical empiricist, and the failure of religion to solve the ills of social relations. He points out the substitutes for religion as (1) a relapse to the sub-human, (2) hedonism, (3) humanism, (4) nationalism, and (5) Communism. His discussion of Communism as a religion offers penetrating insights.

In writing of religion and social relations the writer appears at his weakest. One has the disturbing impression that he is not describing a scene but assembling documentation to a point. The picture is wholly black. But does disparity between profession and performance necessarily prove the inadequacy of any one religion? Is it not an index of the sharpness of the tensions in human relations, to the solution of which man *may* bring his religion, but just as often some other motivating factor? Where religion is a motivating factor in ethics, it always is in conflict with these other factors. One misses any mention of that phase of American Christianity known as the "Social Gospel," which, in spite of its spiritual anemia, has had lasting effects in Christian social action. Perhaps the writer has not always had his ear tuned in the direction from which one might hear.

At times disquieting liberty has been taken in rendering quotations from biblical sources. One notes, among others, the rendering of Micah 4:5 (p. 31) and Acts 11:17 (p. 193) which, if accurately given, would make Micah and Peter wholly unprofitable witnesses to the views they are called to support! This book can do great service in interpreting the Indian point of view to the Western world, but the author's use of sources, at times seriously out of context, and his rather sweeping generalizations will be disturbing to the serious student of religion. His explanation of India's interpretation of the secular state (pp. 202-3) merits careful attention.

ETHEL M. DENTZER

The Growth of the Pentateuch: a Literary, Sociological and Biographical Approach. By IMMANUEL LEWY. New York: Bookman Associates, 1955. 288 pp. $4.50.

The documentary theory of the composition of the Pentateuch associated with the name of Wellhausen and maintained in such standard textbooks as those by Pfeiffer, Bewer, Eissfeldt, and Lods has been under persistent attack on various grounds and from widely differing quarters. From a traditionalist point of view E. Kaufman has opposed it; the Scandinavian school, making use of the results of Near Eastern archeology, has found the Wellhausen theory lacking; and fundamentalists, such as O. T. Allis, have attacked it on dogmatic grounds. Now Immanuel Lewy, whose book, *The Birth of the Bible—A New Approach,* set forth a few years ago a new theory for the growth of the Pentateuch, has elaborated on his theory.

The basic point of difference between Lewy's theory and that of Wellhausen is that he sees the Pentateuch as a pre-exilic book, the bulk of which antedates the period of the writing prophets. He holds that the narratives from Adam to Moses as we have them in the Pentateuch were originally one basic document, the bulk of which comes from the pen of a "humane, enlightened, and balanced literary genius," the prophet and statesman Nathan. It is presumed that Nathan wrote for the purpose of instructing Solomon and other pupils who were under his tutelage. In the course of the next century this document became sacred, but was commented upon by Elisha in the north and the prince-regent Jehoiada in the south. Further extensive revisions took place during the reign of Hezekiah, and, during the reign of Josiah, the high priest Hilkiah compiled the Priestly Code and incorporated it into the Pentateuch. Finally Joshua, the post-exilic high priest, made the final annotations, giving us the Pentateuch essentially as we have it today.

The book is a monument to the patient ingenuity of Dr. Lewy, who displays a dramatic skill in presenting his theories. The references to other workers in the field of Pentateuchal criticism are few, but do occur when others have been led to the same conclusions on individual points or have presented a position which the author feels must be demolished in order to make room for his views. In the main he sticks to references in the biblical text for the undergirding of his own theory of composition. This new theory is so radically detached from the results of others who have grappled with the same problems that it is unlikely to find any widespread acceptance as a general solution. Professor R. H. Pfeiffer has generously contributed a page of introduction in which he pays tribute to the immense learning and the uncommon originality of the author.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Studies in the Book of Lamentations. By NORMAN K. GOTTWALD. Chicago: Alec R. Allenson, Inc., 1954. 122 pp. $1.25.

This work is No. 14 in a series of monographs known as *Studies in Biblical Theology,* of which the advisory editors are T. W. Manson and H. H. Rowley of Manchester, England, and F. V. Filson and G. E. Wright of Chicago. The book opens with a translation of the Book of Lamentations, after which follows the Introduction. The author believes that the first four chapters are the work of one poet, but he cannot be dogmatic about the last one. As regards the date, he thinks that all the poems stem from the exilic period between 586 and 538 B.C. In his consideration of the acrostic form of the first four chapters, Dr. Gottwald concludes that the poet had in mind a twofold purpose: this literary form corresponded to the completeness of grief, responsibility, and hope which he wished to communicate, and furthermore it was an aid to the memory. The literary type may be called a national lament; in a great calamity the poet sought to give expression to communal grief and suffering and the communal sense of sin, but at the same time he also hoped to awaken communal hope and trust. The author holds that this process came to a climax in the Deutero-Isaiah, particularly in Chapters 47 and 53.

In this study Gottwald works within the framework of the historical situation. The fourth chapter of the book bears the heading "The Theology of Doom." He emphasizes the determination and ability of Yahweh to act in history in fulfillment of his announced word. Doom is in accordance with the long proclaimed and inevitable requital of disobedience and rebellion. This prophetic interpretation of national tragedy was the greatest single spiritual achievement of the Exile. Despair was turned to faith, and disillusion to hope, and in this way history revealed the purposes of God. In contrast to Chapter 4, the next section bears the title "The Theology of Hope." According to the author, Lamentations offers a superb example of biblical prayer. The frequent confessions of sin indicate that Yahweh had been perfectly justified in his harsh treatment of Jerusalem; God was guided by a righteous motive and goal, because he had at heart the nation's welfare. The high watermark of the poet's understanding of God is found in one brief sentence (3:33): "For he does not afflict from his heart."

In this monograph the author has succeeded in bringing out the values of a book that has been too frequently ignored in biblical studies.

HENRY S. GEHMAN

Judaism: Post Biblical and Talmudic Period. Edited by SALO W. BARON and JOSEPH L. BLAU. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1954. xxvi, 245 pp. Paper, $1.75; cloth, $3.00.

This is a rare anthology indeed. Practically every aspect of the literature produced by the Jews throughout the Second Commonwealth all the way down to around 500 A.D. is represented, which can be said for none of the other an-

thologies in existence, of which there are a goodly number. Moreover, the selections were made with fine tact, so that the reader gets an intelligent idea of the rich and variegated creativity of the Jew of antiquity and the early Middle Ages. Apocrypha, apocalypse, historical writing, biblical exegesis, folklore, eschatological speculation, and prayer are taken care of. Even an example of sectarian discipline is included. Both the teacher of Jewish history and the teacher of Jewish literature need go no further for illustrative passages in their high school or college courses.

What the present reviewer cannot help but wonder is why no sampling of the dialectic in the Talmud is included, since it occupies the great bulk of that vast literature and represents the chief activity of the Jewish spirit for nigh on five hundred years of the period covered by the anthology and on to the present day. Is it because it would prove too impracticable to the average reader or even to the student of history or literature? But its very impracticableness might be of some value in rounding out the picture of the Jewish mind. Besides, the reviewer is inclined to believe that at least one or two passages might have been chosen and made perfectly clear to the reader. Certainly some of the juridical problems might have been indicated with their solutions, and the arguments set forth.

Apart from the consideration of sheer bulk, it is generally conceded that halakic material of the Talmud reflects the basic social and religious thinking of the Jew of that period, and determined his ethos for untold generations to come. Such matters as the relation of law to equity, the significance of the legal fiction, the authority of the court, and similar matters, are held to be, since Sir Henry Maine and other legal philosophers and historians, of vital importance in the understanding of any civilization. And all the more is it true of Jewish civilization. Perhaps in the subsequent volume which is promised this only lacuna in the anthology will be filled.

There is a good and swift relation of events in a sizable introduction, which should help the reader orient himself toward the literature sampled in this volume. More we cannot expect in a work of this nature. On the whole, the two compilers have laid us under a deep debt of gratitude for so excellent a vade mecum.

JOHN J. TEPFER

The Messianic Idea in Israel from Its Beginning to the Completion of the Mishnah. By JOSEPH KLAUSNER. Translated from the Third Hebrew Edition by W. F. STINESPRING. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. xv, 543 pp. $7.50.

Professor Stinespring, the translator of Klausner's *From Jesus to Paul,* has performed another valuable service in making available to non-Hebraists the comprehensive and fully documented study of Messianism which is, perhaps, the most important of the famous Israeli scholar's contributions to the history

of early Judaism and Christianity. As Klausner himself remarks in the preface to the second Hebrew edition of the work (1927), the volume appeared in three separate parts at intervals of several years. Part III, on "The Messianic Idea in the Period of the Tannaim," was first published in German as a doctoral dissertation at Heidelberg in 1902, and, as the author with engaging lack of self-conscious modesty reminds us in the "General Note" to this third part, it was immediately received with serious attention by Schuerer and other authorities in the field of intertestamental studies. Part I, on "The Messianic Idea in the Period of the Prophets," written in Hebrew, first appeared in the periodical *Ha-Shiloah* in the years 1907-1908 and as a separate volume in 1909. Part II, on "The Messianic Idea in the Books of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha," was first printed in Jerusalem in 1921. The present (third) edition contains a number of additions based on more recent scholarly literature, and also a very interesting and important newly composed article on the differences between the Jewish and Christian Messiah.

Klausner has the great merit of being familiar with both modern western scholarly method and material and traditional rabbinical sources. He also has a good deal of common sense as well as imagination, and these virtues, combined with great industry, have enabled him to produce what is probably the most comprehensive and best balanced study of Messianism in any language. There are times when a reader will be justifiably irritated by the author's self-assurance, and times when he will be amused by his naïveté. But after reading the book a fair-minded reader will have to admit that he has learned a great deal from it and will gladly excuse the author for having a number of ethnocentric prejudices, since these do not prevent him from being very fair on the whole to the views of Christian scholars. The reviewer, however, rather doubts that all Jewish or most Christian scholars will agree with the statement (p. 529) that "The Christian Messiah is in essence only a further development of the Jewish Messiah." Surely it belongs to the essence of the difference between the two that, as Klausner himself repeatedly makes clear, the Jewish Messiah was a human being and the Christian Messiah was a God-Man. But with the vast majority of Klausner's conclusions the reviewer sees no reason to disagree.

R. M.

The Doctrine of Election in Tannaitic Literature. By BENJAMIN W. HELFGOTT. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1954. ix, 209 pp. $3.50.

The late Hilaire Belloc, who shared with his equally gifted friend Gilbert Chesterton a singularly irrational aversion to Jews, once wrote an eight-syllable poem that fully expressed his feelings.

How odd
Of God
To choose
The Jews.

It is with an important aspect of this alleged oddity that Dr. Helfgott deals in his dissertation, the purpose of which is, in his own words, "to determine the effect of the Christian challenge on the Jewish concept of election in the early Tannaitic period and the reaction on the part of Rabbinic thinking toward that challenge."

The work is divided into eight chapters that survey the ancient sources in chronological order: I. Introduction; II. The Christian Challenge (Paul and sub-Apostolic writers); III. Destruction of the Temple (chiefly on Johanan ben Zakkai); IV. The Teachers of Jabneh (Gamaliel II, Eliezer ben Hyrkanos, Joshua ben Hananiah); V. The Bar Kocheba Revolt (Akiba and Ishmael); VI. Reconstruction at Usha (Meir, Simeon ben Yohai, Jose ben Halafta, Judah ben Ilai; VII. Judah ha-Nasi; VIII. Conclusion. These chapters are followed by a 44-page section of notes giving references to the sources and modern literature, an 8-page bibliography, and an index.

Among the chief conclusions reached by the author after a conscientious and intelligent examination of the sources are the following (pp. 130-41). Both universalist and particularist views are to be found among the Rabbinic authorities of the first two centuries A.D., but "those Tannaim whose 'universalistic' opinions are most firmly expressed are the same who most articulately stressed the particular loving relationship between God and Israel." Particularist tendencies, Dr. Helfgott finds, came primarily from the supporters of the School of Shammai, who were more conservative in social-economic matters than the School of Hillel. Of the former the author says, "However, while the opinions of the particularist school regarding the election of Israel are tainted with patriotic fervor and often betray a militaristic undertone, the views of the universalist teachers stress religious motivation and noble purposes."

Significant, too, is his final conclusion that "the Rabbinic statements with regard to the doctrine of election emanating from the teachers of the Post-Hadrianic period lack the bitterness and polemical sharpness of hostile disputants as reflected in the utterances of the earlier Tannaim . . . Christianity was no longer considered a particularly Jewish problem, as its internal threat to Judaism during the Tannaitic period had been fully averted."

With the author's main conclusions those readers who examine his sources and interpretations carefully are likely to agree. There may be some who think that the biographical and background material, which is probably familiar to most students, takes up a disproportionate amount of space, but this disproportion may be justified on the ground that it helps explain the particular doctrines of election that appear at different times and in different schools.

Some minor imperfections might be briefly mentioned, such as questionable grammar ("sunk" for "sank" twice), inaccurate transcription *(bassar* for *basar)* or translation *(zekut* rendered as "blessing" instead of "merit"), and the omission of some relevant modern books, for example Marcel Simon's *Verus Israel.* But the work is very good on the whole and ought to be consulted by all serious students of Early Judaism for the new insights which it provides.

R. M.

The People and The Book. An annotated list of illuminated manuscripts, rare books, authentic documents and related materials. Compiled by JOSHUA BLOCH. New York: The New York Public Library, 1954. 134 pp. $2.00.

Quite appropriately this exhibition catalogue of illuminated manuscripts and rare books is itself a beautiful specimen of printing. The compiler gives due credit to all who helped in preparing the exhibition. This reviewer would express appreciation also to the printer of this volume, Maurice Jacobs of Philadelphia. The paper, the variety of large type, the clear reproduction of the manuscripts and facsimiles, even the binding are pleasing to the eye and pleasant to the hand. One might expect a long annotated list of manuscripts and books to be dull reading for all but specialists. This catalogue is different. Throughout the volume are items of literary and human interest that are fascinating and enlightening to the general reader. This too is fitting, inasmuch as the exhibit of which this is the catalogue was held not in a private museum or seminary library, but in the New York Public Library. It was arranged in commemoration of the three hundredth anniversary of the settlement of Jews in North America. It was designed to illustrate the literary products of Jews throughout their history.

The range of subjects is very wide, including the texts of Jewish classical literature such as the Hebrew Scriptures, the Talmud, the Zohar, and writings of Rashi and Maimonides, as well as liturgical works and examples of more recent writers such as Manasseh ben Israel and Moses Mendelssohn, Isaac Leeser, Isaac M. Wise, and Emma Lazarus. In addition, among a number of "Firsts" in Printed Texts are: the Festival Prayerbook (1485), the entire text of the Hebrew Scriptures (1488), American Jewish Prayerbook (1701), Hebrew Bible in America (1814). The rare manuscripts listed include "The oldest dated manuscript in book form of Hebrew Scriptures bearing the year 916 as the date of completion," a page from Maimonides' "Guide for the Perplexed" in his own handwriting, and the oldest manuscript of the complete text of the Babylonian Talmud (1343).

Among the items of special interest to Americans is the only known copy of the printed letter of Columbus written to Luis de Santangel in 1493 announcing the discovery of the "island of the Indies." Santangel, chancellor of the royal Spanish household, was the Marrano Jew who gave the encouragement and funds to Columbus which helped him to make his historic expedition. Other Americana include Emma Lazarus' handwritten copy of her sonnet, "The New Colossus," the text of which is affixed to the Statue of Liberty, and a letter written by Benjamin Franklin in which he expresses the hope to see "our country establish'd in Freedom, when it will soon become great & glorious, by being the Asylum of all the Oppress'd in Europe. . . ."

The listing of some of the manuscripts and books is made informative by introductory explanations, as for example, with Monasseh ben Israel and the Talmud. Striking details of the discovery of some of the exhibits are provided, but they are occasionally made difficult for the laymen by the use, without

clarification, of such technical bibliographical terms as incunabula, colophon, and ektachrome. The headings and use of larger and smaller type are not consistent. On page 108 "The Marranos" is a heading in large type, but only the first of the next three items before another large type heading relates to Marranos. Some of the headings are complete sentences as on page 97; most of the others are simply phrases. For most of the items exhibited the owner is indicated, but in items 89 and 91 there is no such information given.

In the Introduction there is the conventional and oft-repeated emphasis upon the important role of the Jew in the development of American ideals and institutions, including the much belabored stress on the part Jews have taken in the armed forces. The question may be raised as to whether conformity and military service are the finest expression of Jewish ideals. It might have been interesting and significant to have mentioned the small group of loyal Jews who labored to eliminate war and who, as conscientious objectors, bore witness to the Jewish passion for peace.

ISIDOR B. HOFFMAN

Advocates of Reform. Edited by MATTHEW SPINKA. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953. 399 pp. $5.00.

A fine addition to The Library of Christian Classics is *Advocates of Reform,* which contains a wisely selected group of writings critical of ecclesiastical institutions and doctrines in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Professor Matthew Spinka of Hartford Theological Seminary, editor, has provided succinct introductions to each part of the volume, and has himself translated for the first time from Czech to English Hus's popular treatise *On Simony.* Historical notes throughout the text give context to Hus's polemic, which in itself is a concrete, vigorous, colorful, and at times amusing index to devices for clerical and lay connivance in worldly gain under presumably heavenly auspices. The term "simony" has probably never been more broadly interpreted than by Hus. The editor's colleague at Hartford, Ford Battles, presents two works of Wyclif not previously rendered into English, *On the Pastoral Office,* and an appeal based on Scripture and tradition against the doctrine of transubstantiation, *On the Eucharist.* In addition to these two, who are often cited as precursors of the Reformation, the volume contains conciliarist writings from Henry of Langenstein, Gerson, Dietrich of Niem, and John Major, translated by James Cameron. These selections make available at first hand an area of reform otherwise generally inaccessible for American students. Professor Battles contributes also a translation of Erasmus' serious and direct *Enchiridion,* a "compendious guide for living." Here the great moralist unites biblical, patristic, and classical erudition to produce his own version of the perennial spiritual-ethical handbook, "wrestler's holds" for overcoming the flesh. There are a few better places than this handbook to look for the contrast in spirit between this "advocate of reform" and the reformer Luther. To illustrate: for Erasmus, pride lurks "when all else has been subjugated. . . . But [quoting Virgil] 'per-

sistent labor conquers all things' " (p. 317). This is the precise opposite of Luther on pride. A fair amount of the exhortation, however, offers critique of the familiar churchly acts of piety, and therefore this selection, too, comports well with the editor's general purpose to show the "continuity and interdependence of the entire reform movement from the breakdown of scholasticism to the Reformation of the sixteenth century." All the selections are abridged somewhat to meet the requirements of the series, all of them read well, and all are equipped with ample and appropriate notes.

EDWARD A. DOWEY, JR.

The Confessions of Jacob Boehme. Compiled and edited by W. SCOTT PALMER. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954. 188 pp. $2.25.

This little book, another of Harper's series of devotional works in a delightful pocket format, is a re-issue of an anthology of autobiographical passages scattered throughout Boehme's writings. In her Introduction to the English edition, the late Evelyn Underhill says of Boehme that he "was possessed by a spirit which, whether we choose to regard it as an external power or a phase of his own complex nature, was dissociated from the control of his will, and 'came and went as a sudden shower.' It poured itself forth in streams of strange and turbid eloquence, unchecked by the critical action of the intellect" (p. 17). And Boehme himself describes his mediumistic, or automatic writing as follows: "The Penman's hand, by reason he was not accustomed to it, did often shake; and though I could have wrote in a more accurate, fair, and plain manner, yet the reason I did not was this, that the burning fire often forced forward with speed, and the hand and pen must hasten directly after it. . . ." (p. 39). Passages such as this make the book especially interesting to students of psychology who view such phenomena as manifestations of the "collective unconscious" which are common to mystics the world over. The work is also of great interest for the student of Renaissance occultism—alchemy, astrology, etc.—from which Boehme derived so much of his symbolism.

M. B.

The Birth of Modern Education: The Contribution of the Dissenting Academies 1660-1800. By J. W. ASHLEY SMITH. London: Independent Press, 1954. xii, 329 pp. $4.00.

Among the restrictions imposed upon Puritans by the Clarendon Code (1661-1665) was their exclusion from the ancient universities. Committed as they were to the importance of learning, the Puritans managed to circumvent the intentions of this unfortunate legislation to their own advantage and to the benefit of modern education. With some qualification, this is what Mr. Ashley Smith attempts to demonstrate. The Dissenting Academies were one, perhaps the most permanently significant, of the responses of Puritanism to the intended restraints of the restored Crown and the Established Church.

Mr. Smith's method of organizing his examination of the academies is to be distinguished from the efforts of previous partisans or critics who have tried to describe and assess them. The older historians superimposed a system of order which the academies never possessed. More recent historians of education, e.g., H. MacLachlan, in *English Education under the Test Acts,* employed an inadequate typology based on the question of whether or not the academies had other than ministerial students enrolled. Mr. Smith suggests that the academies are to be understood in terms of the tutors who composed the various faculties and of the educational influences to which they had been subject. Thus, in a sense, the analysis of the academies constitutes an intellectual genealogy.

The tutors are discussed under three main classifications: (1) the Cambridge and Oxford trained men who sought, with modifications, to transmit this heritage; (2) those who, while not themselves trained at an ancient English university, tended to perpetuate this general tradition with some innovations; (3) those who sought an ideal curriculum without particular reference to traditional ideas. Mr. Smith discusses the important men and academies and their interrelationships in the major portions of his work. He also identifies the educational influences of the various theological and ecclesiastical traditions.

Carefully avoiding the temptation to partisan assessment, Smith suggests in conclusion the areas within which possible contributions were made by the academies to modern university life, especially in the area of curricular innovations. Especially significant are his discussions of the employment in the Dissenting Academy of the method of the Natural Sciences. Several important appendices, which indicate literature of the day, etc., and a comprehensive bibliography are attached to the book. The incompleteness of pertinent publishing data in both bibliographical and footnote citation is an unfortunate blemish upon an otherwise sane and thorough study.

David J. Maitland

Religious Liberalism in Eighteenth Century England. By Roland N. Stromberg. London, Oxford University Press, 1954. xi, 192 pp. 21s.

Dr. Stromberg has made a careful study of the primary literature of Christianity and Deism in England in the eighteenth century. The result of his work is to restore proper perspective to our judgment of Deism and its influence. As the germ of a critical movement, pruning the excessive claims of revealed religion, Deism was a valuable enterprise, but the Deists did not carry through its critical function for lack of adequate tools. On grounds of reason alone, Christian supernaturalism had as strong a case as Deism; and since, by and large, its defenders were more able than the Deist attackers, Christianity may be said to have emerged victorious from the eighteenth century debates. What a Pyrrhic victory this was became clear only in the nineteenth century and is therefore no part of Stromberg's concern.

Besides the care and exhaustiveness of this review, revealing the controversy

of the century as more important than it was considered by romantic thinkers (though, *pace* Dr. Stromberg, not more interesting), the chief value of this book seems to me to be its exposition of the Christian counter-argument to Deism. In the process of replying to Deism, Stromberg's analysis shows, Christian thought became arid in victory, because the battle was fought on a field and with weapons chosen by the enemy. As a "reasonable religion," Christianity is even more pathetic than Deism. The glory of Christianity is its unreasonableness; this had to be recognized in the eighteenth century (by the Pietists, and by Wesley), as it had been recognized in earlier times by the Fathers of the Church, and as it is once again being recognized today by neo-Orthodoxy. It is not that rational Christianity is a contradiction in terms, but that the person who is rational has no need of Christanity, just as the person who is Christian has no need of rationality.

J. L. B.

Evangelical Nonconformists and Higher Criticism in the 19th Century. By Willis B. Glover, Jr. London: Independent Press, Ltd., 1954. 296 pp., 17*s* 6*d*.

Dr. Glover is one of those happy discoveries in the field of higher learning, a layman who is theologically literate, and not only literate, but theologically perceptive. A professor in the History Department at Southern Methodist University, he has produced a work of historical scholarship and theological insight which should be a standard work on the period for many years to come.

Concentrating his attention chiefly on the period from about 1880-1900, Dr. Glover describes in detail the way in which the impact of higher criticism gradually won its way to acceptance among nonconformist churchmen in England, and gives the reader a ringside seat at the pitched battles which resulted before the victory was assured. He has gone through the books and periodical literature exhaustively (on a guess, the book was originally a doctoral thesis), and in spite of all the detail, the main tendencies of the period stand out clearly. If there is a single theme which runs through the book, it is this: The peaceful introduction of higher criticism into England was conditional upon its compatibility with evangelical theology; and it was about 1880 that this condition was met (p. 110, cf. *inter alia* pp. 121, 174-75, 283 for repetitions of this contention). The author proceeds to document this thesis in almost every chapter, showing that when higher criticism was combined with "evangelical faith" it was accepted, but that when its results were presented in such a way as to appear gleefully destructive of faith, it met stonewall opposition.

This fact suggests something else about the period which the author also stresses, the lack of any very solid theological thinking. The conservative thinkers of the time had no real theology with which to buttress their position in controversy, and the "liberals" were even more bereft of theological perception. It was not until the 1890's that a significant force of nonconformist biblical scholarship began to be evident, and not until almost the turn of the

century that a really capable nonconformist theologian, P. T. Forsyth, appeared on the scene as one who could both espouse higher criticism and reconstruct a strong theology (Chs. XI and XII). The author also, in the reviewer's opinion, makes good another theme running through the volume, namely the contention that the "inerrancy of the Bible" was undermined by the spirit of the age *before* the impact of higher criticism had become strong. This contention is documented in particular detail in Chapter III.

The book thus represents a picture drawn with meticulous documentation, of religious life on England during the latter third of the nineteenth century, centered around the main theological controversy of that period, the interpretation of the Bible. Such exceptions as a reviewer might want to take to Dr. Glover's volume are on the whole negligible in the light of the indebtedness one feels to him. There are occasions when material is used twice without much justification (cf. the material about Elmslie on pp. 144 and 243-44, the repetition of the assessment of Cheyne on pp. 113 and 206, and of Horton, pp. 183 and 244). There are a number of gratuitous slams at Dr. Fairbairn (pp. 111, 140, 154 and 271) which do not seem fully justified, though the rough treatment accorded Alfred Cave seems to be warranted by the facts of the case. And an impassioned plea must be directed at the publishers to see that no other authors of theirs are ever subjected to the indignity of having footnotes published in such small type as to be scarcely distinguishable to the naked eye.

ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN

Russian Orthodox Bishops in the Soviet Union, 1941-1953. By WASSILIJ ALEXEEV. (Materials for the History of the Russian Orthodox Church in the U.S.S.R. Mimeographed Series, No. 61.) New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954. 163 pp. $1.75.

The Foreign Policy of the Moscow Patriarchate, 1939-1953. By WASSILIJ ALEXEEV. (Materials for the History of the Russian Orthodox Church in the U.S.S.R. Mimeographed Series, No. 70.) New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1955. 238 pp. $2.50.

These two valuable and scholarly works which supplement each other are largely based upon the material found in the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate,* the official organ of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. The first gives interesting data on the number and personalities of the Russian bishops since the establishment of the religious NEP, as the author calls the apparent reconciliation of the Orthodox Church and the Soviet government in 1943. He shows how, in the last years, there has been a steady decline in the number of bishops in active service, and he gives all that can be verified about the Church of the Catacombs, which has refused to recognize the Moscow Patriarchs. His information is on the whole unbiased and is largely free from political bitterness against the Roman Catholic Church.

The second book, quoting still more extensively from the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate,* touches on almost all the aspects of the Church activity abroad, in the Near East and the satellite states, the reunion with Moscow of the former autocephalous Orthodox churches of the countries now behind the iron curtain, the role of the Church in the Soviet peace offensive, and its probable relations to the ecumenical movement. It is very probable that his picture of the relations between the Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church in the United States is the weakest part of the book. He realizes that the situation in the United States is different from that even in France or Germany, since the bulk of the members are now American citizens who are desirous of forming an American Orthodox Church. His own sympathies are with the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, the so-called Karlovtsy group, and he has a tendency to accept their position as to the canonical rights of the Russian Church in America rather than that of the great body of the members headed by Metropolitan Theophilus and now Leonty. As a result, he cites very few documents from the supporters of Theophilus, and the reader might gain the impression that this latter group was relatively unimportant. It has been a hard task to strike a happy medium between the different elements in the Church, and he makes only a few passing references to the Carpatho-Russian parishes and avoids any discussion of the opposition between the supporters of the Metropolitan Theophilus and the newly arrived representatives of the Synod. Yet this is really a slight criticism in a work that is so full of valuable material.

The two volumes are perhaps our first careful study of the situation of the Orthodox Church in the USSR and of the methods by which it is carrying out the policies of the Kremlin. They deserve the careful attention of all interested in the problems of Orthodoxy and of the relations of the Patriarch of Moscow to the other Orthodox Churches.

C. A. M.

A Democratic Manifesto: The Impact of Dynamic Christianity Upon Public Life and Government. By SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1954. viii, 168 pp. $2.75.

This book is a reminder that the struggle against Communism is not merely military, economic, and political: it is basically ideological. In this warfare the Communists have the advantage over the free world in clarity and persuasiveness of argument. Hence the urgent need for an articulate and well-grounded democratic faith. These lectures make an excellent contribution to that end.

Professor Stumpf discusses, first, three fundamentals of democracy—respect for the individual person, the rule of law, and moral responsibility. Second, he shows that Communism, by contrast, denies the worth of persons, substitutes the rule of men for the rule of law, and repudiates morality. Third, he dis-

cusses tendencies in Western thought—such as materialism, ethical relativism, and reductive naturalism—which are in implicit accord with the Communist position and thus subvert the democratic faith. Fourth, he points out the roots from which democracy has sprung: These include Athenian democracy, Stoicism, Enlightenment rationalism, and the modern scientific revolution, but above all the Judaeo-Christian tradition, with its profound view of man as made in the image of God yet prone to sin, its teaching of the moral law, and its ethic of universal love. Specifically, he says that it was through the left-wing-Puritan sects that the main democratic thrust came. To climax his argument Professor Stumpf shows that the several goals of society—order, freedom, and security—cannot be rightly achieved by the destructive motives of fear, self-interest, and desire, but that the motive of man in democracy should be Christian love, or compassion.

To this reviewer the book prompts the following questions: (1) Does the author sufficiently take account of the fact that Communism itself is deeply indebted at many points to the Judaeo-Christian tradition? (2) Since Christian societies have more often than not been undemocratic, may it not be argued that the ideals of liberal secular democracy provide a standard and a source for acceptable Christianity, rather than the reverse? (3) Is not the scientific attitude in many respects a more unambiguous and promising resource for democratic faith than Christianity? (4) Does not the development of a religious grounding for democracy depend upon the reconstituting of religious faith within the framework of modern thought, rather than simply upon the affirmation of the Western religious tradition?

PHILIP H. PHENIX

The American College Chaplaincy. By SEYMOUR A. SMITH. New York: Association Press, 1954. x, 280 pp. $3.75.

In his preface the author, presently Assistant Professor of Religion in Higher Education at Yale University Divinity School, tells us that "this study was undertaken originally to obtain a simple answer to a very simple question: Who are the persons serving as college chaplains and where are they located?" The result is a comprehensive survey of the college chaplaincy in independent and church-related (Protestant) colleges and universities. Introductory chapters deal with the scope and method of the study and the growth of the chaplaincy, which, Mr. Smith reminds us, is a relatively recent and rapidly growing feature of American college life. The central portion of the study is devoted to a study of the role of the college chaplain as preacher, teacher, director of campus religious activities, and counselor. (The average chaplain reports 56.3 hours per week on the job.) Subsequent chapters deal with the training and experience of chaplains, problems most frequently encountered, and a final chapter in which the author shares his conclusions as to the most probable future development of the chaplaincy.

Mr. Smith has given us a comprehensive and scholarly study which college chaplains, administrative staff, and students will find eminently readable and informative.

ROBERT J. PAGE

A Treasury of the Kingdom. An Anthology, compiled by C. A. BLACKBURN, and others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. x, 280 pp. $3.50.

This anthology seeks "to bring home the eternal nature of the Christian message, which is not confined to the Bible alone, but is expressed in the lives and writings of countless Servants of the Kingdom" (compiler's preface). The result is a convenient and, on the whole, distinguished collection of religious writings. The Servants of the Kingdom represent a wide range of interests—literature, the natural sciences, philosophy, the arts, sociology, and history. There is a general selection from recent authors which frequently guides the reader to seek out an author he might otherwise overlook. Epictetus, Plato, Gandhi, and Tagore, as well as St. Augustine, St. Francis, and Pascal contribute to the Treasury and indicate Miss Blackburn's catholicity of taste. Brief and unobtrusive explanatory notes make the book more useful as a collection of readings for public gatherings. No anthology pleases the discriminating reader completely, except the one he is always hoping to make for himself. Miss Blackburn's treasury will be useful and rewarding in the meantime.

ROBERT J. PAGE

Signs and Symbols in Christian Art. By GEORGE FERGUSON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. xiv, 346 pp. 212 plates. 250 line drawings. $10.00.

This truly magnificent and valuable book, by a priest of the Protestant Episcopal Church, combines a vast amount of technical knowledge of symbolism with deep spiritual understanding of its importance for religion. To quote from his Introduction: "Because the experiences of the soul with life's deepest realities are made known through them (symbols), they are a truly universal language. These signs and symbols are the language of the soul." The author has limited himself to the use of Christian symbols in Renaissance art, the examples being drawn from the collections of the Samuel H. Kress Foundation.

The comprehensive character of the work may best be illustrated by a list of the titles of the fourteen sections: Animals, Birds, and Insects; Flowers, Trees, and Plants; Earth and Sky: The Human Body; The Old Testament; St. John the Baptist; The Virgin Mary; Jesus Christ; The Trinity, Madonna, and Angels; The Saints; Radiances, Letters, Colors, and Numbers; Religious Dress; Religious Objects; Artifacts. Many of these subjects are illustrated by marginal line drawings which should prove most useful to the student of iconography.

The selection of the illustrations entirely from American collections, mainly from the National Gallery of Art, in Washington, serves a double purpose.

First, it acquaints the reader with the unbelievable riches of our own collections, and, second, it presents us with a great number of little known works, thus avoiding the sameness and somewhat hackneyed effect of many such compilations. The excellent color reproductions flood the book with the richness and brilliance of the Renaissance, its grandeur and its gaiety. The text is notable for its vast erudition and its simplicity of style, which, combined with most beautiful typography, make it a delight to mind and eye. The bibliography is useful, though one misses a few familar and almost indispensable titles, such as Voragine's *Golden Legend,* G. M. Benson's *The Cross: Its History and Symbolism,* Helen Waddell's *Beasts and Saints,* and, above all, the great works of Émile Mâle.

M. B.

Samothrace. By Karl Lehmann. New York: New York University Press, 1955. 101 pp. 52 illustrations and plan of sanctuary. $2.50.

This "Guide to the Excavations and the Museum" of Samothrace is written for the layman and the student, as well as to fill the gap until the complete report on the excavations is available. The text consists of the following chapters: I. The Island and Its History; II. The Religion of the Great Gods; III. The Excavations; IV. The Museum, and a Selective Bibliography. The chapter of greatest interest to the student of religion is, of course, No. II. The "mysteries" of Samothrace were second in importance only to those of Eleusis, and were considerably less exclusive, being open to people of all nations, slave and free alike. They centered on the worship of a group of divinities, of which the major figure was a Great Mother of pre-Greek origin, called Axieros. Her associate deities included an ithyphallic fertility god called Kadmilos, two youthful demons called Kabeiroi, and an underworld god and his consort. Very little is known about the great annual festival, or the initiation rites, since the "essential content of legend, creed, and experience" still remains the secret of the long dead initiates.

Ancient Near Eastern Texts. Edited By James B. Pritchard. New Material from the Second, Revised Edition. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. Pp. 499-516. $1.00.

This new material, thoughtfully made available to purchasers of the first edition of the Texts, consists of the following sections: Canaanite and Aramaic Inscriptions, translated by Franz Rosenthal; South Arabian Inscriptions, translated by A. Jamme; and Akkadian Myths and Epics, New Texts, translated by E. A. Speiser.

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